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A Publication Dedicated to Diversity in the Law

“Justice O’Connor has often been cited as saying that a wise old man and wise old woman will
reach the same conclusion in deciding cases.  I am not so sure Justice O’Connor is the author of that
line . . . . I am also not so sure that I agree with the statement. . . . I would hope that a wise Latina
woman with the richness of her experiences would more often than not reach a better conclusion
than a white male who hasn’t lived that life.”
- Associate Justice Sonia Maria Sotomayor of the Supreme Court of the United States
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LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD
This year we have finally seen the appointment of a
female Latina justice to the Supreme Court- Sonia Sotamayor.
Her appointment was long overdue, but should be considered as
a step forward in the push for diversity and equality in our judicial system. As Senator Leahy stated in Justice Sotamayor’s confirmation hearing, “there’s not one law for one race or another,
there’s not one law for one color or another, there’s not one law
for rich and a different one for poor. There’s only one law.” It
is our hope that Justice Sotomayor’s appointment will move us
closer to this ideal.

We are also proud to announce that our readership base
continues to expand; subscribers will now be able to access The
Modern American through V.lex, LexisNexis, HeinOnline, and
the Westlaw database. In the spirit of environmentalism, we
are pleased to continue to offer a green publication. The next
year promises to be an exciting one for our publication. Our
Fifth Annual Symposium will bring together renowned scholars
explore how the legal community can better serve marginalized
communities. We will also be welcoming a new Executive Board
for 2010.

There is still much progress to be made. The makeup
of the Court is still predominantly white men particularly. The
lengths we need to go can be seen in the Court’s decision in Ricci
v. DeStefano, where the Court upheld a racist hiring practice that
Justice Sotamayor had ruled against as a judge on the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals. In this issue, we are excited to showcase an article by Professor Girardeau A. Spann examining the
Supreme Court’s rationale in deciding Ricci and the continued
and far-reaching implications of the decision.

As the old editorial board says goodbye, we want to
thank our advisors and staff for all of their help and support
throughout our tenure. It has been a pleasure working with an
such amazing group of people and we are incredibly excited to
see where the new leadership takes The Modern American. Our
school is one of the most diverse in the nation and with this in
mind, we believe that The Modern American should become one
of the most important diversity publication in the United States.
It is with this mentality that we leave the publication to the new
leadership.

This fall, The Modern American, in conjunction with
the Women’s Bar Association, hosted our second annual event,
Preserving the Past, Celebrating the Future: A Continued Commemoration of Our Shared History, on October 29, 2009–pictures of the event can be found throughout this issue. This year’s
program focused on the relationship between women and the law,
specifically, the intersection between immigration and violence
against women. This was a timely issue, 2009 marking the 15th
Anniversary of the Violence Against Women Act. To highlight
that relationship, this issue features the winning essay of the
joint WBA-TMA writing competition, authored by our incoming
Editor-in-Chief, Richael Faithful.

In closing, we hope our issue inspires you to continue
fostering the discourse on diversity and embracing everyday
change in your community.
Sincerely yours,
The Executive Board
The Modern American
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ORPHAN TRAIN MYTHS AND LEGAL REALITY
By
Rebecca S. Trammell*

Introduction
Beginning in the 19th century, as many as 200,000 children across New York City’s overcrowded boroughs, often from
immigrant homes, were removed from their families and relocated to settlements in the American West. Contemporary views
have credited this massive relocation as the impetus for American adoption laws, improved foster care practices, child labor law
reform and the child welfare movement. To the contrary, records
show this forced resettlement of primarily immigrant children
slowed and opposed many child welfare reforms.
Laws and social views regarding the care and treatment of dependent children have evolved, grown and changed
in tandem with the development of America as a whole. American practices and treatment of children have shifted from overt
oppression to eliminating oppressive laws in order to define and
implement successful child welfare policies and practices. This
legal and social evolution has been and continues to be accomplished through various laws, policies and programmatic changes
involving adoption, child labor and child welfare programs
directed at public and private institutions that care for and interact with dependent children.
Part one of this article explores the orphan train movement, emphasizing the historical and legal context of the care of
dependent children in the United States beginning in the colonial
era and extending through the 19th century. Part two of this article
assesses the legal impact of the unique century-specific orphan
train movement on child-related laws and legal institutions in the
United States. This examination challenges the accepted view
that orphan trains contributed to child welfare and posits that, to
the contrary, orphan trains were a detriment to the children the
movement sought to protect. The forced relocation of 200,000
children, primarily from vulnerable immigrant families, worked
against proper recognition of the rights of a child by substituting
a “quick fix” for increased immigration and broader economic
troubles. This article concludes with recommendations for 21st
century child welfare practices and policies that, but for the
orphan train movement, might have developed naturally in the
United States.

Part I–The Orphan Train Movement
Charles Loring Brace has been credited with initiating
the orphan train movement in the United States through his Children’s Aid Society of New York.1 Brace’s plan to move destitute
and homeless children from the streets of New York to Western
farms has been characterized as an unusual and inventive child
care solution.2 This is not, however, an accurate characterization.
Placing large numbers of children into other homes was a common European practice.3 This English process of placing children in homes as apprentices or indentured servants, the so called
“putting out” or “placing out” of children, was later adopted in
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the American colonies.4 Records indicate that as early as 1627,
Virginia-bound English ships carried between 1400 and1500
children across the Atlantic and into child labor apprenticeship
in the colonies.5
In England as well as the American colonies, children
had no legal say in whether they were placed out. This authority
rested with their parents or even local authorities, such as overseers of the poor.6 If a parent died and the local authorities determined the surviving parent could not support the child, that child
would be placed as an indentured servant or as an apprentice with
a family who, in return for service, would provide food, clothing
and training for the child. Local authorities made their determinations in conformity with pre-existing perceptions of gender
and so were more likely to remove a child from the care of a
surviving mother than from a surviving father. Colonial governments and predecessor states enacted laws to control this process
and to regulate agreements involving indentured servitude and
apprenticeships.7
As the population in the United States increased, almshouses, or charitable facilities that provided care for the destitute
were established to house both indigent adults and children.8 But
this was not a preferred system as it imposed a financial burden
on the jurisdiction that created the facility. During colonial times,
the town level of government was generally responsible for the
care of indigents in their jurisdiction, though the responsibility
of indigent care sometimes shifted to the county.9 State governments began assuming support of public charitable institutions
in the 19th century.10 Even with state support, local governments
were expected to financially contribute to care efforts.11During
this period, an early form of paid foster care also existed for
infants who were placed with families.12 Beginning as early as
1866, orphanages were established to remove children from
almshouses and to care for them separately from adults. These
publicly funded orphanages attempted to indenture or apprentice
older children and place younger children in paid foster care.13
Private charities were also established to care for
orphans and destitute children. The New York Orphan Asylum
Society (“NY Society”) was founded in 1806 as the first private
U.S. children’s charity.14 The NY Society required that children
be placed out as soon as they received a basic education.15 Similar institutions were created in Baltimore, Maryland and Boston,
Massachusetts.16 In total, at least 62 private charities were created
between 1800 and 1850,17 most of which strove to place children
in their care into apprenticeships or indentured servitude.18
Informal adoptions were also common where, for example, a relative would take in an orphaned child. Sometimes these
adoptions were made official through private legislation or court
proceedings.19 The first modern adoption statute was passed by
Massachusetts in 1851.20 Even with statutory authority, some
courts were reluctant to apply laws that conferred a right of
inheritance on children adopted under these state statutes.21
Beginning in the mid-19th century, these public and
private institutions faced three major obstacles in their work to
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provide for the children in their care. First, jobs were scarce due out in this manner.36 Organizations in Missouri, Iowa, Texas and
to an economic recession. Second, jobs in labor-intensive cot- Nebraska also placed children across their states and in neightage industries were cut as development in industrialization led boring states. 37 Expansion of railway systems into the American
to mass production. 22 Third, the influx of immigrant families in frontier had a two-fold effect: children were placed on trains in
urban centers like Boston and New York expanded an already transit to faraway cities while railroad companies made efforts
large labor pool while the need for apprenticeships diminished to draw immigrants to the United States. For example, railroads
with so many immigrant adult laborers vying for work. 23 The advertised the United States throughout Europe as “the land of
combined effect of these conditions left many children from opportunity” and the “land of a second chance.”38 These same
immigrant and some non-immigrant families destitute, neglected railroad companies offered reduced or free fares to charities seekor orphaned. The needs of these children strained local public ing to transport children westward. Orphan train trips were also
resources. George W. Matsell, New York City’s first Chief of sponsored and financed by charitable contributions and wealthy
Police, provides a description of these conditions in his 1849 philanthropists such as Mrs. John Jacob Astor III who, by 1884,
semi-annual report on “the problem of vagrant and delinquent had sent 1,113 children west on the trains.39 Implicitly, various
children”. He describes “the constantly increasing number of levels of government sponsored these trips as well, the governvagrants, idle and vicious children . . . who infest our public thor- ment underwriting railroad companies using public funds.40
oughfares, hotels, docks, &c. [sic.].” He saw these children as
Reports provide various estimates of the number of chil“destined to a life of misery, shame and crime, and ultimately to dren riding these trains. One conservative report estimated that
a felon’s doom.”24 Matsell points out that “a large proportion of 106,246 children were placed.41 The most consistent estimates
these juvenile vagrants are in the daily practice of pilfering wher- suggest that between 150,000 to 200,000 children were placed
ever opportunity offers, and begging when they cannot steal.”25
in 48 states, the District of Columbia and Indian Territory locaThere are no reliable records as to the exact number of tions. 42 Various factors give rise to the differences in estimation:
the affected children. The 1854 First Annual Report of the Chil- institutional records were not always well maintained; some children’s Aid Society, drawing on numbers from Matsell’s report, dren were counted multiple times; and records have been lost or
identifies 10,000 “vagrant children” in New York City. 26 Other destroyed.43
contemporary accounts indicate as many
For purposes of placing the chilas 30,000 primarily immigrant children
dren, the charities could be granted guardroamed the streets in New York and Boston In many cases, destitute parents ianship in a variety of ways. In many
in the mid-19th century.27
destitute parents would temporarily
would temporarily surrender cases,
Publicly funded programs failed
surrender child care responsibilities to a
to adequately address these conditions. As child care responsibilities to charity until the parents could sufficiently
a result, over 100 private charities were
improve their financial circumstances to
a charity until the parents
organized from the 1850’s to the 1860’s to
reassume child care responsibilities. A
could sufficiently improve
meet child care needs.28 Following pracdocument transferring guardianship to the
tices established by previous organizations, their financial circumstances charity would be signed by at least one parmost of these charities provided assistance
ent, typically transferring guardianship for
to reassume child care
a specified number of years. Guardianship
to children through indentured servitude,
responsibilities.
would vest in the charity only upon expigenerally indenturing boys by the age of
ration of the term when the child would
12 and girls by the age of 14.29 Given the
depressed economic conditions and lack of employment opportu- be considered abandoned due to the parent’s failure to claim the
nities in the East, charities began to place and indenture affected child.44 A charity could also be given guardianship over a child
children in rural areas where child labor was needed and wel- by order of a magistrate, an officer of the court or an overseer of
comed.30 This grew into the orphan train movement.
the poor. This was the general practice when police or public offiIn 1849, the board of governors of the New York Alms- cials found a vagrant or abandoned child on the streets.45 A pubhouse favored placing children in families and sought legisla- lic institution could also transfer guardianship to a private charity
tion allowing children to be indentured outside the State of New if the public charity was overcrowded or if the private charity was
York.31 In 1855, New York State authorized “trustees, directors determined to be better able to place out children for indenture or
or managers of any incorporated orphan asylum, or institute or adoption.46 In some instances, state laws granted charities guardhome for indigent children” to “bind out” any male orphan or ianship over charges committed to their care.47 In rare instances
indigent child under 21 and any female orphan or indigent child charities could petition for guardianship where the charity or its
under 18.32 Under this authority, the Boston Children’s Mission agent found an abandoned child.48 Children with no surviving
sent a total of 150 children to out-of-state placements in 1850.33 parent had the authority to agree to a charity guardianship.49
The phrase “orphan train” was first used in 1854 to
Charities generally asked the receiving family to sign an
describe the transportation of children outside of their home agreement accepting the child into that family to be cared for as
localities on the railways.34 There were no geographic restric- a member of the family.50 These agreements contained different
tions for these indentures — the children could be placed any- provisions depending on the child’s age.51 Some organizations
where. Other states enacted similar provisions giving charities required formal indenture agreements for placed children and
the authority to indenture children in their custody without geo- transferred guardianship as part of the indenture process, somegraphic restrictions. 35 While the first charities to use orphan times designating a trial period before transferring guardianship
trains were in the East, charities farther West also placed children to the receiving family.52 A successful trial period would conclude
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with a transfer of guardianship while a failed trial period would in Protestant homes to change their religious practices. Similar
terminate the agreement.53
charges were made concerning the placement of Jewish chilChildren not already preplaced with a family or busi- dren.60 Another concern of critics was that not all orphan train
ness were placed on trains traveling on a predetermined route. children were true orphans, but were made into orphans by forced
Placement committees composed of prominent members of removal from their biological families to be placed out in other
towns along the orphan train route were formed to help place states.61 Some claimed this was a deliberate pattern intended
transported children. Advertising space, for instance in news- to break up immigrant Catholic families.62 Some abolitionists
papers, was purchased to advertise the children’s arrival, urg- opposed placements of children with Western families, viewing
ing prospective adopters to contact committee members or to indentureship as a form of slavery.63
simply be present in town when the orphan train was scheduled
Orphan trains were the target of law suits, generally filed
to arrive.54 Committees arranged for the children’s lodging and by parents seeking to reclaim their children.64 Suits were occameals while overseeing placement applicasionally filed by a receiving parent or famtions. The committee frequently requested
ily member claiming to have lost money
community applications in advance of the
been harmed as the result of the placeCriticisms of the orphan train or
train’s arrival and were responsible for
ment. A more complicated lawsuit arose
investigating those seeking a child. Agents movement focused on concerns from a 1904 Arizona Territory orphan
either accompanied children on the train or
that initial placements were train placement in which the New York
met them upon arrival, and were to invesHospital sent 40 Caucasian
made hastily, without proper Foundling
tigate placements before releasing the
children between the ages of 18 months
child. Agents were also expected to work investigation, and that there was and 5 years to be indentured to Catholic
with local committees in making periodic
families in an Arizona Territory parish.
insufficient follow-up
follow-up visits, typically a year or half-aThe families approved by the local priest
on placements.
year after the initial placement.
for placement were identified in the subChildren were constructively split
sequent litigation as “Mexican Indian.”65
into two groups at every stop of the train along its route: chil- Nuns escorting these children were unaware of the racial tension
dren who were selected for adoption and children that were not. between local Anglo and Mexican groups, and placed Caucasian
Selected children whose placement was approved by the local children with Mexican Indian families. A group of white men,
committee would go home with their new family. Children who described as “just short of a lynch mob,” forcibly took the chilwere not selected would re-board the train and go to the next dren from the Mexican Indian homes and placed most of them
stop, where the process would be repeated. In this manner, sib- with Anglo families. Some of the children were returned to the
lings who were already taken from their parents would frequently Foundling Hospital, but 19 remained with the Anglo Arizona Terbe separated for placement in different geographic locations. ritory families. The Foundling Hospital filed a writ of habeas corSometimes these children were reunited, but in many cases they pus seeking the return of these children. The Arizona Supreme
never saw each other again.55
Court held that the best interests of the children required that
Children pre-placed for adoption were also placed on they remain in their new Arizona homes.66 On appeal, the U.S.
orphan trains and delivered to the adopters who sent requests to Supreme Court found that a writ of habeas corpus seeking the
the charities. These requests usually included detailed require- return of a child constituted an improper use of the writ. Habeas
ments specifying the child’s age and physical characteristics. If corpus writs should be used “solely in cases of arrest and forcible
a child matching the description was found, a “receipt” for the imprisonment under color or claim of warrant of law,” and should
child would be sent to the requesting famnot be used to obtain or transfer custody
ily stating where and when the child would
of children.67 These events were well pubarrive by train. The family would present Nuns escorting these children licized at the time with newspaper stories
the notice of arrival receipt to the agent
titled “Babies Sold Like Sheep,” telling
were unaware of the racial readers that the New York Foundling Hosaccompanying the child and if the numbers
matched, they would take the child home.56
tension between local Anglo pital “has for years been shipping children
in car-loads all over the country, and they
During its 75 year existence, the
and Mexican groups, and
are given away and sold like cattle.”68
orphan train movement generated both
supporters and critics. Criticisms of the placed Caucasian children with
Charities attempted to guaranorphan train movement focused on contee
successful
orphan train placements by
Mexican Indian families.
cerns that initial placements were made
agreeing to remove children from failed
hastily, without proper investigation, and
placements and, where necessary, transthat there was insufficient follow-up on placements.57 Chari- port the child back to the charity’s Eastern office at the charties were also criticized for not keeping track of children placed ity’s expense.69 Many children placed out west had survived on
while under their care. Some placement locations charged that the streets of New York, Boston or other large eastern cities and
orphan trains were dumping undesirable children from the East generally were not the passive, obedient, respectful children that
on Western communities.58 In 1874, the National Prison Reform some families expected; this prompted placement changes and
Congress charged that these practices resulted in increased cor- returns to the East.70 Older boys wanted to be paid for their labor,
rectional expenses in the West.59 Catholic clergy maintained sometimes asking for additional pay or leaving a placement to
that some charities were deliberately placing Catholic children find a higher paying placement. It is estimated that young men
Fall 2009
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initiated 80% of the placement changes that occurred as part of
the movement.71 As one young man wrote, “[a] boy could easily
find work and set his own wages as a farm hand around here.”72
These issues added to the perception that New York juvenile
delinquents were being imported into Western communities.73
Efforts to refute or substantiate these criticisms led to
several reviews of orphan train procedures and placement practices. Reviews were conducted by the criticized charities internally and also by independent organizations. Internal charity
reviews defined failed placements as those where children were
subsequently placed in prisons or almshouses. One charity maintained that a review of its 1858 placements of children under 15
indicated a 2% failure rate with a 4% failure rate for placements
of children under 18.74 An 1874 charity self-review found that
only five children (four boys, one girl) out of 6,000 Indiana placements were in state reformatories.75 Another charity found that of
45 children who were placed and identified in their records, 11
children (24.4%) were not found, while one of the remaining 34
children had committed a crime and fled the state.76
The Minnesota State Board of Corrections and Charities
reviewed Minnesota orphan train placements between 1880 and
1883. The Board found that while children were placed hastily
and without proper investigation into their placements, only a few
children were “depraved”77 or abused. The review criticized local
committee members who were swayed by pressure from wealthy
and important individuals in their community. The Board also
pointed out that older children were frequently placed with farmers who expected to profit from their labor. The Board recommended that paid agents replace or supplement local committees
in investigating and reviewing all applications and placements.78
An independent study from 1900 comparing orphan
train placements with placements made by a public state charity
within the same state revealed additional insight into the orphan
train system. The study found that between 1888 and 1897 the
state charity made fewer placements than the orphan train movement, but used similar strategies and procedures. Both placement
groups relied on local advisory boards composed of prominent
community members and Protestant clergy. Both placement
groups required regular reports from foster parents, local advisory board members and local agents. In all cases, these reports
were frequently late or missing entirely. State charities, the study
concluded, were no more successful than orphan train charities
in placing children.
There were no real differences between the placement
practices and placement results of orphan train charities and an
in-state charity. This highlights the frequently overlooked reality of the orphan train movement. Trains allowed large numbers
of children to be transported farther than would other means
available at the time. Using trains as a placement tool has been
characterized and perhaps romanticized as the “orphan train
movement.” This overlooks the fact that orphan train transport
was just one child placement strategy among many used in the
period. A comparison between state charity and orphan train
placement illustrates the common shortcoming of both systems:
the placement of older children was more difficult and generally for shorter duration than the placement of younger children.
Child placement success, then, did not vary according to the
vehicle used to accomplish the placement.79

6

The End of the Orphan Trains
Numerous factors came together to end the orphan train
movement in 1929.80 One factor was that railroad expansion in
the United States was complete and most railroads ended subsidized fares provided to charities moving children.81 Another
critical and underlying factor was that the need for labor which
drove the initial success of orphan train placements in the West
was no longer as great. The trains had relocated children to rural
areas where their labor was needed on the frontier. Movement of
children to the Midwest and West paralleled settlement patterns.
Laws like the Homestead Act of 1862 encouraged the migration
of settlers, offering 160 acres to any settler who would farm and
build a shelter upon received land. Thousands of settlers subsequently moved west to claim their land.82 Railroads received
government land, which was sold to finance further construction
of railroads needed to connect the country. These settlers needed
laborers to work their homesteads, build houses and farm their
land purchases.83 Orphan train children provided this labor. As
the West was settled, the labor demand declined. In 1893, Frederick Jackson Turner presented his thesis that the American frontier
had ended and the West had become civilized.84 The orphan train
children were no longer needed to settle the West.
Another factor that contributed to the end of the orphan
train movement was the backlash from the Western states. They
reacted to their role as “a dumping ground for dependents from
other states”85 by passing legislation limiting or prohibiting
placement of out-of-state children. Many of these states had
become urbanized and were facing their own child care and child
placement issues. Cities such as Chicago and St. Louis began to
experience the same problems in caring for neglected and destitute children that New York, Boston and Philadelphia had experienced in the mid-1800s.86 These cities began to seek ways to
care for their own orphan populations. In 1895, Michigan passed
a statute prohibiting out-of-state children from local placement
without payment of a bond guaranteeing that children placed in
Michigan would not become a public charge in the State.87 Similar laws were passed by Indiana, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota,
Missouri and Nebraska. Negotiated agreements between one or
more New York charities and several western states allowed the
continued placement of children in these states. Such agreements
included large bonds as security for placed children. In 1929,
however, these agreements expired and were not renewed as charities changed their child care support strategies.88
Lastly, the need for the orphan train movement decreased
as legislation was passed providing in-home family support.
Charities began developing programs to support destitute and
needy families limiting the need for intervention to place out
children.89 State and local governments funded foster care for
orphans while compulsory education and anti-child labor statutes
were also being passed.90 Social work had become a profession
and social workers began to focus on keeping families together.91
Hull House and other similar programs were established in urban
areas to provide in-home assistance for families and children.92
In 1909, Theodore Roosevelt called the first White House Conference on Children, which directed state and federal bodies to
implement programs designed to aid destitute children and their
families.93 The Federal Children’s Bureau was established in
1912 with Julia Lathrop of Hull House as its first chief.94 These
20th century laws and initiatives focused on keeping families
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together first and paths such as foster care second. While a few
states were continuing to allow indentured servitude, the national
trend was moving away from child labor.95 Orphanages and even
almshouses were still used to provide care when needed, but family care and foster care were becoming the accepted preference.96
Urbanization of the western states together with the growth of
other programs, and strategies to support these needy children
eliminated the need to use railroads to move children to the west.
In 1929 the orphan trains stopped running.

adoption laws. It does not follow that the orphan train movement
was central to the creation of adoption laws across the United
States.
By 1925, every state and U.S. territory had some form
of adoption law.105 A guide to American adoption laws prepared
in 1925 by the Department of Labor Children’s Bureau identified
a trend away from adoption by deed to a “procedure in which
human values are carefully considered and the supervisory duty
of the State is recognized.”106 This study identified Minnesota,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon and Virginia as having the most
modern adoption laws, with provisions focusing on the best interPart II–The Legal Impact of the
ests of the child, and providing for notification and termination
Orphan Train Movement
of the rights of natural parents.107 Recognizing the need for clarification in adoption practices, states such as New York and OreThe orphan train movement has been described as the gon enacted statutes that specifically addressed complex issues
driving force for changes to American adoption law, the creation in adoption law like consent from the natural parent or from an
of child labor laws, and reforming child welfare and foster care institution regarding the adoption. For instance, under a 1923
practices.97 Beginning in 1854 and ending in 1929, the orphan New York statute, a parent who was unable to care for a child
train movement was but one aspect of these evolving legal and could place that child with an institution or children’s aid socisocietal changes. A careful review of legal history indicates that ety, and the institution or society could then place the child for
it was not the driving force for these changes.
adoption without any further consent from the natural parent.108
In contrast, the 1920 Oregon statute allowed natural parents to
place children with institutions or organizations, but required
Adoption Law
additional specific consent before a child could be placed for
adoption. Courts addressed adoption pracThe orphan train movement has
tices by determining that adoption statutes
been credited with establishing American
required strict construction.109 Courts also
adoption laws.98 One author maintains The orphan train movement has struggled with the question of whether
that the increasing number of farmers who been credited with establishing adoption laws provided a right of inheriwanted to legalize the placement of orphan
tance for adopted children.110
American adoption laws.
train children in their families resulted in
Despite the wave of newly
states enacting adoption laws.99 This propenacted adoption statutes, not all children
osition is not supported by the timeline of
were formally adopted. Authors tracing adoption law history and
enacted state adoption laws. In 1846, Mississippi passed a law the orphan train movement generally overlook the doctrine of
that authenticated and made a public record of private adoption equitable adoption. Equitable adoption, a judicial remedy which
agreements.100 Texas passed a similar statute in 1850.101 Mas- existed in colonial times and continues to be used today, is a remsachusetts enacted the first general adoption law in 1851.102 The edy to establish inheritance or other rights for someone who has
Massachusetts statute mirrors modern adoption statutes in having not been formally adopted. The court in Johnson v. Johnson111
a number of requirements such as written consent from the natu- discussed the doctrine as arising from the “‘placing out’ of homeral parents or guardian and the child’s consent where the child less and indigent children from urban areas in the East to the
was 14 years of age or older. In 1853, Pennsylvania followed western United States.”112 The court recognized that “[m]ost of
suit.103 All of these statutes were enacted before 1854, the date these placements were memorialized only with an oral agreement
credited as the beginning of the orphan train movement. Given made at the train platform and few children were ever formally
the dates of these adoption laws, the orphan train movement can- adopted leaving them in” legal limbo.”113 Drawing on a chain of
not be wholly credited with the establishment of American adop- equitable adoption cases, the court identified the equitable remtion law. A more likely cause was an effort to reduce requests for edy as one grounded in a valid contract to adopt. Such a contract
private legislation to formalize adoptions. Other states, recogniz- establishes the same rights for a child that would exist if the child
ing adoption statutes as a way to reduce their own private legisla- is legally adopted, and these rights include both child support and
tive burdens, began to pass adoption statutes similar to those of a right to inherit.114
Mississippi, Texas, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania.
During the 75 years of the orphan train movement,
No legislative history has been located indicating the adoption laws grew and evolved as part of society’s growing recrole of orphan trains in the passage of state adoption laws. In ognition of a need to protect and nurture children. The orphan
fact, one author maintains that adoption laws were passed for trains served as a placement vehicle for thousands of children
the purpose of “securing to adopted children a proper share in who found homes in at least 45 states.115 Studies indicate that
the estate of adopting parents who should die intestate.”104 Even only a small percentage of these children were formally adopted,
without orphan trains, it is reasonable to conclude that the pre- despite enacted statutes and equitable adoption, and “the great
1854 trend in enactment of adoption laws would have led most majority of placements seemed to be characterized by a desire
states to promulgate similar laws by the early 20th century. There for a teenager’s labor, even if warm feelings subsequently develis no substantiation for the proposition that the influx of orphan oped between the parties.”116 The greater percentage of nontrain children resulted in greater urgency for some states to pass adopted children were often placed in a “legal limbo” that was
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not recognized until one or both “adopting” parents died, and the
child, who was not legally adopted by the deceased, was barred
from administering or inheriting the estate.117 The relatively low
percentage of orphan train adoptions together with the greater
emphasis on placements to provide farm labor, might indicate
that far from fostering American adoption law, the orphan train
movement was actually a negative force in the process.

Child Welfare Reform
Conflicting views exist regarding the orphan train movement’s role in child welfare reform. Some authors see improvements in child welfare as a reaction to poor orphan train placement
practices,118 while others see child welfare reforms resulting from
positive and progressive orphan train practices.119 Nineteenth
and early 20th century child welfare organizations engaged in a
variety of activities and programs they believed would promote
the welfare of children; the orphan train movement was just one
of these programs. When considered in the context of other child
welfare programs at the time, it becomes clear that the orphan
train movement was only a single part of a broad legal and
social movement focusing on child welfare and child welfare
reform.120 In this light, it appears that other child welfare programs and laws may have had a more central role than the orphan
train movement.
Many other strategies have been used to provide for the
welfare of children and these strategies have varied to reflect
changing ideas about childhood and what is best for children.
In the 18th century, almshouses were constructed to care for destitute, ill or mentally deficient children and adults. As early as
1800, child welfare reformers recognized that children should be
housed separately from adults and provided with different types
of care. One almshouse recommended that children “should be
kept as much as possible from the other paupers, habituated to
decency, cleanliness, and order, and carefully instructed in reading, writing, and arithmetic. The girls should also be taught to
sew and knit.”121 Private charities were developed to care for children by supplementing the child welfare efforts of almshouses.
Gradually, in the 19th century, facilities were established to house
only children.122 These residential institutions focused on providing children with discipline, work and education.
Contrary to the proposition that the orphan train movement drove child welfare reforms, various states’ legislative
imperatives to address child welfare concerns may have driven
the orphan train movement. Even from before the use of orphan
trains, the preferred and most common publicly funded child
welfare practices involved indentureship, apprenticeship, or placing out.123 Growing awareness of child welfare issues in these
unregulated practices led to legislative action to examine and
change their child welfare strategies.
An 1869 Michigan commission examined the state’s
child welfare practices and based on their recommendations, the
Michigan legislature created a state public school for dependent
children and mandated that all public charges be transferred
there. All children in this institution were to be placed out with
private families as soon as possible.124 Other states adopted similar laws, requiring the removal of children from almshouses or
limiting the time that children could remain in state institutions
before being placed with families.125 These institutions and laws
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developed contemporaneously with the orphan train movement
and the legislative imperatives to place out institutionalized children may have played a driving role in the use of orphan trains.
Increased awareness and concern for child welfare reform led
to increased state and federal involvement in child welfare and
family placement programs, independent of any implications of
the orphan train movement. Governments created state charity
boards charged with overseeing all public and private charitable
institutions within the state.126 These state charity boards represented a significant departure from earlier practices in which
private charities were incorporated within a state and then left to
their own devices with limited or no state oversight. Such state
oversight was met with resistance. The New York Society for
the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [Society] refused to allow
the New York State Board of Charities to inspect their facilities,
maintaining that they were not a charity as defined by under New
York law. By 1899, state charity boards were established in 30
states.127
On the national level, the National Child Labor Committee was created and, together with other child welfare organizations, lobbied for a federal children’s bureau to collect and
disseminate information affecting the welfare of children. Legislation introduced in 1905-06 was endorsed by President Theodore Roosevelt, members of the Cabinet and members of both
the House and Senate, but failed to reach the floor for a vote.128
The bill was introduced again in 1908-09 and 1909-10.129 During this period, the first White House Conference on Children
and Youth was held in Washington, D.C. With almost 200 people
in attendance, this conference emphasized the harm children
incurred from institutionalization.130 The conference reinforced
the importance of family and home life, stating that “[h]ome life
is the highest and finest product of civilization. It is the great
molding force of mind and Children should not be deprived of it
except for urgent and compelling reasons.”131
Creation of a federal children’s bureau was a central
focus of the conference and President Roosevelt together with
conference attendees endorsed the pending legislation. President
Roosevelt sent a message to Congress urging favorable action on
the Children’s Bureau bill, stating:
There are few things more vital to the welfare
of the nation than accurate and dependable
knowledge of the best methods of dealing with
children, especially with those who are in one
way or another handicapped by misfortune; and
in the absence of such knowledge each community is left to work out its own problem without
being able to learn of and profit by the success
or failure of other communities along the same
lines of endeavor.132
Legislation establishing the Children’s Bureau was
passed and signed in 1910-11 and became effective in 1912
under President Taft.133 The bill emphasized that the Children’s
Bureau would investigate and report on issues and furnish information regarding children’s issues from all parts of the country.
The Bureau was not to encroach on the rights of the states and
would not eliminate the duty of the states to deal with child welfare issues within their jurisdictions. The Bureau would effectuate the federal government’s duty to make information available
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to the various states, supporting them as they cared for children
within their boundaries.134
The national child welfare movement continued as
President Wilson hosted a second White House Conference in
1919, declaring the same year as “Children’s Year”. The Conference focused on child welfare standards, beginning as a series of
meetings in Washington, D.C. and continuing across eight cities throughout America. Small committees determined minimum
standards in the areas of child labor, health care for children and
mothers, aid for special needs children, and general child welfare minimum standards. These standards were published by the
Children’s Bureau and concluded with a charge to the individual states to review and evaluate state legislation in light of the
standards.135
As a result of the 1919 White House Conference and
the efforts of various child welfare organizations, state regulation
of public and private child placement practices gained importance. In his 1919 work, Child-Placing in Families, Slingerland
observed “[t]here seems to be a strong conviction among experts
in social work that the public authorities, representing all the people should not only supervise and standardize all private agencies, but should enter directly into many phases of child-helping
work.”136 Slingerland proposed that this process be accomplished
“a step at a time,” beginning with a general child welfare law.
Using this approach, “reasonably advanced child welfare laws”
could be passed in a number of states suffering from obsolete,
inadequate and sometimes contradictory laws regarding child
welfare and family placement.137
By the early 20th century, it was widely accepted that
child welfare was best accomplished through family placement of
dependent children. Despite contrary views, the concept of family placement for children did not originate with the orphan train
movement. Family placement for children was practiced before
and during colonial times. Between 1854 and 1929, large scale
in-family placement of neglected and dependent children happened to be facilitated by the railroads. As child welfare became
a more prominent subject of concern nationwide, state governments assumed responsibility for child welfare within their
boundaries, creating and regulating the structures necessary to
meet this responsibility, thus ending the orphan train movement.

Though placing out and foster care both allow for the
placement of a child in another family, the differences are found
in payment for the care provided. Placing out usually involved a
formal or informal indentureship whereby a child would work for
a family in return for care.141 Foster care generally involves payments to the foster family to provide for the child’s care, eliminating the need for the child’s labor as a form of payment.142 Orphan
train placements were almost always grounded in the assumption
that the child would work in return for care, with or without an
actual indenture agreement and the institutions did not pay the
receiving families for the child care.
Not only were placing out and paid foster case fundamentally different in practice but paid foster care existed in
the colonies and so cannot be uniquely attributed to the orphan
train movement. Historically, paid foster care was described as
“boarding out” and was essentially the equivalent of modern foster care. Infants were boarded out in colonial days at the cost of
$1.50 per week.143 Boarding out became a more frequent practice
in the late 19th century as states mandated the removal of children
from institutions and their placement in families. Both public
and private charities expanded their boarding out practices. One
example, the Boston Temporary Home for the Destitute, which
for a number of years had used the promise of “light service” to
induce families to accept children, began, in the 1880s to make
board payments in lieu of labor-service. By the 1890s, payment
for board replaced all “light service” placements.144
While paid foster care existed independent of the orphan
train movement, it also had a great impact on the movement itself.
This growing practice of paying families to care for dependent
children became a factor in reducing unpaid, labor-based orphan
train placements. The system of payment for boarding out or foster care also increased emphasis on both pre-placement and postplacement investigation and supervision. Organizations making
on-going placements for the care of children adopted improved
policies and procedures for placement supervision.145 As state
governments became more involved in the placement of children
within their jurisdictions, state regulations were promulgated to
ensure adequate child placement supervision.

Foster Care

The orphan train movement has been described as a
primary factor in child labor reform, but in light of history the
orphan train movement seemed to contribute more to the problem of child labor rather than the push for child labor reform.
As states adopted stricter regulations regarding child placement,
child welfare and foster care, the casual placement and supervision practices of orphan train charities failed to meet regulatory
standards thereby impacting the use of child labor which was the
driving force of the orphan train movement. In the early 19th century with the expansion of the frontier, children were employed
in mining, fishing, lumber, agriculture and almost every other
industry.146 Though society’s view of children changed in the mid
to late 19th century, the driving force for these changes in child
labor reform came from factory workers and educators. In 1832,
the New England Association of Farmers, Mechanics and Other
Workingmen adopted a resolution that “children should not be
allowed to labor in the factories from morning till night, without
any time for healthy recreation and mental culture” because such

While some claim the Children’s Aid Society was the
first to offer foster care and that the modern concept of foster care
evolved directly from the orphan train program, this view is not
supported in the legal and social history.138 It is important to first
recognize the relationship between placing out and foster care.
Legally, the term “‘place out’ shall mean to provide for the care
of a child in a free home, in a family other than that of a relative
within the second degree.”139 A legal definition for foster care
can be found in the Code of Federal Regulations, which defines
foster care as “. . . 24-hour substitute care for children placed
away from their parents or guardians and for whom the State
agency has placement and care responsibility. This includes, but
is not limited to, placements in foster family homes, foster homes
of relatives, group homes, emergency shelters, residential facilities, child care institutions, and pre-adoptive homes.”140
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work “endangers their . . . well-being and health.”147 MassachuThis agricultural opposition to child labor legislation
setts adopted the first state child labor law in 1836, linking man- is reflected in existing labor laws. American labor law includes
datory education to a requirement that children under 15 working significant exemptions allowing the employment of children
in factories must attend at least three months of school a year.148 in agriculture. The Fair Labor Standards Act’s minimum age
In 1876, the Working Men’s Party proposed banning employment requirements do not apply to minors employed by their parents
of children under the age of 14,149 and in 1881, the first national or guardian, or to children working on a farm owned or operated
convention of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) passed a by a parent or guardian. Children ages 10 and 11 may harvest
similar resolution.150 The National Child Labor Committee was short season crops outside of school hours, and children under
formed in 1904 to address the need for child labor legislation, 12 may work in nonhazardous farm jobs with parental consent or
and by 1909, primarily through their lobif their parents are also employed on that
bying efforts, 43 states passed some sort
farm.164 The Human Rights Watch charges
of legislation prohibiting employment of The Fair Labor Standards Act’s that agricultural work is the “most hazardchildren under a certain age.151 However, minimum age requirements do ous and grueling area of employment open
state exemptions were numerous and varto children in the United States.”165 The
ied significantly between states. Some not apply to minors employed 19th and 20th century child labor movement
of the most common exemptions from by their parents or guardian, or focused on protecting child workers, but
the prohibition on child labor were made to children working on a farm was unable to secure protections for chilfor orphans, children of widowed mothdren working on farms and in agriculture,
ers or disabled parents and for farm and owned or operated by a parent the very locations where orphan train childomestic labor.152 Special permits exemptdren were being placed. Far from being a
or guardian.
ing children from the application of child
factor in securing protections against child
labor laws were also available.153 Parents
labor, the orphan train movement reinand farmers complained that child labor was essential to their forced the use of children as farm laborers, a practice that 21st
survival and opposed child labor restrictions.154 Enforcement of century laws protecting children has failed to prevent.
these child labor laws became a significant problem.155 Individual states complained that variations between state child labor
laws created unfair competition resulting from the allowed or
Conclusion
disallowed employment of children in various state industries.156
Orphan trains and the orphan train movement have
These concerns resulted in federal legislation passed in
1916, establishing national labor standards.157 Declared uncon- become a romanticized legend. Children’s books have been writstitutional,158 legislation was again passed in 1918 and was also ten extolling the successes of orphan train placements. Docudeclared unconstitutional.159 This resulted in an organized move- mentaries have been filmed capturing orphan train nostalgia.
ment for a constitutional amendment giving the federal govern- Modern depictions show happy children in new clothes hangment authority to regulate child labor. While the constitutional ing out of train windows, a stark contrast to the image of “street
amendment passed, it failed to be ratified by the necessary num- rats” adorned in rags that were also taken at this time. A picber of states.160 Federal legislation regulating child labor was ture of what appears to be hundreds of children, all waiting to
finally enacted in 1938 when the Fair Labor Standards Act was be adopted, standing on and around a railroad train catches the
expanded to include a prohibition on the employment of children modern imagination.
The reality of the orphan train movement is very difunder 16 in industries whose products were shipped in interstate
ferent. Orphan trains ran from 1854 through 1929, a period in
commerce.161
The orphan train movement found its utility in providing American history of the greatest changes in views regarding
child labor and successful placement of children hinged on the childhood and laws affecting children. It is understandable that
need for the child labor in the Midwest and West. The founder the orphan train movement would be linked to these changing
st
of the Children’s Aid Society of New York commented on the views and laws, and that 21 century authors would see the emisuccess of orphan train placement: “[it] helps to solve, in the gration of 150,000 to 200,000 children, accompanied by dramatic
only feasible mode, the great economic problem of poverty in photographs and other memorabilia, as the driving force in these
our cities, for it sends future laborers where they are in demand, changing views and laws. But a review of era generated records
and relieves the over-crowded market in the city.”162 Orphan train does not support this fantasy that the orphan train movement was
placements, especially for children 12 and older, were made in the positive driving force in modern adoption law, child welfare
response to the western need for farm labor. It is important to laws, foster care practices and child labor laws.
Historical records, relevant legislation and case law
note that opposition to child labor laws came from the agricultural community dependent on child labor as was supplied by the provide an authoritative foundation in assessing the nature and
orphan trains. Children were employed on their own family farms extent of the orphan train movement’s role in these changes. The
and hired out as extra hands on neighboring farms. In 1910, when orphan train movement and orphan train placements were not the
major efforts were underway to limit child labor, 72% of children driving force for modern adoption laws, foster care practices and
child welfare laws. Instead, many of these reforms came about to
ages 10 to 15 were employed in agriculture.163
specifically oppose orphan train practices.
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THE “NEW” WITHDRAWAL OF CONSENT STANDARD
IN MARYLAND RAPE LAW:
A YEAR AFTER BABY v. STATE
By
Mary Huff*

I. Introduction

degree, both felonies.12 During deliberation, the jury came to the
court with questions specifically concerning the effect of postOn April 16, 2008, the Maryland Court of Appeals, penetration withdrawal on consent. The pertinent note read, “[i]f
the highest court in the state, ruled that a woman may withdraw a female consents to sex initially and, during the course of the sex
consent for vaginal intercourse after penetration has occurred. act to which she consented, for whatever reason, she changes her
After consent has been withdrawn, the continuation of vaginal mind and the man continues until climax, does the result constiintercourse by force or threat of force may constitute rape.1 The tute rape?”13 The defense argued that the court should respond to
ruling caused a news sensation because the
the note in the negative on the theory that
defendant, Maouloud Baby, was convicted
the woman consented to penetration.14 The
of first degree rape and related charges
[i]f a female consents to sex prosecution argued that any 15slight intruafter his female victim testified that he
sion into the vagina is rape. The judge
“continued to have sex with her for five or initially and, during the course was confused by the question and avoided
of the sex act to which she making a factual determination by telling
ten seconds after she asked him to stop.”2
The over-reaching implications of what consented, for whatever reason, the jury to re-read the initial instructions.16
has been termed “The Five-Second Rule”
The jury submitted another note which
are obvious, because the most difficult she changes her mind and the read, “[i]f at any time the woman says stop
man continues until climax, is that rape?”17 The defendant’s counsel
legal elements to prove in any rape crime
3
case are force and non-consent. A vic- does the result constitute rape? requested that the court repeat the prior
tim’s ability to change his or her mind duranswer. The judge agreed and instructed
ing intercourse could effectively remove
the jury, “[t]his is a question that you as
the problem of consent as a barrier to rape
a jury must decide. I have given the legal
convictions and give rise to a host of criminal prosecutions.
definition of rape which includes the definition of consent.”18 The
Black’s Law Dictionary defines rape as “unlawful sexual jury returned with a guilty verdict, and on February 17, 2005,
activity with a person without consent and by force or threat of Baby was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment with all but
injury.”4 At common law, the crime of rape consisted of unlawful five years suspended and five years probation upon release.19
sexual intercourse by a man with a woman who was not his wife
On appeal, Baby argued that the lower court erred in
through force and against her will and required at least slight refusing his request to instruct the jury to return a verdict of “not
penetration of the penis into the vagina.5 Currently, Maryland guilty” if persuaded that the complaining witness consented to
statutorily defines the crime of “rape in the first degree” as the sexual intercourse but withdrew her consent after penetration.
act of “[engaging] in vaginal intercourse with another by force, Baby also argued that the court erred in denying his motion to
or the threat of force, without the consent of the other.”6 The exclude expert testimony concerning “rape trauma syndrome.”20
applicable punishment is “imprisonment not exceeding life.”7 The Court of Special Appeals agreed, overturning Baby’s rape
In contrast, “post-penetration” rape8 describes a situation where and sexual offense convictions and holding that the trial court
two people initially engage in consensual sexual intercourse, but erred in not answering the jury’s questions on consent. Based
during intercourse one person “communicates to the other the upon its interpretation of the English common law behind Maryrevocation of consent and the other party forces the continuation land’s statutory definition of rape, and relying on Battle v. State,21
of intercourse against the will of the non-consenting person.”9 the Court of Special Appeals ruled that “if a woman consents to
One person decides to stop and the other person does not. Only sexual intercourse prior to penetration and withdraws the consent
one state has explicit legislation criminalizing post-penetration following penetration, there is no rape.”22
rape: Illinois.10 Until Baby, Maryland was one of two states that
On certiorari, the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed
expressly held that post-penetration continuation of intercourse the reversal of Baby’s convictions but articulated a new standard
after withdrawal of consent did not constitute rape.11
of consent. The highest state court held that the language in Battle stating, “ordinarily, if [a woman] consents prior to penetration and withdraws the consent following penetration, there is
II. The Baby Case
no rape,” is properly characterized as obiter dictum and will not
be afforded precedential weight.23 After a lengthy discussion of
At trial in 2004 Baby was convicted not only of rape the history of rape and its original emphasis on punishing those
in the first degree, but also of committing a sexual offense in who de-flower virgins, the court turned to recent cases in other
the second degree and two counts of sexual offense in the third states on the withdrawal of consent post initial penetration. For
14
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example, in State v. Bunyard,24 under a rape statute similar to
Maryland’s, the Kansas intermediate appellate court held that
“a participant in sexual intercourse may withdraw consent after
penetration has occurred. The continuation of sexual intercourse
after consent has been withdrawn, and in the presence of force
or fear, is rape.”25 The Maryland Court of Appeals found the reasoning in similar cases in Kansas, Connecticut, and Maine persuasive and held that the Maryland rape statute “punishes the act
of penetration, which persists after the withdrawal of consent.”26
The court further held that initial penetration does not complete
the act of intercourse.27 Therefore, a woman may withdraw consent for vaginal intercourse after penetration has occurred, and
after consent has been withdrawn, the continuation of vaginal
intercourse by force or the threat of force may constitute rape.28
The court also agreed with the Court of Special Appeals
that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the issue
of consent and by simply sending the jury back to review previous instructions.29 The seven-judge panel was split over the section of the opinion addressing a victim’s withdrawal of consent,
with four judges signing on to the opinion and one concurring.

least momentarily in displacing the male sex
organ.”34

In other words, the court’s reasoning was a very polite
way of saying that a female victim would have to temporarily
separate her partner’s sexual organs from her own after asking
him to stop in order to have legal recourse. Along a different line,
Judge O’Connell, writing for the Appellate Court of Alaska, has
also noted that if the crime of rape depended on proof of nonconsent prior to initial penetration, there could be no rape if a
male penetrated a sleeping victim.35
Feminist scholars claim that judicial and legislative failure to recognize a person’s right to withdraw consent to sexual
intercourse at any time exposes adherence to social myths and
antiquated attitudes underlying rape laws. One such myth is that
of “The Unstoppable Male,” or the idea that “once a man engages
in sexual activity, it is physically impossible for him to stop.”36
The modern articulation of this reasoning is that a man should be
allowed “reasonable time to withdraw” after hearing a woman’s
withdrawal of consent.37 Feminist advocates concede that there
may be a need for a reasonable time analysis and that this would
be a proper question of fact for a jury.38 Another social myth
reflected in the debate on withdrawal of consent is that “promisIII. Comparisons With Other States
cuous women suffer less harm,” or that someone who has already
Although the recent Baby ruling created a firestorm of put herself in a compromising position is not harmed.39 Finally,
local media coverage in the Washington, DC metropolitan area, the most prominent myth in discussions of post-penetration rape
seven other states ascribe to similar laws on consent in rape cases: is the idea that “initial consent waives autonomy.”40 This myth is
Alaska, California, Connecticut, Kansas, Maine, South Dakota, the law in North Carolina, where once a woman initially consents
and Illinois.30 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine recognized to sexual intercourse or penetration, she has, for the purposes
of a rape prosecution, waived the right to
a woman’s right to withdraw consent to
withdraw consent.
sexual intercourse as early as 1985. DurOn the other side of the debate,
ing that time, feminists and legal reformists were attacking states’ statutory marital this law is literally climbing into critics point to the danger and uncertainty
rape exemptions as well. Advocates of the bed with people and seeking to the issue of post-penetration withdrawal
right to withdraw consent approve of out- micromanage the entire sexual of consent raises for men. Specifically
addressing the Baby ruling, Pennsylvania
comes such as that in Baby, arguing that
experience.
litigator Julia Morrow argued in a teleholding otherwise only serves to deny
vised interview with CNN Prime News
women basic civil rights31 and perpetuates
that “this law is literally climbing into
social myths about men, women, and sex.
Failure to recognize a person’s ability to withdraw con- bed with people and seeking to micromanage the entire sexual
sent to sexual intercourse denies that person dignity and auton- experience. This law is incredibly dangerous and will open up
omy under the law. For example, the Supreme Court of North the floodgates.”41 Morrow continued to harp that women should
Carolina has declared, without any citation to legal authority, take responsibility for “who they bring home” so that innocent
that “if the actual penetration is accomplished with a woman’s men will not become victims of this new law.42 Morrow’s conconsent, the accused is not guilty of rape.”32 Therefore, once a cerns about the holding’s implications for men are well-founded.
woman consents to penetration there can be no rape during that Particularly because the specific facts in Baby refer to a five to
act of intercourse, even if the penetration continues subsequently ten second continuation of sex after protest, men may have to be
by use of force or coercion.33 A woman in North Carolina may educated to acknowledge that this translates into the need to stop
have a right to say ‘no’ to sex, but she has no right to say ‘stop’. immediately when a sexual partner does communicate a wish to
Courts addressing the issue of post-penetration withdrawal of stop in order to avoid criminal penalty.
Aside from this, Morrow’s reaction reflects a common
consent have pointed out the absurd implications of holding that
post-penetration rape is something less than rape. The Maine willingness to ignore the real harms suffered by actual rape victims by preferring hypothetical concerns for men. Additionally,
Supreme Court reasoned that
the law does climb into bed with people, and always has. Out of
“if rape occurs only when a male’s entry of the
necessity, and in order to protect people from harm, state legisfemale sexual organ is made as a result of comlatures define what constitutes a punishable offense, and courts
pulsion, [rape cases] would turn on whether
interpret matters that come before them. Legislatures and courts
the prosecutrix, on revoking her consent and
thereby establish legal definitions of acceptable sexual behavior
struggling against the defendant’s forcible
and carve out rights and boundaries. For example, in all states a
attempt to continue intercourse, succeeds at
Fall 2009
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yelled at him, told him to stop, and even attempted to push him
off of her but Baby continued to push his penis for about five seconds after the witness asked him to stop.54 Only a construction of
the facts in the light most favorable to the defendant could negate
a clear indication that an unwanted sexual assault occurred upon
an unwilling victim.
Most cases involving the issue of post-penetration withdrawal of consent consist of a similar fact pattern. The complaining witness makes allegations of forcible rape and the criminally
accused claims that there was no sexual intercourse, or if there
was, that it was consensual and he stopped after she asked him to.
Prosecutors almost never pursue rape charges in cases involving
the purely hypothetical “we knew each other, we were both into it,
now she’s claiming rape because she’s angry with me or embarrassed about what she did” scenario against which opponents of
post-penetration withdrawal of consent in rape laws warn.
Most interestingly, the media did not pick up on the fact
that the defendant walked away as a free man. In order for the
Maryland Court of Appeals to articulate a new rule that effectuates a human being’s right to exercise free will and choose to stop
engaging in intercourse, it had to release a previously convicted
rapist onto the streets. Indeed, “The Five Second Rule” does raise
a host of concerns such as abuse of litigation and Constitutional
Due Process concerns for perpetrators who have to be put on
notice of the law. However, such concerns are beyond the scope
of this article. As the public record indicates, future rape convicIV. Implications
tions are unlikely in instances where the victim changed his or
Understandably, the “five to ten seconds” timeframe her mind in the throes of sex. Further, this kind of conviction
upon which Baby was convicted is the key source of public outwill depend on the ability of the prosecucry. However, the facts of the case were
tion to show that the perpetrator continued
more complicated than the media would
with intercourse despite the victim’s clear
suggest. Baby testified that he placed him- The ability to withdraw consent verbal or behavioral cues to stop. As in
self between the victim’s legs while the two
can be viewed either as a
Baby, a complaining witness may have to
were in the backseat of the victim’s car and
triumph for women’s rights assert that the defendant caused her pain in
merely attempted to penetrate her with his
order to aid in successful prosecution. The
penis, but failed.51 The complaining wit- or as a potential floodgate for ability to withdraw consent can be viewed
ness testified that Baby did penetrate her litigation that infringes upon either as a triumph for women’s rights or
vagina with his penis.52 The victim testithe rights of innocent men. as a potential floodgate for litigation that
fied that first another man forced himinfringes upon the rights of innocent men.
self upon her in the car. Then Baby made
In over a year, the predicted “flood” has
advances towards her and verbally made it clear that she could been less than a leaky faucet. The effects of the “new” Maryland
not leave until he was finished with her.53 The victim said that standard of post-penetration withdrawal of consent remain to be
Baby’s attempts to penetrate her with his penis hurt her, so she seen.

person may freely withdraw consent to sexual intercourse before
penetration.43 Even in North Carolina, in situations involving multiple acts of sexual intercourse, consent for a prior act,
whether with the defendant or a third party, does not constitute
consent for a subsequent act of intercourse.44
In the same CNN Prime News interview, former Florida
prosecutor Mark Eiglarsh opined that Baby should only be used
as precedent “in the most limited of circumstances by both prosecutors and law enforcement [officials].”45 In Eiglarsh’s opinion,
“no jury in the world will convict” a man for simply not stopping
for five seconds during consensual sex.46 Eiglarsh seems to have
been correct, for the time being. In over a year since the final
ruling, Baby has not been the basis for any successful prosecutions of rape defendants.47 During this time, the case has been
cited twice, but only as precedent for criminal procedure matters.48 In Hutchinson v. State, Baby clearly applied as precedent:
the complaining witness claimed forcible rape by a stranger and
the defendant admitted to penetrating the witness “digitally” but
claimed he stopped when she changed her mind.49 However, the
decision failed to address the issue of post-penetration withdrawal of consent entirely and only cited Baby for the Maryland
standard of evaluating harmless error to a defendant on an evidentiary ruling.50
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Seeking Protection from the Law?
Exploring Changing Arguments for U.S. Domestic
Violence Asylum Claims and Gendered Resistance
by Courts
By
Richael Faithful*

I. Introduction
In July 2009, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) argued in a supplemental Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) brief that under certain circumstances, female
domestic violence (“DV”) survivors may have a cognizable asylum claim in the United States.1 The DHS brief breaks nine years
of executive level silence on the issue,2 as the Obama administration ignites advocates’ imaginations about the future of domestic,
gender-based asylum.
The administration’s new position is significant on two
levels. First, domestic violence has become the miner’s canary
issue for gender-based asylum. Gender-based claims occupy an
ambivalent area in United States asylum law but in recent years,
female genitalia mutilation (“FGM”), also known as female circumcision,3 has been the basis under which women bring successful asylum claims.4 The BIA’s treatment of the DHS brief has
the potential to clarify the gender question, marking its relevance
and meaning in asylum law today.
Second, the BIA’s response is a potential turning point
for women’s issues within international law. The United States,
like many other countries, is conflicted on the gender question
because it is still influenced by historical tensions between malecentered norms and modern challenges to them. Domestic violence, as a quintessential women’s issue on one hand, exposes
the human rights law evolution that is beginning to fully embrace
violence against women as an issue, and on the other hand,
exposes its shortcomings as an area that still fails to adequately
protect women from gendered persecution. Thus, a successful
effort to recognize DV claims may align emerging values with
ancient practices to further legitimize women’s issues within
human rights law.
This essay intends to offer context to the executive
branch’s new position, and to evaluate proposed ideas in order
to better establish gender-based asylum claims. Part One of this
essay briefly provides a background for the development of international human rights law related to women’s issues. Part Two
observes the ways in which embedded male bias within United
States common law creates persistent barriers for domestic violence claims. Part Three evaluates the executive’s position and
alternative proposals for reform under governing law. Finally,
Part Four concludes by arguing that at this stage, devising comprehensive strategies for systemic reform is the most important
contribution that human rights scholars can make to strengthen
future DV and other gender-based claims.
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II. Freedom from Gendered Violence as a
Human Right
Women’s citizenship within international human rights
law is a new phenomenon. International human rights law is
the culmination of evolved shared values and aspirations by the
world community that “corresponds only partially to the historical reality: the rights of women and of non-white persons, in fact,
arose relatively late in history.”5 This area of law is humanizing
its treatment toward women to meet a “standard of citizenship,”6
as conditions surrounding women are increasingly recognized
as inhumane. More recently, feminism and human rights have
formed a rich dialectical relationship. This relationship relies on
each field’s strengths to fill in theoretical gaps to develop more
inclusive and relief-driven principles.7 The result is tangible
improvements in legal citizenship for some poor women, women
of color, and women living in the global south.
Refugee law must be viewed within this broader international human rights history and legal framework. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the basis of international human
rights, is often criticized for excluding social and economic
rights, such as the right to work, right to control one’s possessions, and the right to be free from violence. Women are disproportionately impacted by these fatal exclusions,8 but a multitude
of conventions and agreements now expressly recognize women’s
legal citizenship. The most notable international commitment is
the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”).9
CEDAW is generally hailed as a pivotal international law
effort to enfranchise women. One Latina feminist scholar claims
that CEDAW “takes a holistic approach towards women from all
walks of life attaining full personhood by recognizing the importance not only of civil and political rights but also of social, economic, cultural and solidarity rights.”10 She further argues that
“[t]his treaty, along with other gender specific documents and
perspectives recently embraced by the global community as well
as the recognition of the need for gender perspectives in general
documents (such as the International Criminal Court statute), are
(can be) the foundation for making women’s equality an accessible reality.”11 Other feminist scholars, however, criticize what
they view as CEDAW’s practical futility with the consideration
that “rights only exist to the extent states recognize and enforce
them.”12 The area of asylum law uniquely feels the absence of
accountability mechanisms to enforce CEDAW.
United States asylum law is based on the Immigration
and Nationality Act revision after adoption of the 1951 United

The Modern American

Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refu- asylum describes its legal framework as heavily reliant on malegees Convention”) and the corresponding 1967 United Nations centered experiences.25 Specifically, many of these critiques
protocol.13 Gender is not an enumerated asylum ground under appropriately point out that certain persecution-defined harms,
the Refugees Convention, which includes race, religion, nation- such as domestic violence, are often regarded as “private” issues
ality, political opinion or a “particular social group.”14 In 1991, that are unworthy of foreign intervention.26 Beyond this specific
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu- observation, male bias also appears within the common law tests
gees (“UNHCR”) attempted to address this omission by issuing for defining persecution. These tests premise “rational” presumpGuidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women that explained tions about violence on a limited set of realities faced by a minor“women refugees who are persecuted on account of their oppo- ity of applicants. For this reason DV is an exceedingly difficult
sition to social traditions need protection and therefore should claim to prove within the governing law.
qualify as members of a [particular social group].”15 Several
It is worth noting that gender violence is not synonycountries, including the United States, issued their own guide- mous with violence against women. Historically, among feminist
lines to further clarify the role of gender in refugee cases.
writers, domestic violence had been conceptualized as spousal
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) or heterosexual partner violence.27 Contemporary feminist writissued Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum ers and advocates prefer the term, “intimate-partner violence,”
Claims from Women (“INS Guidelines”) in 1995.16 Domestic to capture abuse within non-legally recognized relationships
advocates heralded the INS Guidelines as a “significant step for- (such as relationships between non-married people or between
ward for women in asylum law[.]”17 In terms of DV claims, the lesbian, gay, or transgender-identified individuals).28 Others preINS Guidelines are helpful because they affirm that “private” fer “gender-based violence” to broaden this perspective even
persecution in which the government is unwilling or unable to more because gender non-conformity (sometimes perceived as
intervene is a cognizable asylum claim.18 At the same time, how- homosexuality) and other gender-related human rights abuses
ever, the INS Guidelines failed to establish domestic violence occur outside the law’s current scope.29 This discussion is framed
itself as a form of persecution and instead regarded it merely as within the context of domestic violence for analytical purposes.30
evidence of past persecution.19 Most importantly, the INS Guide- Generally speaking, relationship violence, regardless of form,
lines do not assume the force of law. 20 This essential issue will remains on the outskirts of the law because male-centered perbe discussed more in the final section.
spectives continue to dominate asylum law.31
Efforts by international law-making bodies to establish
It is also important to understand DV as a social, politiviolence against women as a cognizable asylum claim within cal, and moral pandemic. The international statistics are staggerits member-states clearly fall short. The United States (“U.S.”) ing. One-quarter to one-half of all women are abused by intimate
rarely grants asylum for gender-based violence against women, partners, and 40 to 70% of all female murder victims are killed
even though 80% of the world’s 27 million
by intimate partners.32 Sadly, U.S. statisrefugees are women and children.21 The
tics reflect similar trends. A 1995-1996
legal authority around domestic violence is Simply put, U.S. immigration survey found that nearly 25% of women,
clear, yet “its operation still depends on the courts and executive officers and 7.6% of men, were raped or physipolitical will of those who interpret it.”22
cally assaulted by an intimate partner in
lack the political will to
Simply put, U.S. immigration courts and
their lifetime.33 Intimate partner violence
enforce the law.
executive officers lack the political will to
constituted 20% of all non-fatal violence
enforce the law.
against women in 2001, and 3% of all nonfatal violence toward men.34 Almost half
of all 3.5 million crimes committed against
III. Reading Between the Lines: Critical Gender family members were spousal abuse between 1998 and 2002.35
Perspective in Asylum Common Law and
DV exhibits a pattern of violence and oppression that is inherent
Precedent Cases
in any reasonable notion of persecution. The international community’s impression of persecution in the 1950’s, however, does
Feminist legal scholars have long-argued that DV survi- not reflect our modern realities, and those seeking to expand the
vors deserve asylum protection as a “particular social group”23 definition of DV have faced a decades-long legal challenge that
(“PSG”). These analyses generate explanatory force behind argu- has proven more difficult than ever imagined.
ments that violence against women is tolerated within asylum
Domestic violence does not fit neatly into the current
law throughout the world.24 Interestingly, however, even though refugee legal regime. In order to be eligible for a discretionary
gendered violence remains a rare basis on which to grant asylum, grant of relief, a petitioner must show a well-founded fear of pertwo new trends have emerged. First, DV claims tied to religious secution based on a protected status and must meet three criteria:
or political persecution are increasingly successful. Second, 1) the pervasiveness of the act in the individual’s home country;
“uncivilized” violence against women, specifically FGM, is gain- 2) a lack of existing refuge within the individual’s home country;
ing favor within courts as a basis for asylum. I argue that these and 3) the government’s unwillingness or inability to intervene.
two patterns do not reflect significant improvement in attitudes Two requirements specifically pose challenges for domestic viotoward female survivors; rather, these patterns reveal systemic lence claims: proving persecution (clear probability that one’s
male bias within the asylum legal framework in its common law life or freedom is threatened)36 and demonstrating that such
and interpretative rationale.
persecution is attributed to a statutorily protected status, such as
Scholars address male bias within asylum law in both race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or a PSG.37 Many
a general and a specific context. Generally, scholarship on DV DV petitioners argue that they will suffer persecution based on
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their membership in a PSG or based on their political opinion is that this test presents a pernicious epistemological dilemma
against women and girl violence. 38
when considered with the non-PSG standards. As noted before,
Ironically, without gender as an enumerated ground, there are three criteria for the persecution threshold, including a
PSG DV claims are not viable at all because “defining what con- “pervasive” standard and “inability to escape” standard. DV surstitutes such a group for purposes of the INA remains elusive vivors who may experience “private” violence that is nonetheless
and inconsistent.” 39 The PSG category is sometimes referred to pervasive, normalized, or honored, face a disadvantage to prove
as a Refugee Convention drafting “afterthat their persecution is visible when it is
thought,”40 only added on a whim by a
systemically ignored, rationalized, or ritualDV survivors who may
single delegation wishing to have a miscelized. Thus, the “substantial evidence” bar49
lany category. One scholar described the experience “private” violence is heightened for DV survivors who must
Refugee Convention’s provisions, which
that DV has a high occurrence rate
that is nonetheless pervasive, show
he believes mirrors post-World War II era
and is visible in their home country. Such a
politics, as “frozen in time.”41 U.S. immi- normalized, or honored, face proposition is counter-intuitive because any
gration judges and the United Nations have a disadvantage to prove that “rational” state government would address
construed this category to mean selective
known harms against its citizens,
their persecution is visible widely
persecution, 42 meaning that a PSG cannot
but this presumption is inaccurate when
be significantly defined by its past or future when it is systemically ignored, applied to DV and other gendered violence.
persecution. For instance, the Sixth Circuit
rationalized, or ritualized. The internal tensions built into the visibilCourt found that young, attractive Albanian
ity test and other standards starkly contrast
women who fear being forced into prostiwith the realities of violence faced by a
tution are not a PSG because they constitute a self-defined or large number of women. Further, this dilemma demonstrates a
“impermissibly circular” (IC) group.43 DV claims are arguably narrow common law construction that favors male-experienced
most vulnerable on this point because “domestic violence survi- persecution.
vors” are interpreted as an “impermissibly circular” social group
The final PSG test is “particularity” which requires a
that is defined by its membership. The IC application discussed social group to be discerned “in a manner sufficiently distinct
in the next section will address how the three PSG tests pose dis- that the group would be recognized, in the society in question, as
tinct barriers for DV claims.
a discrete class of persons.”50 The “particularity” test is intended
to create a benchmark for objectively determining group membership.51 Yet its interpretation, like the visibility test, reveals
Male Bias Embedded within Legal Tests
implicit male bias. An opinion from the Third Circuit, Fatin v.
Immigration & Naturalization Service,52 characterizes this bias,
There are three PSG tests: immutability, visibility, and stating:
particularity. Each test contains subtle, insidious male-bias in
its common law construction that leads to an unnecessarily nar“Limited in this way, the ‘particular social
row interpretation. The outcome is that legitimate DV claims are
group’ identified by the petitioner may well satrejected almost per se because PSG tests are construed narrowly
isfy the BIA’s definition of that concept, for if a
and heighten the burden of proof for petitioners.
woman’s opposition to the Iranian laws in quesThe first test is the Acosta standard, which establishes
tion is so profound that she would choose to
that a social group must share a common, immutable “ characsuffer the severe consequences of noncompliteristic that either is beyond the power of the individual members
ance, her beliefs may well be characterized as
of the group to change or is so fundamental to their identities
‘so fundamental to [her] identity or conscience
or consciences that it ought not be required to be changed.”44
that [they] ought not be required to be changed’
Some courts have slightly expanded this definition to include
(internal citation omitted). The petitioner’s
an innate characteristic or shared past experience.45 The Acosta
difficulty, however, is that the administrative
standard is favorable to DV claims. For example, a female DV
record does not establish that she is a member
survivor who suffers persecution at the hands of a male lover
of this tightly defined group, for there is no eviwho hurts her because of his belief that women are subordinate
dence in that record showing that her opposito men, and because he has the physical ability to do so, may eastion to the Iranian laws at issue is of the depth
ily meet the Acosta standard on account of her identity as female
and importance required.”53
or her history of abuse.46 Overall, the flexibility around the
Acosta standard accommodates DV claims. It is the other two
The Circuit Court rejected Fatin’s petition despite ample
requirements—visibility and particularity—that are the most dif- evidence that she was doubly at risk as a female member of a
ficult to meet.
politically targeted family in Iran.54 Moreover, the Court relied
Social visibility is the second PSG test. This test is par- on an admittedly sparse record to conclude that a reasonable
ticularly context-dependent47 since petitioners must provide evi- fact-finder could not find that the petitioner would face a threat
dence that they are at greater risk due to their membership in an amounting to persecution “simply” because she is a woman.55
identifiable PSG.48 This test clearly excludes less visible forms The opinion ignored her family’s political status when relevant,
of persecution like DV or rape. Other scholars have examined and her status as a politically-vulnerable woman when important
the exclusion of privatized violence in detail, and this will be to determine that she was at risk for neither reason. This case
addressed briefly later in the essay. More significant, however, demonstrates that the visibility and particularly tests interlock to
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reinforce male bias by privileging male-experienced persecution Judges choose to find sympathetic exceptions among cases rather
over other types of meritorious persecution.
than choosing to embrace gender-based persecution into the law.
The three “particular social group” tests create numerous This approach inevitably undermines future domestic violence
barriers for proving persecution outside traditional male norms. claims. There are three primary areas of analysis ripe for inconPerhaps worse than rejecting legitimate
sistent, biased discretion, which are approDV claims vis-à-vis PSG tests, the courts
priate to call “opportunistic rationality”:
courts inconsistently apply private/public persecution, state/non-govhave adopted the facially-neutral rule of
“impermissibly circular,” which adversely the rule based on culturally- ernmental actors, and violent experiences.
impacts gender-based claims. Worse still,
rationality reinforces that
loaded, paternalistic beliefs Opportunistic
courts inconsistently apply the rule based
“reason” goes as far as the logician in genon culturally-loaded, paternalistic beliefs about “deserving exceptions. der-based asylum cases.
about “deserving exceptions.”
The first area of analysis is the
distinction between “private” and “public”
persecution. Domestic violence is essenThe “Impermissibly Circular” Argument and Its tially a misnomer as violence against partners takes place in both
Opportunistic Rationality
private and public view. Its description relates more to an antiquated conception of the relationship between perpetrator and
The “impermissibly circular” (“IC”) rule derives from survivor. Nevertheless, “[t]raditional human rights law (and virthe rationale that a PSG must exist independently of the perse- tually all other discourses except feminism) has separated out
cution suffered by the applicant for asylum.56 In other words, a acts that occur in the public sector from those that transpire in
PSG must exist before the alleged persecution to avoid defining a the private sphere.”67 As a result, courts have rejected otherwise
group within its own “contours.”57 Past persecution, under some legitimate asylum claims on the basis that there is no justificacircumstances, may demonstrate a well-founded fear of future tion for state intervention. Over time, “private act” justifications
persecution; it cannot, however, constitute the substantive claim have become less accepted, but remarkably it continues to have
for protection.58 In some cases, previously discussed PSG tests a menacing presence in U.S. asylum domestic violence claims,
are interwoven together to form an IC analysis. For instance, exemplified by a feminist BIA favorite: The Matter of R-A-.
at-risk youth within a certain country are unlikely to meet the
The Matter of R-A-68 is an archetypal example of the
persecution threshold because their membership is based on a enduring belief that domestic violence is essentially a private
self-defining, mutable characteristic—age.59 IC, therefore, refers matter. In this case, Rodi Alvardo, a native Guatemalan, sought
to the ways by which a PSG is narrowed in the common law to refugee status after suffering years of violent physical, sexual,
necessarily exclude claims.60 Otherwise, supporters fear that the and emotional abuse from her husband, which included: her dislaw would “sanction an illogical, circular ‘nexus’ construct, i.e., located jaw for a late period, spinal injuries from a kicking attack
individuals are targeted for persecution because they belong to after refusing an abortion and near physical disability when a
a group of individuals who are targeted for persecution.”61 This thrown machete barely missed her fingers.69 Alvardo demonfear seems to contradict the fundamental purposes for asylum to strated that domestic violence in Guatemala remains prevalent70
provide refuge to individuals who are persecuted for particularly and that few if any legal organizations could have helped her.71
inequitable reasons.
She was successful in the lower immigration court in arguing that
Many gender-based claims, especially DV claims, are her political opinion, opposing male domination, culminated in
dismissed for being “impermissibly circular.”62 U.S. courts con- her well-founded fear of persecution, with which the BIA parsistently apply the IC rule, despite international consensus urg- tially agreed.72 The BIA ruled that the case turned on whether
ing judges to include women as a PSG when appropriate.63 Not Alvardo’s husband had knowledge of her views and abused her
only is it peculiar that federal courts apply a non-discrimination but for her views.73 In its determination, the BIA refused to apply
human rights treaty to exclude legitimate claims by women,64 but the imputed political doctrine,74 a device that allows the court
it is even more unsettling when the U.S. is one of the four coun- to affirmatively impute a political opinion through evidentiary
tries (out of 41) with a domestic policy that recognizes “women” inferences, such as acts of resistance.75 The imputed political
as a PSG.65 If arguably U.S. courts have become more gender- doctrine is recommended by the INS Guidelines for cases such
sensitive in response to the 1995 INS Guidelines, courts still as this one. Instead, almost in defiance, the BIA dismissed INS
embrace IC derivatives to deny DV claims, and to say that bat- Guidelines as “not controlling on us”76 and found that “it is diffitered women are too large of a social group
cult to conclude on the actual record before
for the purposes of statutory construction.66
us that there is any ‘opinion’ the respondent
It appears that the classic could have held, or convinced her husband
Recent cases continue to show a reluctance
to recognize freedom from gendered vio“worthy refugee” dilemma she held, that would have prevented the
77
lence as a civil or political human right.
is only further strained with abuse she experienced.”
While there are indications that
The BIA’s opinion in The Matgender, race, and cultural ter of R-A- rendered the petitioner’s belief
gender-based claims are receiving more
serious treatment, adjudicators continue
complexities.
that she deserves to live free from domesto perpetuate male bias and, in certain
tic violence as an apolitical viewpoint. In
instances, substitute cultural bias for genother words, although governing law does
der bias. It appears that the classic “worthy refugee” dilemma is not require political opinions to be articulated in a certain way
only further strained with gender, race, and cultural complexities. or venue,78 the court was unwilling to recognize her claim as
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worthy of intervention because it was not an effective opinion. claim against her black persecutors.83 The problem with characThe de-politicization of Alvardo’s views reinforces the belief that terizing FGM cases as exceptionally violent is that it obscures
domestic violence is not a public matter—it is simply another urgency around violent experiences, such as domestic violence,
unfortunate private situation over which the state has no power.
that are more familiar to U.S. judges. “Uncivilized” violence
The second area of analysis relates to non-state per- against women and girls “over there” does not force courts to
secutors. DV claims reveal the historic reluctance of judges to confront gender-based violence as a widespread, complex pheview non-governmental actors as potential
nomenon. In actuality, it exacerbates culpersecutors in the “safe haven” standard
tural and racial stereotypes in a way that
(among the three persecution criteria). “Uncivilized” violence against isolates and distances them from the issue.
Opponents to broadening the standard women and girls “over there” Inconsistent application of the law creates
maintain a misguided belief that “construthe potential for a racialized, tiered system
does not force courts to
ing private acts of violence to be qualifyby which violence is evaluated in the asyconfront gender-based
ing governmental persecution, by virtue
lum law in a way that ultimately does not
of inadequacy of protection, would obviserve human rights law.
violence as a widespread,
ate, perhaps entirely, the ‘on account of ’
Opportunistic
rationality
is
complex phenomenon.
requirement of the statute.”79 This is a slipdefined by false notions about the nature
of violence, and it is reinforced by legal
pery-slope argument that posits that updatrationalizations about distinctions among
ing the standard to reflect present-day
realities will somehow validate any asylum claim. On the con- these false notions. In addition to the PSG test interpretations,
trary, broadening the standard does not wash away state sover- male bias plays a more subtle role in decision-making through
eignty; instead, it more accurately captures the complex violence arbitrary application that is ironically justified by North Ameripatterns that we see today. There is a real distinction between can feminist paradigms.
inadequate state protection and unwillingness from the state to
protect a class. Fortunately, the current U.S. jurisprudential trend
IV. New Formulations, New Prospects?
is to acknowledge negative governmental action as rising to the
standard. It remains to be seen whether this trend will widely
The DHS supplemental brief submitted to the BIA
apply to gender-based cases, in which petitioners usually do not
have any practical protection at home. Equally worrisome, the on behalf of a domestic violence asylum-seeker seems to be a
modern “safe haven” standard is subject to high levels of discre- positive outcome for gender-based asylum cases. The brief prestion without codification. One example is Canada, which treats ents “alternative particular social group formulations” to the
its gender guidelines more seriously, arguing that pain and suf- respondent’s claim: “Mexican women in an abusive domestic
84
fering may result from willful government acquiescence.80 The relationship who are unable to leave.” DHS concedes that the
future of the modern “safe haven” standard will appreciably respondent’s argument fails under governing legal principles
because the “central common characteristic” is circular.85 In
depend on the outcomes of current DV cases.
addition to the alternative formulations, the
The final “opportunistic ratiobrief proposes that if either of its formunality” area of analysis is seen in violent
Opportunistic rationality
lations meets the criteria for a cognizable
experiences for which courts have creis defined by false notions claim, then remand is an appropriate mechated exceptions. Over the last decade, only
one area of gender-based asylum claims about the nature of violence, anism to consider where “significant legal
developments intervene.”86 The last caveat
has seen almost universal success: FGM
and
it
is
reinforced
by
legal
outlined by the brief is that some, but not
cases.81 These cases typify the “worthy refrationalizations about
all, domestic violence survivors are eligible
ugee” dilemma where adjudicators choose
for asylum. However, like any other asylum
to recognize the brutality of gender-related
distinctions among these
claim, every applicable requirement must
violence in one context while choosing to
false notions.
be satisfied for asylum to be granted.87
rationalize it in another. Half of the federal
There are discernable signs of
circuit courts and the BIA have found FGM
broader advocacy in the brief. In its genas an act of persecution rising to the level of
asylum protection during the last several years. Successful FGM eral requirement discussion, the brief stated that the applicant
cases will expose domestic violence claims to increased biased may satisfy the safe haven standard by showing that government
acquiescence is contributing to the respondent’s persecution.88
scrutiny at best.
FGM is not qualitatively distinct from DV but cultural This position reinforces the authority of the INS Guidelines
bigotry and racism color the issues differently in some judges’ despite higher courts’ attempts to dismiss their importance.
eyes. Courts’ treatment of domestic violence in relation to FGM Moreover, before laying out the formulations, the brief opined
exposes Western feminists’ failure to incorporate strong racial and “especially given the uneven development of the standards govcultural analysis into its advocacy surrounding the issue. Promi- erning cases like this one, it is important to articulate how a social
89
nent issue scholar Pamela Goldberg’s three-case comparison in group in such cases might be defined.” Both of these statements
the Second Circuit found race to be a key distinction among the are restrained, yet are striking examples that likely foreshadow
gender-based asylum claims that she studied.82 Notably, in one the new administration’s more liberal treatment of gender-based
case she describes that a black petitioner’s “exotic ‘otherness’” asylum cases.
did not reflect negatively against her as much as it supported her
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DHS articulates its formulations as “Mexican women political one. Many immigration judges may have a good faith
in domestic relationships who are unable to leave” or “Mexican belief that DV survivors simply do not meet the existing statuwomen who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions tory requirements. However, it is clear that there are systemic
within a domestic relationship.”90 DHS argues that a PSG claim impediments that influence the confines within which judges are
is “best defined in light of the evidence about how the respon- able to interpret important legal considerations like statutory
dent’s abuser and her society perceive her role within the domes- intent, case-specific facts, and policy issues. There is not much
tic relationship.”91 The brief goes on to detail the evidence on optimism for the successful outcome of the DV survivor in this
record that supports the formulation, including her testimony that particular case, considering the case law trend against DV claims
her husband “used to tell her that he could do anything he wanted and the absence of any significant changes to PSG construction,
to her because she belonged to him,” and it suggests that further but there is optimism that the DHS brief will create opportunities
fact-finding may substantiate that “social expectations in Mexico for institutional change on a case-advocacy level.
do little to disabuse [him] of his views in this regard.”92 These
Ultimately, institutional change is the best assurance
formulations, DHS argues, satisfy the immutability, visibility, that DV claims will be fairly adjudicated. There are a variety of
and particularity requirements, in which “complex and subtle” ways to affect institutional change, even through notoriously confact-finding may be required, and existing statutory definitions servative institutions, such as immigration courts. Attorneys who
may be evoked, to reasonably interpret the claims.93
challenge prevailing norms and assumptions in asylum advocacy
Interestingly, the DHS formulations are identical to play an important role. Theorists, especially feminist scholars,
some feminist scholars’ proposals over the last decade to trans- have fulfilled a vital need by forming the basis by which some
form DV into a cognizable asylum. The primary, though not advocates have advanced alternative frames. Policy advocates
exclusive, project by feminists during this time has been to find (many of whom fall into the latter categories as well) also target
ways to narrow domestic violence claims so that they better fit the underpinnings that limit future progress for DV claims. Each
into the three PSG factor tests. Feminists’ proposals can be gen- approach, in its persistence and originality, promises that gendererally categorized into three groups: 1) traditional approach: re- based asylum claims, in time, will be treated more seriously by
formulating arguments to fit within existing legal interpretations; courts.
2) feminist approach: arguing that existing interpretations are
inaccurate or biased against legitimate claims, thus urging new
V. Conclusion
rule construction and 3) reform approach: advocating for international and domestic statutory revisions to more clearly include
I suggest that scholars concerned about gender-based
“gender” into refugee law. DHS adopted a traditional approach
that attempts to narrow the “domestic violence survivor” class asylum may want to shift their focus from re-thinking legitimate
by combining several elements: geography, political opinion, and arguments about why gendered violence is deserving of asylum
protection, to discussing systemic changes that can more directly
case-specific facts.
The DHS formulations will test scholars’ proposals that affect decision-making. I believe in particular that strengthening
were argued to meet judicial scrutiny when initially proposed— the INS Guidelines can prove to be enormously beneficial. At
all other factors remaining consistent. One proposal, written by least one persuasive feminist scholar credits the INS Guidelines
Patricia Seith in 1997, argues that domestic violence is analo- with successful rape and FGM claims, in which the guidance
gous to FGM because both practices attempt to “control [ ] established “a valuable legal framework for asylum claims based
98
women’s sexuality,”94 and that “[w]omen living in a particular on domestic violence.”
Since this assessment was over a decade ago, there are
country who are subject to domestic violence, are unable to get
government protection, and oppose the practice” meet the BIA questions yet to be re-visited about the INS Guidelines. Should
requirements under the seminal decision in Kasigna.95 Another they be codified or at least be required reading for judges? If
they remain nonbinding, is there addiprominent scholar on domestic violence
tional authority that can make them even
asylum, Laura Adams, made an argument
The consistent denial of DV more persuasive? Based on its success,
for a doctrinal re-orientation that takes
two views related to government acqui- claims is not a legal issue—it is can gender-based violence be considered
an independent basis (within PSG) upon
escence. One view is similar to the DHS
a political one.
which future persecution will be deterformulation suggesting that a DV claim
mined? With vast opportunity in a human
itself may implicate a foreign governrights era, thinkers can move away from
ment’s failure to protect its citizen from
persecution.96 Adams takes the position that shifting the focus defending its values to implementing its force.
The political climate toward human rights is ideal for
from the individual batterer to the state’s relationship to the harm
is the necessary ingredient for a successful DV claim.97 It will be engineering fine-tuned legal and policy reform strategies. It is a
interesting to see whether the BIA embraces any of these aspects, matter of catching up U.S. asylum law with its international commitments which is by no means easy, but it is possible given the
as both scholars introduced these ideas at least five years ago.
The fundamental belief that guides the traditional strong framework outlined by scholars and advocates alike. DV
approach is that the current legal PSG construction is based on survivors deserve asylum protection, as do other gender-based
an honest, intellectual disagreement about proper interpretation. violence survivors. Human rights advocates’ chief test is to make
The consistent denial of DV claims is not a legal issue—it is a this area a priority.
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Postracial Discrimination
By
Girardeau A. Spann*

Introduction
In one respect, the 2008 election of Barack Obama as
the first black President of the United States may turn out to be
bad for blacks, and for other racial minorities as well. Some have
suggested that the Obama election indicates that we now live
in a postracial society, where discrimination based on race has
ceased to be a serious problem.1 Others have strenuously contested that claim, arguing that significant racial discrimination
still exists in the United States notwithstanding the election of
President Obama.2 But one thing does seem reasonably clear. The
Obama presidency has served to embolden those who wish to
deny claims of current racial injustice.
Claims of racial injustice can now be challenged simply by arguing that the culture obviously makes it possible for
minorities to compete with whites on a level playing field. Under
this reasoning, racial disparities that continue to inhere in the
allocation of societal benefits and burdens must be caused by
the attributes of individual minority group members themselves,
rather than by any invidious consideration of their race. Although
the argument is by no means a new one, the election of President
Obama now gives that argument more apparent plausibility than
it has had in the past. Indeed, if one were inclined to preserve the
nation’s tradition of privileging white interests over the interests
of racial minorities, it would be strategically sensible to frame
one’s discriminatory impulses in precisely this manner. That way,
the nation’s evolution to its supposed new postracial maturation
could ironically be utilized as an ingenious device for continued
racial oppression.
The essence of this postracial form of discrimination
would entail the transformation of a conventional discrimination
claim asserted by racial minorities into a claim of reverse discrimination asserted by whites. That transformation could be
achieved by stressing the absence of any legally cognizable basis
for providing remedial resources to the original minority claimants, in order to free up those resource for allocation to worthier
whites. The technique would entail more than just the time-honored practice of evading a discrimination claim by blaming the
victims. It would also recast the minority victims as shameless
perpetrators of discrimination, with all of the negative connotations that an indictment of unlawful discrimination conveys.
It turns out that this postracial discrimination strategy is
far from merely hypothetical. Its proponents include a majority
of the current Justices on the United States Supreme Court. The
Roberts Court, despite its relative youth, has already issued a
number of decisions that employ the technique of postracial dis
crimination to elevate the interests of whites over the interests of
racial minorities. The most revealing is its 2009 decision in Ricci
v. DeStefano,3 where a divided Court required the City of New
Haven to utilize the results of a firefighter promotion exam that
benefitted whites, even though the exam had a racially-disparate
impact that adversely affected Latinos and blacks. The majority opinion depicted historically advantaged white firefighters as
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the victims of unlawful discrimination, while depicting historically disadvantaged minority firefighters as the politically powerful perpetrators of invidious discrimination.4 The governing
legal doctrines hardly compelled the Court’s result, or the Court’s
inversion of the customary categories of perpetrator and victim.
In fact, both the statutory meaning of Title VII and the Court’s
own precedents had to be modified so severely that the decision
amounts to an exercise in conservative judicial activism.
In Title VII, Congress outlawed racially disparate
employment practices unless they could be justified by a showing
of job-relatedness, and by the absence of any less discriminatory,
job-related alternative. In so doing, Congress struck a political
balance between its pragmatic interest in protecting settled white
employment expectations and its aspirational interest in dissipating the entrenched advantages that whites continue to have over
racial minorities in the employment market. Although this was
a quintessentially legislative judgment—made by a politically
accountable Congress, operating under a constitutional form of
government that assigns democratic policymaking functions to
its representative branches—the Supreme Court apparently disagrees with the legislative balance that Congress struck.
The Ricci Court not only marginalized the effectiveness of statutory disparate-impact claims, but it also threatened
to declare such claims unconstitutional. And the Ricci decision
does not exist in isolation. When Ricci is considered in conjunction with other Roberts Court decisions concerning voting rights,
racial profiling, English language education, and school resegregation, the Roberts Court’s race cases seem to fit neatly into the
pattern of Supreme Court hostility to racial minority interests
that is becoming the hallmark of postracial discrimination.
Part I of this Article discusses the Roberts Court’s recent
Ricci decision, highlighting the Supreme Court voting blocs
that have developed with respect to the issue of race. Part I.A
describes the majority and concurring opinions of the conservative bloc Justices. Part I.B describes the dissenting opinion of the
liberal bloc Justices. Part II describes the doctrinal difficulties
that are entailed in trying to defend the Court’s resolution of the
case. Part II.A explains why the decision does not fit comfortably within the dictates of preexisting title VII doctrine. Part II.B
explains why the decision does not fit comfortably within the
law governing summary judgment. Part III argues that the Ricci
decision constitutes an exercise in postracial discrimination.
Part III.A describes how the Court inverts the categories of per
petrator and victim in a way that ultimately allows it to invert the
categories of discrimination and equality. Part III.B argues that
the Ricci postracial discrimination technique is simply the most
recent in a long line of judicial strategies that the Supreme Court
has historically used to justify the oppression of racial minorities.
The article concludes that the potential effectiveness of genuine antidiscrimination remedies, such as the Title VII remedies
that the Court dilutes Ricci, may be precisely what attracts the
Supreme Court to its practice of postracial discrimination.
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The Ricci Decision

A. The Conservative Bloc

In Ricci v DeStefano,5 the Supreme Court held 5–4
that the City of New Haven was required by the employment
discrimination prohibitions contained in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to utilize the results of a written firefighter
promotion exam that the City administered, even though the City
chose to reject those results because of the racially disparate
impact that the exam produced. Whites generally performed better than blacks and Latinos on the exam, and the City feared that
use of the exam would subject the City to potential liability for
violating the disparate-impact prohibition of Title VII. However,
seventeen white firefighters and one Latino firefighter—firefighters who would have been eligible for immediate promotions if
the exam results had been certified—threatened to sue the City.
They claimed that a decision to disregard the exam results would
be racially motivated in a way that would violate the disparatetreatment prohibition of Title VII. The City, therefore, believed
that it was on the horns of a dilemma. Whatever action it took, it
would be subject to a Title VII suit filed by unhappy firefighters.
The City chose not to certify the exam results, and the disap
pointed white and Latino firefighters sued. The United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut entered summary
judgment for the City, and a panel of the Second Circuit—whose
members included then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor—summarily
affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion. The full Second
Circuit denied rehearing en banc, by a vote of 7–6. The Supreme
Court then reversed the lower courts, finding that the City’s
actions violated the disparate-treatment provision of Title VII.
Although the disappointed firefighters also claimed that the City
violated their Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights,
the Supreme Court saw no need to reach the constitutional issue
in light of its statutory disposition of the case.6
The majority opinion detected an internal tension
between the disparate-impact and disparate-treatment provisions
of Title VII. Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts,
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, resolved that tension by giving primacy to the disparate-treatment provision, unless there
was a “strong basis in evidence” for concluding that disparatetreatment was necessary to avoid a disparate-impact violation.7
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion, suggesting that the
disparate-impact provision of Title VII was itself invalid, because
it compelled the consideration of race in a way that violated
the Equal Protection principle of the Constitution.8 Justice
Alito wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Scalia and
Thomas, arguing that the City’s stated desire to avoid a Title
VII disparate-impact violation was a mere pretext for the City’s
actual desire “to placate a politically important racial constituency.”9 Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, arguing that Title VII permitted disparate treatment as long as there was “good cause” to
believe that such treatment was necessary to avoid a disparateimpact violation, and stating that there was good cause in Ricci
because less discriminatory job-related alternatives were availa
ble.10 It is noteworthy that the Justices in Ricci voted in ways that
are so highly correlated with their votes in other race cases that
the Supreme Court can fairly be said to consist of conservative
and liberal voting blocs on the issue of race.

The five Justices who joined Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion in Ricci vote so consistently against the minority interests presented in race cases that they have come to constitute a
conservative Supreme Court voting bloc on the issue of race.11
The members of that voting bloc are Chief Justice Roberts, and
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. None of those
five Justices has ever voted in favor of the racial minority claim
at issue in a constitutional affirmative action case, a majorityminority redistricting case, or a racial integration case while sitting on the Supreme Court.12
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1. Justice Kennedy’s Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Ricci, joined
by the other members of the conservative bloc, held that New
Haven’s decision not to certify the results of its firefighter promotion exam in order to avoid a potential Title VII disparate-impact
violation had the effect of itself constituting a Title VII disparatetreatment violation.13 The opinion began with a detailed recitation of the facts as Justice Kennedy viewed them, because the
majority’s understanding of what it held to be undisputed facts
was important to the majority’s holding that the case could be
resolved on summary judgment.14
According to Justice Kennedy, the New Haven City
Charter required the City to fill vacancies in its classified civil
service jobs through a merit-based system including the use of
written examinations. The City hired an Illinois company to serve
as an outside consultant, whom it asked to design job-related
exams that could be used as part of the process of identifying the
most qualified applicants for promotion to lieutenant and captain.
The consultant designed multiple-choice exams after a lengthy
process that was intended to ensure job-relatedness. That process included an oversampling of minority input in order to guard
against unintentional white bias. The consultant also designed
oral exams containing hypotheticals that were intended to test
for qualities including firefighting, leadership, and management
skills. According to the employment contract between the City
and the firefighters union, the written exams were to account for
60% of an applicant’s total eligibility score, and the oral exams
were to account for the remaining 40%.15
When the written and oral exams were administered
to promotion candidates in December 2003, the written exams
turned out to have a racially disparate impact. Although a number of whites, blacks and Latinos had taken the exams, all ten
applicants who scored high enough to be eligible for “immediate
promotion” to lieutenant were white. Of the nine applicants who
scored high enough to be eligible for immediate promotion to
captain, seven were white and two were Latino.16
The City’s legal counsel believed that the results of the
written firefighter promotion exams might constitute a violation
of the disparate-impact provision of Title VII, and that the need
to avoid such a violation might authorize the use of race-conscious remedies for the disparate impact produced by the exams.
The legal counsel communicated those views to the New Haven
Civil Service Board, which was the municipal agency charged
with certifying the results of promotional exams for civil service
positions.17 As a result, the Civil Service Board held a series of
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meetings to determine whether it should certify the exam results
in light of the disparate impact produced by the exams. At these
meetings, some firefighters who took the exams defended the
results. They included the named plaintiff Frank Ricci—a dyslexic firefighter who spent considerable time and money preparing for his written exam. Other firefighters who took the exams
spoke against certifying the results, describing the exam questions as outdated and not relevant to firefighting practices in New
Haven.18
The President of the New Haven firefighters union
asked the Civil Service Board to conduct a validation study to
determine whether the exams were job-related. Representatives
of the International Association of Black Professional Firefighters urged the Board to reject the exam results, arguing that the
exam was “inherently unfair,” that a validation study for the exam
was necessary, and that the exam results could be adjusted to
avoid their racially disparate impact.19 The Illinois consultant
who developed the exams testified that his company possessed
substantial experience developing similar exams in other cities,
that it had taken precautions to ensure that the exams were jobrelated, and that the exams minimized the possibility of any racial
bias.20 Another consultant, who sometimes competed with the
consultant who designed the New Haven exams, testified that he
was a bit surprised by the deg ree of disparate impact exhibited in
the New Haven exams, but noted that whites generally perform
better than minorities on such written exams. The competing
consultant also testified that an alternative selection procedure,
using “assessment centers” rather than written exams, could better gauge a candidate’s reactions to real world firefighting situa
tions. He concluded, however, that the New Haven exam results
could be certified as stemming from a “reasonably good test,”
and that assessment centers might be used in the future.21 A
retired black fire captain, who was a fire program specialist at the
Department of Homeland Security, testified that the exam questions seemed relevant, and noted that whites generally perform
better than minorities on written tests. A Boston College professor of race and culture also testified that whites typically outperform minorities on written tests, and further stated that the New
Haven exams might have been developed in a subtly skewed way
that could have favored white candidates.22
At the Civil Service Board’s final meeting on the issue,
the City’s legal counsel argued that he now believed that federal
law prohibited certification of the exam results because of their
disparate impact, which was greater than the disparate impact
exhibited in the City’s prior exams. He also thought that the
testimony compiled by the Board showed that there were less
discriminatory alternatives to the New Haven exams that had
produced the racially disparate impact. The City’s chief administrator, who spoke on behalf of Mayor DeStefano, also argued
against certification because less discriminatory alternatives
existed. In addition, the City’s human resources director argued
against certification, favoring the use of a less discriminatory
alternative.23 However, other witnesses at this final meeting
favored certification of the results. These included the President
of the New Haven firefighters union, who emphasized the evidence showing that the exams were fair and reasonable. The witnesses favoring certification also included plaintiff Ricci, who
conceded that assessment centers might be a less discriminatory
alternative. However, Ricci emphasized that assessment centers
were not available for the 2003 round of promotions, and that
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assessment center protocols would take several years to develop.
After this series of meetings, the Civil Service Board deadlocked
2–2 on the certification question, meaning that the exam results
were not certified.24
The disappointed firefighter promotion candidates, who
were plaintiffs in the District Court and petitioners in the Supreme
Court, alleged that the City’s refusal to certify the exam results
constituted unlawful discrimination that violated the disparatetreatment provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Of the seventeen whites and two Latinos who were eligible for
immediate promotions based on the contested exam results, all
but one Latino sued New Haven officials to challenge the City’s
refusal to certify the exam results. They also alleged a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. The parties filed cross motions for
summary judgment, with the City arguing that it had good cause
for any disparate treatment in which it had engaged, because the
City was trying to avoid a Title VII disparate-impact violation.
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
entered summary judgment for the City, finding that the desire to
avoid disparate-impact liability did not establish the discriminatory intent necessary for a Title VII disparate-treatment violation,
and that the City’s actions did not violate the Equal Protection
rights of the plaintiffs. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion that adopted the reasoning of the District Court, and denied
rehearing en banc by a vote of 7–6 over two written dissents.
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to consider what it
viewed as a novel question presented by the interaction between
the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title
VII.25 The Solicitor General of the United States participated as
amicus curiae, urging affirmance of the lower court decisions.26
Justice Kennedy’s legal analysis first addressed the Title
VII statutory claim asserted by the petitioners, which was ultimately resolved in a way that avoided the need to address the
constitutional Equal Protection claim.27 Justice Kennedy noted
that Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and that the Title VII
prohibition applies to both intentional “disparate-treatment” discrimination and unintentional “disparate-impact” discrimination.
As originally enacted in 1964, the language of Title VII prohibited only intentional disparate-treatment discrimination, but the
1971 Supreme Court decision in Griggs v. Duke Power28 interpreted the statute to prohibit unintentional disparate-impact discrimination as well. Under Griggs, an employment practice with
a racially disparate impact constituted a Title VII violation unless
the employer could establish that the practice was sufficiently job
related to constitute a “business necessity.” In Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody,29 the Supreme Court further held that even a demonstration of job-related business necessity would not suffice to
avoid Title VII disparate-impact liability if the plaintiff could
establish that a less discriminatory alternative practice would also
serve the employer’s legitimate business needs. The Griggs reading of Title VII was formally codified by Congress in the Civil
Rights Act ofAlthough the firefighter promotion exam results did
establish a prima facie Title VII unintentional disparate-impact
violation, the City’s race-based decision to remedy that prima
facie violation by refusing to certify the exam results would also
constitute a Title VII intentional disparate-treatment violation,
unless the refusal to certify was adequately justified. The District

The Modern American

Court, and the United States as amicus curiae, believed that the
motive of preventing a disparate-impact violation could not, as a
matter of law, constitute a disparate-treatment violation, but Justice Kennedy concluded that this analysis was wrong because it
applied the wrong legal standard. The fact that the City may have
had a permissible objective in seeking to avoid disparate impact
did not establish that race-based means of achieving that objective were permissible.31
Because Justice Kennedy found the disparate-treatment
and disparate-impact provisions of Title VII to be in conflict, he
considered possible ways of resolving that conflict while still
advancing the ultimate purpose of Title VII, which was to provide
a workplace “where race is not a barrier to opportunity.”32 He
rejected the petitioners’ suggestion that unintentional disparateimpact discrimination could never justify intentional disparatetreatment discrimination, concluding that both statutory goals
had to be accommodated if possible. He then rejected the petitioner’s argument that disparate treatment should only be permissible if it were first established that a disparate-impact violation
actually existed. Justice Kennedy reasoned that such a holding
would undermine the desire of Congress to promote voluntary
compliance with Title VII, by forcing employers to address
ambiguous disparate-impact claims only at their peril.33
Justice Kennedy also rejected the suggestion made by
the respondent City, and by the United States, that intentional
disparate-treatment should be permissible whenever an employer
had a good-faith belief that such disparate treatment was necessary to avoid a disparate-impact violation. Justice Kennedy
concluded that this good-faith standard would ignore the “foundational prohibition” of Title VII, which bars employers from taking adverse employment actions “because of…race.”34 It would
“encourage race-based action at the slightest hint of disparate
impact,” in a way that “amounted to a de facto quota system” that
focused unduly on statistics. “Even worse,” such reliance on statistical disparities would permit an employer to pursue a desired
“racial balance” in violation of Title VII’s express disclaimer of
any interpretation “calling for outright racial balancing.”35
Justice Kennedy borrowed what he believed to be the
appropriate compromise standard from prior Supreme Court
affirmative action cases that addressed the tension between the
goals of advancing prospective race neutrality and providing a
remedy for past discrimination. In the affirmative action context,
the Court previously held that the Equal Protection clause prohibits the use of race-based affirmative action remedies unless
there is a “strong basis in evidence” establishing that race-based
remedies are necessary.36 Even though the Title VII statutory
constraints might not be parallel in all respects to the constitutional constraints, Justice Kennedy found that the constitutional
principles still provided helpful guidance in the statutory context.
The “strong basis in evidence” standard gave effect to both the
disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title VII.
It left ample room for voluntary employer compliance efforts,
while appropriately constraining employer discretion in making
race-based decisions.37
Justice Kennedy viewed the “strong basis in evidence”
standard as consistent with the Title VII prohibition on making
racial adjustments to employment-related test scores, and with
the need to protect the “legitimate expectations” of those who
would be burdened by the abandonment of such test scores solely
because of race-based statistics. He reasoned that, if Title VII
Fall 2009

prohibited adjusting test scores, it also prohibited “the greater
step of discarding the test altogether.”38 The “strong basis in evidence” standard was also consistent with Title VII’s protection of
bona fide promotional examinations.39 Because the Court would
go on to hold that New Haven did not satisfy the “strong basis in
evidence” standard, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion expressly
declined to reach the question of whether the Title VII disparateimpact provision itself would be constitutional in a case where
the standard had been met.40 He did, however, emphasize that
Title VII did not prohibit an employer from intentionally designing a test or employment practice in a way that would provide a
fair opportunity for all individuals to compete regardless of their
race.41
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion went on to hold
that New Haven’s decision not to certify the firefighter promotion exam results violated the disparate-treatment provision
of Title VII. Whatever the City’s subjective motive, the record
made it clear that there was no objectively strong basis in evidence to support a disparate-impact violation.42 Moreover, the
disappointed firefighter petitioners were entitled to summary
judgment, because this lack of a strong basis in evidence was
established by undisputed facts. Even though summary judgment
requires the facts to be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, here there was no “genuine” dispute about the
pertinent facts, because no rational trier of fact looking at the
record as a whole could conclude that there was a strong basis
in evidence to fear that certification of the exam scores would
amount to a disparate-impact violation.43
The exam pass rate for minorities, which was approximately 50% of the pass rate for whites, did establish a prima
facie racially disparate impact that was well below the 80% standard used by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
to implement the Title VII disparate-impact provision. That was
especially true since no black candidates could have been considered for any of the available promotions if the exam scores were
used. However, that threshold statistical disparity was “far from
a strong basis in evidence that the City would have been liable
under Title VII had it certified the results.”44 Despite the statistical discrepancy, the City would be liable for a disparate-impact
violation only if its exams were not job related, or if there were
a less discriminatory alternative, and neither condition could be
satisfied under the “strong basis in evidence” standard.45
There was no genuine dispute concerning whether the
exams were job-related and consistent with business necessity,
because the City’s contrary assertions were “blatantly contradicted by the record.”46 The consultant who designed the exams
took great pains to ensure their job-relatedness, and most of the
witnesses who testified before the Civil Service Board found the
exams to be adequate in this regard. Even the competitor consultant, who had some criticisms of the examination design process,
recommended certification after concluding that the exams were
“reasonably good.”.47 The City did not even ask the consultant
for the technical report to which it was entitled, and which could
have explained any of the City’s job-relation concerns.48
There was also no strong basis in evidence for believing that an equally valid but less discriminatory alternative to
the exams might exist. First, although the use of a 30/70 percent
weighting of the written and oral exam scores might have reduced
the racially disparate impact that was produced by the 60/40 percent weighting that was actually used, the 60/40 weighting was
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the weighting specified in the firefighter union contract with the compel an employer to “intentionally design his hiring practices
City. In addition, there was no evidence that the 60/40 weighting to achieve the same end.” As a result, Justice Scalia concluded
was arbitrary, or that a 30/70 weighting would produce an equally that “[i]ntentional discrimination is still occurring, just one step
valid measure of the proper mix between job knowledge and situ- up the chain.”57 He also stated that it would not matter if Title
ational skills.49 Second, although “banding” exam scores could VII required the “consideration of race on a wholesale, rather
have reduced disparate impact by ranking candidates along fewer than a retail, level,” because the Government “must treat citizens
categories of scores—and thereby producing more ties among as individuals not as simply components of a racial, religious,
candidates—a state court held that such banding violated the sexual or national class.”58 He also stressed that “of course the
City Charter. Moreover, such banding, motivated by a desire to purportedly benign motive for the disparate-impact provisions
increase minority promotions, would have violated the Title VII cannot save the statute.”59
prohibition against adjusting test results on the basis of race.50
Justice Scalia thought that it might be theoretically posThird, although the competitor consultant suggested that the use sible to defend a disparate-impact provision as simply an evidenof assessment centers instead of written exams could provide a tiary tool that could be used to “smoke out” intentional disparate
job-related selection method that would have less of a racially treatment.60 However, such a theory could not save the constidisparate impact, there was testimony that assessment centers tutionality of the Title VII disparate-impact provision, because
could not have been used for the 2003 promotions. In any case, it did not recognize an affirmative defense for good faith.61
the competitor consultant was primarily interested in marketing Although the majority’s disposition precluded the need to rule
his own services—a strategy that proved successful, because upon the constitutionality of the Title VII disparate-impact proviNew Haven did subsequently hire him as a consultant.51
sion in Ricci, “the war between disparate impact and equal proJustice Kennedy’s opinion concluded by stressing that tection will be waged sooner or later.”62
fear of litigation alone cannot constitute the strong basis in
evidence required to permit intentional race-based disparate 3. Justice Alito’s Concurring Opinion
treatment under Title VII. He characterized the New Haven examJustice Alito’s concurrence stated that it was written to
ination process as a fair and neutral way to determine which firefighters were entitled to promotions based on their qualifications address omissions in the dissent’s recitation of the facts, and to
and experience. The City’s refusal to certify the results of that establish that, even under the dissent’s view of the facts, there
were factual disputes that precluded sumexamination procedure imposed a burden
mary judgment for the City.63 Justice Alito’s
on those who had participated in the testJustice Scalia, alone in his opinion was joined by Justices Scalia and
ing process—a burden that was aggravated
by the City’s reliance on “raw racial statis- concurring opinion, argued Thomas, but not by Chief Justice Roberts
or Justice Kennedy.
tics.” Justice Kennedy went on to state that
that the Court would
Justice Alito believed that an
the Court’s decision should make it clear
eventually have to decide objective and a subjective question had to
that, if the minority firefighters now filed
a disparate-impact suit against the City for whether the disparate-impact be answered in order to determine whether
an employer could avoid Title VII liability
certifying the exam results, the City would
provision of Title VII
for a disparate-treatment claim such as that
be able to avoid Title VII disparate-impact
was itself unconstitutional filed by the disappointed firefighters. The
liability for its actions.52 The majority’s
disposition of the case in favor of the disas a violation of the Equal objective question was whether the stated
reason for the disparate treatment was
appointed firefighters made it unnecessary
Protection principle.
a legitimate reason under Title VII. The
to consider the constitutional Equal Protecsubjective question, which implicated the
tion claims asserted by the petitioners.53
employer’s actual intent, was whether the
stated legitimate reason was a mere pretext for discrimination.64
2. Justice Scalia’s Concurring Opinion
The stated objective reason for New Haven’s race-based
Justice Scalia, alone in his concurring opinion, argued disparate-treatment in refusing to certify the firefighter promothat the Court would eventually have to decide whether the dis- tion exam results was the legitimate reason of avoiding dispaparate-impact provision of Title VII was itself unconstitutional rate-impact liability. But as the majority held, no reasonable jury
as a violation of the Equal Protection principle. Although he could find that there was a “substantial basis in evidence to find
characterized the question as “not an easy one,” Justice Scalia the tests inadequate.”65 That made any inquiry into actual subjecseemed to embrace the argument that he outlined for finding the tive intent unnecessary.66 However, the dissent argued that the
disparate-impact provision to be unconstitutional.54 Because the proper standard for resolving the objective question should be
federal government cannot discriminate on the basis of race, it whether the evidence provided “good cause” for the City to fear
cannot by statute require public or private employers to discrimi- disparate-impact liability. Nevertheless, even the dissent would
nate on the basis of race.55 However, Title VII’s disparate-impact presumably concede the City’s disparate-treatment liability if
provision requires employers to “place a racial thumb on the the asserted disparate-impact concern were a mere pretext for
scales” in assessing and remedying the statistical outcomes of intentional discrimination. As a result, the entry of summary
their employment policies, and “that type of racial decisionmak- judgment for the City by the lower courts could not be affirmed,
ing is, as the Court explains, discriminatory.”56
because there was ample evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury
Justice Scalia believed that the Title VII disparate impact to find that the City’s purported disparate-impact concern was
provision did not mandate the use of racial quotas, but that it did
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actually a pretext for political placation of an important racial
constituency.67
Justice Alito offered several reasons, including appeasement of an important black political leader in New Haven, for
believing that such political placation was the City’s actual motive.
The record demonstrated that City officials worked behind the
scenes to avoid certification of the exam results, because certification would have antagonized the black political leader whom
Mayor DeStefano did not wish to antagonize. This local black
leader had strong personal and political ties with the seven-term
Mayor that stretched back for more than a decade, and the Mayor
had previously selected the black leader to serve as Chair of the
New Haven Board of Fire Commissioners. While serving in that
capacity, the black leader once created a political flap by stating
that certain new recruits would not be hired because “they just
have too many vowels in their name[s].”68
The City’s political motives did not stop with placation.
The record suggested that members of the Mayor’s staff had tried
to orchestrate the city’s response to the promotion exam controversy in part by silencing the City’s Fire Chief and Assistant Fire
Chief, both of whom favored certifying the exam results. The
record further suggested that the Mayor made up his mind to
oppose certification of the exam results, but wanted to conceal
that fact from the public. In addition, during the Civil Service
Board meetings held to resolve the certification issue, local black
leaders with strong ties to the Mayor’s office tried to exploit racial
tensions by threatening ramifications if the exam results were
certified. They also accused white firefighters of cheating on the
exam, although those accusations turned out to be baseless. In
addition, the City relied heavily on testimony of the competitor
consultant who offered some criticism of the exams, using him
as a conduit for the Mayor’s political views. The city, as a reward
for his assistance, ultimately hired the competitor consultant. The
Mayor decided to overrule the Civil Service Board even if the
Board decided to certify the exam results, and after certification
failed by a 2–2 vote, the Mayor took credit for scuttling the exam
results.
Justice Alito concluded that these facts provided ample
basis for a reasonable juror to conclude that the City’s stated
disparate-impact justification was simply pretextual. He noted
that even the United States Solicitor General conceded that the
lower courts did not give adequate consideration to the pretext
possibility.69 Justice Alito emphasized that he was not simply
equating political considerations with unlawful discrimination.
However, he did believe that unlawful discrimination was not a
permissible way to win over a political constituency.70
Even if the Mayor’s decision to overrule any adverse ruling by the Civil Service Board were overlooked, and even if the
Civil Service Board were viewed as having made the final certification decision, the Mayor’s improperly motivated influence
could still taint the Civil Service Board’s decision. Although the
Supreme Court under Title VII never resolved the question of
improper influence on a decisionmaker, the courts of appeals
applied a variety of standards to the question. In Ricci, a reasonable jury could find that those lower court standards were met in
a way that impermissibly tainted the Civil Service Board decision
not to certify the exam results. In any event, it was the politically
predisposed Mayor, and not the Civil Service Board, who had
final decisionmaking authority.71 The petitioners—such as dyslexic Frank Ricci who had to hire someone at his own expense
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to prepare for the exam, and Latino Benjamin Vargas who had to
give up his part time job to prepare for the exam—deserved more
than sympathy. They had a right to evenhanded enforcement of
Title VII’s prohibition against racial discrimination—a right that
the City’s refusal to certify denied them.72

A. The Liberal Bloc—Justice Ginsburg’s
Dissenting Opinion
The four Justices who joined Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Ricci vote so consistently in favor of the minority
interests presented in race cases that they have come to constitute
a liberal Supreme Court voting bloc on the issue of race.73 The
members of that voting bloc are Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. With only minor deviations, those four Justices
have almost always voted to uphold the racial minority claims at
issue in constitutional affirmative action cases, majority-minority
redistricting cases, and racial integration cases while sitting on
the Supreme Court.74
Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion argued that New
Haven did not violate Title VII by seeking to avoid the racially
disparate impact of its firefighter promotion exam. Justice Gins
burg emphasized that New Haven had a long history of racial
discrimination in its fire department, and although blacks and
Latinos made up almost 60 percent of the City’s population,
minorities were still rare in fire department command positions.
She conceded that the white firefighters who scored well on the
promotion exams “understandably attract this Court’s sympathy,”
but “they had no vested right to promotion.” In holding that the
City lacked a “strong basis in evidence” for its decision not to
certify the exam results, the majority pretended that the City was
motivated only by race. However, Justice Ginsburg concluded
that there were multiple flaws in the exams that the City used, and
that other cities used better selection procedures that yielded less
racially skewed outcomes. One could not help but wonder why the
City did not use one of the alternatives that would have produced
less disparate results. Justice Ginsburg stated that the majority
“barely acknowledges the pathmarking decision in Griggs,” and
the centrality that the disparate-impact concept plays in Title VII
enforcement. As a result, she believed that the majority’s decision
in Ricci would not have staying power.75
Justice Ginsburg believed that the majority’s recitation
of the facts omitted important details. Firefighting in general was
associated with a long legacy of racial discrimination, which
Congress recognized in 1972 when it extended Title VII coverage
to state and municipal employment—where racial discrimination
was even more prevalent than in the private sector. Employment
decisions often abandoned merit in favor of nepotism or political patronage, thereby entrenching preexisting racial hierarchies.
New Haven illustrated the problem. In the early 1970s, minorities
comprised 30% of the population, but only 3.6% of the City’s five
hundred and two firefighters. Moreover, only one of the Department’s one hundred and seven officers was a minority firefighter.
It took a lawsuit and subsequent settlement before conditions in
the New Haven fire department improved. However, by the time
of the 2003 promotions at issue in Ricci, minorities still remained
badly underrepresented in the senior officer ranks—where only
one of the City’s twenty one fire captains was black.76
The City’s promotion exams produced the stark racial
disparities that were at issue in Ricci, where minority candidates
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passed at about half the rate of blacks. In making its 2003 round
of promotions, New Haven adhered to the testing regime outlined
in the firefighters union contract that it had used for two decades,
without closely considering what sort of practical examination
would best measure fitness for promotion. Accordingly, when the
City asked its consultant to design promotion exams, the consultant was told to adhere to a 60% written component and a 40%
oral component, without ever considering other alternative selection regimes. Because those 50% racial disparities fell well below
the 80% standard that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission used for Title VII enforcement, City officials were concerned about the danger of incurring Title VII disparate-impact
liability. As a result, the New Haven Civil Service Board held a
series of public meetings designed to assess job-relatedness and
the availability of less-discriminatory alternatives.77
At those meetings, some participants favored certifying
the exam results, and some objected to certification. The evidence
presented in favor of certification stressed the close relationship
between the exams and the assigned study materials, as well as
the considerable time and expense that many applicants invested
in preparing for the exams. The evidence against certification
included questions about the germaneness of the exam to New
Haven practices and procedures, as well as racially-correlated
unequal access to study materials that was traceable to the fact
that white applicants had relatives in the fire service from whom
they could obtain materials and assistance.78
Other evidence showed that the nearby City of Bridgeport previously used selection procedures similar to the procedures used by New Haven, but reduced the racially-disparate
impact of its selection process when it changed the relative
weighting of its written and oral exams. The new weighting
gave primary weight to the oral exam, which could better test
responses to real-life scenarios. A competitor consultant stated
that behavioral responses to hypothetical situations presented in
“assessment centers” could test for pertinent skills—with less
of a disparate impact—in a way that was more valid than mere
written multiple choice exams. A Boston College professor of
counseling psychology also noted that testing procedures such as
those used by New Haven could have certain built-in biases that
gave an advantage to white applicants. When the Civil Service
Board’s 2–2 vote ultimately precluded certification of the exam
results, the two Board members who voted against certification
stated that they did so because the evidence presented at the public meetings convinced them that the exams were flawed, and that
there were better alternatives.79
Justice Ginsburg noted that the disappointed firefighters
who sued the City for failing to certify the exam results alleged
that the City’s defense of trying to avoid a Title VII disparateimpact violation was a mere pretext. However, when the District
Court entered summary judgment for the City, it merely followed
Second Circuit precedent in holding that the intent to remedy
disparate impact did not constitute intent to discriminate against
nonminority applicants. The District Court also rejected the pretext argument, finding that the exam results were sufficiently
skewed to make out a prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination, and that the City should not be forced to use racially
skewed exam results that were presumptively invalid. Although
the City was conscious of race, the District Court held that such
race consciousness did not amount to racially disparate treatment.
The City’s actions were race neutral in the sense that the exam
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results were discarded for all races, and the City’s actions were
not analogous to a racial quota because everyone was treated uniformly without any individual preference. 80
Justice Ginsburg observed that when Title VII took effect
in 1965, it did not create genuine equal opportunity, because subtle and sometimes unconscious forms of discrimination simply
replaced formerly undisguised discrimination. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court’s 1971 unanimous decision in Griggs responded
by holding that Title VII embodied a congressional intent to prohibit discrimination through unintentional disparate impact—as
well as through intentional disparate treatment—by focusing on
the consequences rather than the form of an employer’s actions.
The Court’s 1975 unanimous decision in Albemarle Paper then
held that even a showing of job-related business necessity could
not defeat a disparate-impact claim if the plaintiff could show the
existence of an alternative job-related employment practice that
had less of a racially disparate impact. Lower courts then began
to enforce the Title VII disparate-impact provision in ways that
invalidated employment practices, such as the firefighter promotion exams at issue in Ricci, by carefully scrutinizing employer
claims of business necessity. However, in its 1989 Wards Cove
decision, the Supreme Court began moving in a different direction. A bare majority of the Court adopted a new standard of
proof for business necessity in Title VII disparate-impact cases
that was more deferential to employers and less protective of
employees seeking to avoid discrimination. Congress responded
to Wards Cove, and other Supreme Court decisions that cut back
on civil rights enforcement, by enacting the Civil Rights Act of
1991, which formally codified the disparate-impact reading of
Title VII that was adopted in Griggs.81
Justice Ginsburg accused the majority of manufacturing
a tension between the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact
provisions of Title VII that simply did not exist. No previous
Supreme Court decisions—including the now-discredited decision in Wards Cove—ever detected such a tension, and both
provisions sought to promote the same objective of ending workplace discrimination by promoting genuine equal opportunity.
Although the task of the Court should be to harmonize statutory
provisions, the majority set the two provisions at odds with each
other by characterizing actions taken to avoid disparate-impact
liability as actions taken “because of race.” By codifying Griggs
and Albemarle Paper, Cong ress adopted a statutory design under
which efforts to comply with the law by giving employees an
equal opportunity to compete could not constitute a disparatetreatment violation—subject to one condition. The employer
taking a race-conscious remedial action must have “good cause”
to believe that the racially disparate employment practice being
remedied would not withstand scrutiny as a business necessity.
Under the facts of Ricci, Justice Ginsburg thought that it was
hard to see the “business necessity” for the particular exams and
60/40 percent exam weightings that the majority required the
City to use.82
Justice Ginsburg also noted that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission interpretive guidelines, which were
entitled to judicial deference, would not turn efforts to avoid
disparate-impact liability into violations of the very statute with
which those efforts were designed to comply. She emphasized
that the Supreme Court’s own gender discrimination precedent
in Johnson v. Transportation Agency held that voluntary affirmative action programs for women did not violate the Title VII
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disparate-treatment provision. Although Ricci was not an affirmative action case, the New Haven effort to avoid actual discrimination would certainly be likewise immune from Title VII
disparate-treatment liability.83
Justice Ginsburg thought that the “strong basis in evidence” standard that the majority invoked to resolve the statutory tension it invented was too enigmatic. The standard was
drawn from “inapposite equal protection precedents,” and was
not elaborated upon. Equal Protection precedents were inapposite because—unlike Title VII—the Equal Protection Clause was
interpreted by Personnel Administrator v. Feeney and Washington
v. Davis as not having a disparate-impact component.84 Prior to
Ricci, the Supreme Court never questioned the constitutionality
of Title VII’s disparate-impact provision, because that provision
“calls for a ‘race-neutral means to increase minority…participation’—something this Court’s equal protection precedents also
encourage.”85 “[O]nly a very uncompromising court would issue
such a decision.”86 Justice Ginsburg also thought that the cases
on which the majority relied most heavily were particularly inapt,
because they involved absolute racial preferences. In contrast,
an employer’s effort to avoid Title VII disparate-impact liability
involved no racial preference at all, but rather, involved an effort
to rely on job-related qualifications that do not screen out candidates of any race. Even Title VII race- and gender-conscious
affirmative action cases used a reasonableness standard, rather
than the majority’s new “strong basis in evidence” standard.87
Although a dominant theme of Title VII has been to
encourage voluntary employer compliance, Justice Ginsburg
believed that the majority’s “strong basis in evidence” standard
made voluntary compliance hazardous. Ricci illustrated that discarding a dubious selection process would subject an employer to
costly disparate-treatment litigation, in which the outcome would
be very uncertain. Moreover, under the majority’s standard,
the showing that an employer would have to make in order to
avoid disparate-treatment liability was virtually the same as the
showing that would be required to establish an actual disparateimpact violation—thereby undermining an employer’s incentive
to engage in voluntary Title VII compliance efforts. Even those
Equal Protection affirmative action cases from which the majority borrowed its “strong basis in evidence” standard did not apply
that standard as harshly as the majority did in Ricci. Those cases
never suggested that anything more than a prima facie case of
prior discrimination would be required to permit the use of raceconscious affirmative action remedies.88
Justice Ginsburg found that the majority’s desire to protect the “legitimate expectations” of the disappointed firefighters
who scored well on the promotion exams was circular, and she
proposed her own “good cause” standard. If, as the City feared,
the exam failed to constitute the least discriminatory means of
testing for pertinent promotion qualities, the disappointed fire
fighters could have no legitimate expectation of profiting from
the results of the exams. That was especially true in Ricci,
because the prime objective of Title VII was to prevent exclusionary practices from freezing the status quo. In addition, Justice Ginsburg viewed as unfounded the majority’s suggestion that
the “strong basis in evidence” standard was necessary to avoid
de facto quotas that were intended to promote an employer’s
desired racial balance. Justice Ginsburg believed that her proposed “good cause” standard would guard against racial balance
quotas by ensuring the presence of a credible disparate impact
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claim. Justice Ginsburg also failed to understand why the majority departed from customary practice by refusing to remand the
Ricci case for District Court application of the new standard that
the majority announced. The failure to remand also deprived
the City of an opportunity to invoke the statutorily recognized
defense of good faith compliance with the interpretive guidelines
adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.89
Justice Ginsburg outlined several factors showing that
the City satisfied her “good cause” standard for assessing voluntary efforts to avoid disparate-impact liability. All agree that the
New Haven promotion exams had a sufficiently striking disparate impact to establish a prima facie case of Title VII liability.
Moreover, the nature of the exams that established this disparate
impact was suspect, because the City gave no consideration to
anything other than its customary 60/40 percent weighting—
even though that weighting produced racially disparate results
in the past. Reliance on written exams to assess practical skills is
a questionable practice, because such exams do not necessarily
identify leadership abilities. In fact, skepticism about the utility
of such written exams has been expressed not only by experts
who testified at the New Haven Civil Service Board meetings,
but by other published experts, by courts, and by the Title VII
administrative guidelines as well. Mere pencil-and-paper knowledge of the history and vocabulary of baseball would not qualify
one to play for the Boston Red Sox.90
Accordingly, it is not surprising that most municipal
employers do not evaluate their promotion candidates through
written tests or by giving tests the same weight as New Haven
did. Two-thirds of the municipalities included in a 1996 study
used assessment center simulations rather than written exams
to evaluate candidates, and the popularity of assessment centers
seems to be increasing over time. Among the municipalities that
continue to use written exams, the median weight assigned to
those exams is 30%—half the weight that New Haven assigned
to its written exams. Therefore, Justice Ginsburg concluded that
the prevalence of the assessment-center and modified-weighting
alternatives would have made it difficult for New Haven to argue
that its selection process was a business necessity. The majority rejected these alternatives, asserting that assessment centers
were unavailable in 2003, and that Title VII prohibited the racial
adjustment of test scores. However, the only evidence in the
record that supported the unavailability of assessment centers in
2003 was an offhand remark made by Frank Ricci—one of the
disappointed firefighters—which was belied by the widespread
use of assessment centers at the time in other municipalities. And
changing the weight of the written and oral exams would not
constitute a prohibited racial alteration of test scores, but would
rather constitute the substitution of a new selection procedure.
Justice Ginsburg thought that the majority’s dismissal of any substantial risk of disparate impact liability was reminiscent of the
deferential standard accorded employers under Wards Cove, but
Wards Cove was overruled by Cong ress in the Civil Rights Act
of 1991—precisely because it was too protective of employers.91
Justice Ginsburg also found the New Haven exams
questionable because the City precluded its consultant from getting expert feedback on potential questions from anyone in the
New Haven fire department. The restriction was intended to protect the security of the exam questions, but this “very critical”
defect resulted in exam questions that were sometimes confusing, irrelevant, spotty in their coverage, and potentially biased
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in favor of nonminority firefighters. In addition, the exams had
technical defects that undermined the validity of the exam score
cutoffs, and the ensuing candidate rankings. Although the majority criticized the City for not requesting a technical report to allay
its concerns about job relatedness, the technical report would
merely have summarized evidence that was produced at the Civil
Service Board meetings, and would not have established the
reliability of the exam as an assessment tool. The many defects
contained in the exams created at least a triable issue of fact that
precluded summary judgment against the City, even under the
majority’s “strong basis in evidence” standard.92
In response to Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg stated that she would not have opposed a remand
to resolve the factual disputes revealed in the record, but the
majority insisted on disposing of the case by summary judgment.
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion argued that the City’s asserted
fear of disparate-impact liability was merely a pretext for the
desire of certain officials in the mayor’s office to placate a politi
cally powerful racial constituency, and that there was a sufficient
factual dispute about this to vacate the lower court rulings of
summary judgment for the City. Justice Ginsburg also noted that
the facts on which Justice Alito drew to support his pretext claim
were drawn from the self-serving statement of facts submitted
by the petitioners. Moreover, many of those allegations were
either misleading or entirely devoid of support in the record. The
important point, however, was that the Civil Service Board—not
the Mayor’s office—made the ultimate decision not to certify the
exam results, and there was no evidence of political partisanship
on the part of Civil Service Board members. In addition, the New
Haven political forces favoring certification of the exam results
attempted to exert just as much pressure on the Civil Service
Board as did the political forces opposing certification.93
Justice Ginsburg went on to question the relevance of
Justice Alito’s pretext argument, because political considerations
alone could not be equated with unlawful discrimination. Politicians commonly respond to racial considerations without engaging in racial discrimination. There is no reason to believe that the
Mayor’s office wished to exclude white firefighters from promotions, since white firefighters would also be promoted under a
nondiscriminatory selection procedure. The District Court found
that the presence of political considerations did not negate the
City’s genuine desire to avoid disparate-impact liability, and it
found a total absence of discriminatory animus toward the petitioners. Those findings were “entirely consistent with the record.”
Moreover, as established by the Court’s recent post-9/11 racial
profiling decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, a desire to please political
constituents is not inconsistent with a desire to avoid unlawful
discrimination. 94
Justice Ginsburg concluded that the majority forced the
City of New Haven to use a flawed promotion exam that would
produce racially disparate results without identifying the bestqualified candidates for promotion. The majority decision broke
the promise of Griggs by denying equal opportunity through use
of a test that was “fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”95

Doctrinal Strain
The outcome in Ricci did not flow naturally from preexisting Title VII doctrine. Rather, Justice Kennedy’s majority
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opinion constructed a previously undetected tension between the
disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title VII,
and then resolved that tension in a way that strained against the
overall antidiscrimination objective that Title VII was enacted
to advance. In addition, Justice Kennedy announced the Court’s
modification of pre-existing Title VII doctrine in the process of
granting summary judgment for the disappointed firefighter petitioners, even though significant factual disputes almost certainly
made summary judgment for the petitioners improper. It appears
that Justice Kennedy did both of these things knowingly, in order
to convey the strength of the Court’s commitment to a new postracial conception of employment discrimination law.
Title VIJustice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Ricci
adopted a novel reading of Title VII that rebalanced the competing interests between whites and racial minorities that are at stake
in the allocation of limited societal resources. Moreover, it rebalanced those interests in a way that undermined the initial balance
struck by Cong ress in enacting and amending Title VII. The opinion also failed to apply the standing limitations that the Supreme
Court has in the past used to defeat minority claims of racial
discrimination. In so doing, the Court yet again illustrated a willingness to relax standing requirements for reverse discrimination
claims asserted by whites that are strenuously enforced in cases
asserting traditional discrimination against racial minorities.

1. Zero Sum Balance
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion asserted that Ricci
was a case of first impression concerning the divergence between
the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title
VII.96 But Justice Ginsburg’s dissent pointed out that no such conflict existed, because both provisions of Title VII were designed
to advance the same goal—the elimination of employment practices that had commonly produced workplace discrimination in
the past.97
In one sense, Justice Ginsburg was certainly correct.
There was no conflict under pre-existing law, because pre-existing law held that the consideration of race for the sincere purpose
of avoiding disparate impact discrimination did not constitute the
type of racial consideration that could amount to a Title VII disparate-treatment violation. That is what the District Court held
when it followed Second Circuit precedent; that is what the Second Circuit panel held when it summarily affirmed the District
Court in its brief per curiam opinion; that is what the full Second
Circuit held when it denied rehearing en banc; that is what the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission established when
it adopted its Title VII interpretive guidelines; and that is what
the Supreme Court itself established in an analogous gender
discrimination case holding that the consideration of gender to
prevent disparate impact did not amount to a Title VII disparatetreatment violation.98
But Justice Kennedy also had a point. Even though
Title VII law was settled at the time of the Ricci decision, there
had long been undercurrents of discontent with that settlement.
Individual conservative-bloc Justices in prior Title VII cases
expressed the view that racial affirmative action could not be
used to benefit minorities who were not themselves actual victims
of particularized discrimination, because such affirmative action
imposed too great a burden on adversely affected whites.99 As
Justice Kennedy stressed in his Ricci opinion, several Supreme
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Court constitutional decisions struggled with the issue of when
the Equal Protection Clause permitted affirmative action programs to benefit minorities at the expense of so-called innocent
whites.100 Accordingly, what Justice Kennedy was really doing
in Ricci when he detected and resolved a novel tension between
the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title
VII was changing the balance that the Supreme Court previously
struck between the zero-sum interests of whites and racial minorities in discrimination cases.101
In any alleged race discrimination or affirmative action
case, a contested societal resource—such as the right to a firefighter promotion—has to be allocated to either a white person or
to a racial minority. In order to make that allocation, some way
has to be found to balance the competing interests underlying
the white and minority claims of entitlement to that resource.
Previously, the balance was struck so that close cases would be
resolved in favor of racial minorities, in order to compensate for
past discrimination or to promote prospective diversity. Ricci,
however, re-struck the balance so that close cases would now be
resolved in favor of whites. It did this by increasing, to a “strong
basis in evidence,” the standard of proof that had to be met before
a resource could be given to a racial minority.102
In other words, the five-Justice Ricci majority re-struck
the balance between white and minority interests in Title VII
cases, so that the new balance would mirror the balance that the
Supreme Court previously struck in its constitutional affirmative
action cases. That might initially appear to create a desirable doctrinal symmetry, but there is an important asymmetry that exists
between Title VII and constitutional cases. In Title VII cases the
appropriate balance is supposed to be struck by Congress—not
by the Supreme Court. It is true that statutes are often ambiguous, and the exercise of loosely constrained judicial discretion
is often required for the Supreme Court to announce statutory
meaning. But that is not the case with the disparate-impact provision of Title VII.
As Justice Ginsburg pointed out, Justice Kennedy was
not writing on a clean slate when he chose to strike a new Title
VII balance in favor of whites. The Supreme Court previously
tried to strike a similar balance in Wards Cove and other decisions that cut back on civil rights enforcement. However, Congress responded by overr uling those cases in the Civil Rights Act
of 1991.103 Therefore, when Justice Kennedy rewrote Title VII
in Ricci to correspond to the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection
jurisprudence, he was usurping legislative policymaking power
from Congress. Congress wanted the close cases to be resolved
in favor of racial minorities, believing that to be the best way
of reducing employment discrimination. But Justice Kennedy
wanted the close cases to be resolved in favor of whites, even if
it meant allowing fire department officers to remain overwhelmingly white.
The Supreme Court’s usurpation of legislative racial
policymaking power in Ricci may be difficult to justify in separation-of-powers terms, but it is hardly unprecedented. As a matter
of relative institutional competence, it is difficult to see why a
politically insulated Supreme Court would view itself as better
able than a politically accountable national legislature to balance
the subtle and complex competing interests that are necessarily
entailed in trying to formulate a coherent national race relations
policy. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court seems always to have
thought that it could do a better job than Congress in mediating
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the nation’s racial tensions. When the Court invalidated congressional efforts to limit the spread of slavery in Dred Scott v. Sanford,104 Congress overruled that decision by securing the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment.105 The Fourteenth Amendment
was designed to shift the pre-Civil War federalism balance in
matters involving race from the states to the federal government,
by giving Congress the power to enforce the equality and antidiscrimination provisions of the Amendment.106 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court decision in the Civil Rights Cases107 re-struck
that balance in favor of state sovereignty by reading a “state
action” component into the Fourteenth Amendment, even though
Section Five expressly gave Congress the power to enforce the
Amendment.108 If judicial activism is defined as the disregard of
clearly expressed legislative policy judgments, then Ricci entails
an exercise in conservative judicial activism.
Justice Kennedy used the new “strong basis in evidence” standard as the doctrinal device that would accord his
desired additional weight to the interests of whites in the Title VII
balance. Like the lower courts and the Solicitor General, Justice
Ginsburg thought that that any genuine desire to avoid a disparate-impact violation would suffice to prevent a disparate-treatment violation. She insisted only on the presence of “good cause”
to fear a disparate-impact violation, as a safeguard against frivolous or pretextual disparate-impact claims.109 Justice Ginsburg
also emphasized that the heightened “strong basis in evidence”
standard would frustrate the Title VII preference for voluntary
compliance, by making it hazardous for employers to implement
voluntary remedies for disparate impact. Only a disparate-impact
showing that was strong enough to establish an actual Title VII
violation would be sufficient to immunize employers from potential disparate-treatment violations.110
The law governing contract modifications, as well as the
law of accord and satisfaction governing the settlement of legal
disputes, supports Justice Ginsburg’s view. Reminiscent of Justice Kennedy’s approach, classical contract law would not rec
ognize the presence of consideration supporting a modification or
accord and satisfaction unless the underlying relinquished claim
was in fact a meritorious one.111 However, such a rule made voluntary modifications and settlements largely worthless, because
the underlying legal claim would still have to be adjudicated in
order to establish the validity of the modification or settlement.
After realizing this, modern contract doctrine dispensed with the
need to establish the validity of the underlying claim. It insisted
only on “good faith” motivation, and it did so precisely so that
voluntary modifications and settlements could become legally
enforceable.112
Utilization of the “strong basis in evidence” standard,
therefore, constitutes another important way in which the Ricci
majority undermined the thrust of Title VII—by frustrating the
congressional desire to rely heavily on voluntary rather than
coerced compliance. Justice Kennedy’s adoption of a “strong
basis in evidence” standard thrusts Title VII voluntary compliance back to the days of classical contract law, and in so doing,
undermines the Title VII preference for voluntary compliance.
Moreover, the “strong basis in evidence” standard seems to apply
in a way that benefits whites more than it benefits racial minorities. Although there is ample reason to find a “strong basis in
evidence” supporting the City’s fear of disparate-impact liability,113 there is not a “strong basis in evidence” for the Court to
have rejected the assessment-center and modified-weighting
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alternatives that the city wished to use in lieu of its racially
skewed written exams.114 It seems unlikely that the effect of Justice Kennedy’s “strong basis in evidence” standard on voluntary
settlements went unnoticed—or was unintended. Without voluntary compliance to supplement formal enforcement of Title VII,
there will simply be fewer occasions in which contested resources
are given to racial minorities rather than to whites.
The unequal application of discrimination law to whites
and racial minorities is illustrated even more clearly by Justice
Scalia’s concurring opinion. Although Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion expressly left open the question of whether the Title
VII disparate-impact provision was constitutional,115 Justice Scalia apparently believed that the provision did violate the Equal
Protection principle of the Constitution by forcing employers to
engage in race-based decisionmaking in order to avoid disparate
impact.116 Justice Scalia then suggested that the disparate-impact
provision of Title VII might be saved if it were viewed as an evidentiary tool to “smoke out” intentional discrimination, but that
such a saving construction would require recognition of a good
faith defense to any disparate-impact claim.117 This is striking
because Justice Scalia also emphasized that a benign motive on
the part of Congress in enacting the disparate-impact provision
could not save the constitutionality of the provision.118 This reasoning creates a curious form of discrimination. When Congress
acts to remedy disparate-impact discrimination, a benign motive
will not save the constitutional validity of its actions.But when
an employer acts to create disparate-impact discrimination, a
benign motive will save the validity of the employer’s actions.
For Justice Scalia, therefore, a good faith, benign motive can be
used to permit racial discrimination, but not to prevent it. A legal
regime that would permit such an outcome is indeed a noteworthy regime.
Justice Alito too wrote a curious concurrence. By arguing that New Haven’s asserted concern with disparate impact was
really a politically motivated desire to placate a minority constituency,119 Justice Alito appears to believe that racial politics is
somehow illegitimate. Although he concedes that racial considerations can sometimes play a permissible role in political bargaining, he says that racial discrimination never can.120 However,
the issue to be decided was whether the City’s decision to forego
certification of the firefighter promotion exam results constituted
permissible racial consideration or impermissible racial discrimination. Justice Alito apparently believed that the City’s actions
constituted a mere pretext for impermissible discrimination,121
but his reasoning was circular. The only evidence that Justice
Alito offered to support his discrimination conclusion was that
the City considered race.122
Justice Alito could not have been pleased by his perception of racial politics in New Haven. One of the black leaders, whom Justice Alito viewed as having been placated by the
Mayor’s administration, once objected to hiring firefighters who
“just have too many vowels in their name[s],”123 an apparent reference to New Haven’s long history of hiring white Italian firefighters instead of blacks.124 This suggests that “racial placation”
had long been the norm rather than the exception in New Haven
politics. If such ubiquitous racial politics were now to be recon
ceptualized as unlawful racial discrimination, it is noteworthy
that Justice Alito wished to effect that reconceptualization when
the long history of New Haven racial politics began to benefit
racial minorities rather than whites. It also makes one wonder
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whether Justice Alito believes that he can realistically exclude
his own racial considerations from the adjudicatory process in
the way that he apparently believes they should be excluded from
the political process.125

2. Standing
Although no Justice mentioned it, the disappointed New
Haven firefighter petitioners may have lacked standing to chal
lenge the City’s failure to certify the promotion exam results.
They may have lacked standing because none of the petitioners
could be sure of receiving the promotions they sought, even if
the exam results had been certified. Under the City’s “rule of
three,” the City Charter required that civil service positions be
filled from among the top three exam performers for each position.126 However, we cannot tell which of the top three candidates would have been chosen for any position. There were eight
lieutenant vacancies, so only eight of the top ten candidates who
qualified for “immediate promotion” to lieutenant under the rule
of three would actually be promoted. Furthermore, there were
seven captain vacancies, so only seven of the top nine candidates
who qualified for “immediate promotion” to captain would be
promoted.127 Collectively, we cannot know which of the eighteen petitioners would have received the fifteen available promotions, but we do know that three of the petitioners would not have
received any of the promotions at all.128
It may seem silly, but under the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence, such uncertainty about whether a favorable
ruling will actually redress a plaintiff ’s alleged injury can deprive
that plaintiff of standing. Moreover, a plaintiff ’s failure to establish a redressable injury is not merely a prudential impediment
to standing, but rather can amount to a constitutional defect that
deprives the Court of jurisdiction under the case-or-controversy
provision of Article III.129 On occasion the Supreme Court
has applied this particularized redressability requirement with
remarkable stringency. For example, it denied environmental
plaintiffs standing to enforce certain financial incentive provisions of the Endangered Species Act, because those incentives
might not ultimately result in protection of the endangered species at issue.130 It also denied other environmentalists standing
to challenge mining, oil, and natural gas exploitation of federal
lands, because the plaintiffs did not show with sufficient particularity that they would use the precise tracts of land that were
being opened up for exploitation.131 It even denied indigents
standing to challenge preferential “charity” tax status for hospitals that refused to provide certain charitable medical care to
indigents, because the hospitals might continue to deny such care
even if they were denied preferential tax status.132 In Ricci, no
petitioner could be certain that a favorable ruling would redress
his or her injury, because no petitioner could be certain of getting
a promotion. Indeed, three petitioners could be certain that they
would not get a promotion, although we do not know which three
petitioners they would be.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court does not always enforce
its standing redressability requirement with such stringency.
Sometimes the Court grants standing despite serious redressability problems, as it did when it granted the State of Massachusetts
standing to challenge the Environmental Protection Agency’s
refusal to regulate certain greenhouse gas emissions even though
such regulation was not guaranteed to reduce the global warming
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injuries that the State alleged.133 Because the law of standing is in
notorious disarray, it is not surprising that Supreme Court standing decisions are often difficult to reconcile.134 The problem is
that there is one overriding principle that does seem to reconcile
many of the Court’s standing cases. The law of standing often
protects the interests of whites more than it protects the interests
of racial minorities.135
In the 1984 case of Allen v. Wright,136 the Supreme
Court denied standing to black parents who challenged the allegedly unlawful grant of tax-exempt status to segregated private
schools, because those schools might continue to deny admission to blacks even if the tax exempt status of the schools were
revoked. In the 1975 case of Warth v. Seldin,137 the Supreme
Court denied standing to black and Latino plaintiffs who challenged exclusionary zoning practices alleged to be intentionally
discriminatory, because the low and moderate income housing
developments that had sought zoning variances still might not
ultimately be constructed even if the exclusionary zoning practices were invalidated. In four police and prosecutorial misconduct cases decided between 1974 and 1983, the Supreme Court
found that a lack of standing and other justiciability defects
barred suits by black victims of allegedly discriminatory police
brutality and other official abuses, because prior official misconduct was moot and the threat of future recurrences was too speculative for injunctive relief to redress any current injury.138
The Supreme Court has been fairly frequent in its denial
of standing to minority plaintiffs who wished to challenge allegedly discriminatory practices that harm racial minorities. However, the Court often grants standing in analogous cases to white
plaintiffs who wish to challenge affirmative action or antidiscrimination practices that benefit minorities. In Northeastern Florida
Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America v.
City of Jacksonville,139 the Court granted standing to a white
construction contractor who challenged an affirmative action
program designed to benefit minority contractors, even though
the white contractor was unlikely to be awarded one of the contracts at issue if the affirmative action program were invalidated.
Other Supreme Court cases have similarly granted standing to
whites seeking to challenge affirmative action programs,140 or
voter-redistricting prog rams designed to benefit racial minorities,141 without requiring the strong redressable injury showings
that the Court has demanded of minority plaintiffs. Ricci is a
case that falls on the permissive white-plaintiff side of the line.
It tacitly recognizes the standing of at least three white plaintiffs
to challenge an antidiscrimination law that benefits racial minorities, even though they cannot possibly prove redressabiThe one
final irony that should be noted in the Supreme Court’s tacit grant
of standing to the Ricci plaintiffs is its effective issuance of an
advisory opinion. The purpose of the Article III standing requirement is to help ensure that the federal courts do not issue advisory opinions—opinions that make abstract pronouncements of
law that are unnecessary to the resolution of a concrete “case” or
“controversy” presented in an adversary context.142 Because the
Supreme Court disposed of the Ricci case by granting the motion
for summary judgment filed by the petitioners, the Court ended
up making abstract pronouncements that were dependent on the
resolution of factual issues that seem clearly to have been in dispute. The Court even announced that minority firefighters could
not win a hypothetical Title VII disparate-impact suit if they were
subsequently to file one.143 Moreover, the Court did all of this
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without the vigorous adversary presentation that would have
been available if the Court had followed the customary practice
of remanding a case with contested facts for trial. The Court’s
decision to grant the petitioners summary judgment is therefore
also quite curious.

Summary Judgment
As Justice Kennedy noted, summary judgment is appropriate only where there is “no genuine issue as to any material
fact,” and one party is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”144
His opinion went on to hold that “there is no evidence—let alone
the required strong basis in evidence—that the tests were flawed
because they were not job-related or because other, equally valid
and less discriminatory tests were available to the City.”145 The
assertion that there is “no evidence” questioning job-relatedness
or supporting the existence of less discriminatory alternatives is
simply incorrect. The assertion that there is no “strong basis in
evidence” is the very legal issue that is under dispute.

1. No Evidence
Justice Kennedy’s assertion that there was “no evidence”
supporting the City’s disparate impact fears does not withstand
scrutiny. His opinion itself described evidence in the Civil Service Board hearing record that both questioned the job-relatedness of the City’s promotion exams and suggested the presence
of less discriminatory alternatives. Some witnesses testified that
the exams were outdated and not relevant to firefighting practices in New Haven.146 Others called for a validation study to
determine job-relatedness, because the exams were “inherently
unfair.”147 The competitor consultant testified that “assessment
centers” were not only better at assessing job-relatedness, but
that they would also constitute a less-discriminatory alternative
selection device.148 A college professor with relevant expertise
testified that the New Haven exams may have contained subtle
racial biases that favored whites.149 The City’s legal counsel and
officials in the Mayor’s administration also testified that there
were less discriminatory alternatives to the exams.150
Justice Kennedy’s opinion ignored the additional pertinent evidence highlighted in Ginsburg’s dissent. She pointed to
testimony establishing that most municipalities do not use pencil-and-paper exams to evaluate promotion candidates because
of questions about the sufficiency of those exams in assessing
practical job-related skills. She also cited evidence in the record
establishing that other municipalities use alternate weighting
percentages that place more emphasis on practical skills than on
written exam results.151 Far from containing “no evidence,” the
record was replete with evidence of less discriminatory alternatives that posed fewer job-relatedness problems. Not only were
alternate weightings of exam and practical skills a seemingly better alternative, but the conclusion that assessment centers would
have been a better alternative actually seems to have been uncontested. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy rejected these evidentiary
showings out of hand.
Justice Kennedy rejected the alternate weighting option
because he viewed it as prohibited by the New Haven firefighter
union contract, the New Haven City Charter, and the Title VII
prohibition against adjusting test scores “on the basis of race.” He
also saw no evidence that the original New Haven exam weighting
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was arbitrary.152 The union contract and City Charter were largely
irrelevant, because they would simply be unlawful if they com
pelled a degree of disparate impact that was prohibited by Title
VII. Also, the fact that the original exam weighting may not have
been arbitrary was simply nonresponsive to the claim that better
alternatives existed. However, the question of whether alternate
weightings would constitute prohibited race-based adjustment of
test scores, as Justice Kennedy argued, or the mere substitution of
an alternate selection procedure, as Justice Ginsburg argued,153
is more serious. Ultimately, however, it simply begs the central
question presented in the case. Proper legal characterization of a
decision by the City to use an alternate weighting process would
turn on whether the City was motivated by genuine disparateimpact concerns when it declined to certify the exam results, or
whether that decision was a mere pretext for racial bias. But the
question of motive certainly seems like a disputed issue of fact
that could have been better resolved by a trial on remand than by
Justice Kennedy’s ex cathedra determination.154
Justice Kennedy rejected the assessment center alternative, even though no one seems to dispute the claim that
assessment centers would have been more job-related and less
discriminatory than written promotion exams. Justice Kennedy
gave only one reason for rejecting the assessment center alternative. He stated that assessment centers would not have been
available for the 2003 firefighter promotions.155 However, that
conclusion was based on a single offhand comment made by
Frank Ricci—one of the very petitioners challenging the City’s
failure to certify the exam results.156 Although Frank Ricci was a
firefighter who worked hard to score well on his promotion exam,
the record does not suggest that he had any expertise whatsoever
in designing, implementing, or evaluating promotion procedures.
As Justice Ginsburg pointed out, there was no particular reason to
believe that assessment centers—which were in widespread use
in other municipalities at the time—were unavailable to the City
of New Haven.157 Moreover, the record does not disclose any
reason it was important for promotions to be made in 2003, rather
than waiting until assessment center procedures could be established. That is especially noteworthy since the Supreme Court
did not finally order the promotion exam results to be certified
until 2009. Although Justice Kennedy was unwilling to accord
any deference to New Haven’s fear of potential disparate-impact
liability, he was willing to accord total deference to Frank Ricci’s
stated basis for opposition to assessment centers.
The racial politics of which Justice Alito apparently disapproved may well have been viewed by minorities as the only
alternative available to counteract the more entrenched politics
that had caused the City to use its de facto discriminatory promotion procedures for the previous twenty years.158 In a political
climate where a fire department would forego promotion assessment alternatives that were more job-related and less discriminatory than written multiple-choice exams, it is easy to understand
how racial politics could become as salient as Justice Alito found
them to be.159 Whether the City’s effort to deviate from its previous practices was genuine or pretextual seems at least to be
a genuine issue of material fact. Justice Ginsburg notes that it
is common practice for the Supreme Court to remand a case in
which it has announced a new rule of law, so that the trial court
can apply the new rule to the facts.160 That customary practice
certainly seems compelling when factual disputes abound, as
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they did in Ricci, but it was not compelling enough to serve the
purposes of the Ricci majority.

2. No Strong Basis in Evidence
Although it is difficult to defend Justice Kennedy’s
assertion that there was “no evidence” of less discriminatory,
job-related alternatives, Justice Kennedy also asserted that any
evidence that might exist was not sufficient to satisfy the “strong
basis in evidence” standard that the Court was announcing as its
new disparate-impact rule.161 It seems clear that there was significant evidence of less discriminatory, job-related alternatives
contained in the Civil Service Board hearing record. It also seems
clear that any suggestion that such alternatives were lacking was
far from undisputed for summary judgment purposes. But Justice
Kennedy knew all of this. My suspicion is that Justice Kennedy
was not simply making an evidentiary or civil procedure mistake
when he decided to enter summary judgment for the petitioners
despite the existence of striking factual disputes. I suspect that
Justice Kennedy was making a statement about the stringency of
the new disparate-impact rule that the Court was adopting.
By deeming a very strong factual showing of better
alternatives to be insufficient even to defeat a motion for summary judgment, Justice Kennedy communicated that it would
henceforth be very difficult to establish a disparate-impact discrimination claim under Title VII, even when a prima facie case
of disparate impact was statistically demonstrated. The Court
was reinstituting an era of strong deference to employer discretion, in order to immunize employers from disparate-impact
claims. As Justice Ginsburg viewed it, the Court was reverting to
the interpretation of Title VII that it had adopted in Wards Cove,
even though Congress had overruled Wards Cove by statutory
amendment in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.162 I believe that Justice Kennedy was conveying the idea that disparate impact claims
would now be as difficult to uphold under the Title VII “strong
basis in evidence” standard as affirmative action programs have
been to uphold under the “strong basis in evidence” Equal Protection standard that Justice Kennedy borrowed.163
Since the conservative voting bloc took firm control of
the Court in race cases after 1990, the Supreme Court has upheld
the constitutionality of a racial affirmative action program in only
one case—and even that case seems doctrinally indistinguishable
from another case in which the Court invalidated a similar program on the same day.164 Justice Kennedy’s decision to grant the
petitioners summary judgment in Ricci, despite the existence of
important factual disputes suggests that we can expect outcomes
in future Title VII disparate-impact cases that are similar to the
outcomes we have seen in affirmative action cases. Justice Kennedy himself illustrates this with the “advisory opinion” that
he issued to reject the hypothetical claim asserted by minority
firefighters in the hypothetical New Haven disparate-impact case
that was never even filed.165 Even though such a hypothetical suit
would be filed by different plaintiffs, using legal theories and evidentiary presentations that had not yet been developed—let alone
presented to a court—Justice Kennedy was still confident that
the minority firefighters would lose their case. He could not have
known this unless he had already determined that the “strong basis
in evidence” standard was so heavily tilted toward the interest of
white firefighters that no hypothetical disparate impact would be
sufficient to outweigh the harm to whites.166 This also suggests
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that Justice Ginsburg was correct when she feared that Justice
Kennedy’s “strong basis in evidence” standard would undermine
the congressional preference for voluntary compliance with Title
VII.167 For Justice Kennedy, there appears to be very little gap
left to fill between potential liability (under the “strong basis in
evidence” standard) and actual liability (under the statutory Title
VII standard) for voluntary compliance to fill. He appears to be
equally solicitous of white interests under both standards.
The stringency of Justice Kennedy’s “strong basis in evidence” standard means that the scales are tipped in Title VII cases
before the Court even begins its analysis. Because the Court has
now detected a conflict between the statute’s disparate-treatment
and disparate-impact provisions, the Court must balance competing interests to resolve that conflict. The “strong basis in evidence” standard means that when unclear or disputed evidence
is in equipoise, the balance will be struck in favor of protecting
the white interest in avoiding disparate-treatment discrimination,
rather than in favor of the racial minority interest in avoiding
disparate-impact discrimination. It is unclear why a tie should
go to the white interests under a statute that was enacted to prevent discrimination against racial minorities—unless the Court
believes that times have changed so much that whites are now the
primary victims of racial discrimination.

Postracial Discrimination
Postracial discrimination is discrimination against racial
minorities that purports to be merely a ban on discrimination
against whites. It is premised on the belief that active discrimination against racial minorities has largely ceased to exist, and
that the lingering effects of past discrimination have now largely
dissipated. As a result, a prospective commitment to colorblind
race neutrality is now sufficient to promote racial equality, and
any deviation from such neutrality will itself constitute unlawful
discrimination. Although versions of this view have been around
since the era of official segregation,168 the claim that we now
live in a postracial society has acquired enhanced plausibility
from the success of prominent racial minorities in roles that were
traditionally reserved for whites. Those successes have ranged
from the golfing achievements of mixed-race Tiger Woods in a
traditionally white game,169 to the selection of black politician
Michael Steele as head of the Republican Party,170 to the election
of mixed-race Barack Obama as President of the United States.171
As recent events have indicated, however, the claim that
we now live in a postracial society is quite premature. Black Harvard Professor Henry Louis Gates still believed that he was being
racially profiled in 2009 when he was arrested by a white police
officer after allegedly breaking into his own house.172 The suburban Philadelphia Valley Swim Club still thought it was appropriate to exclude black children from its swimming pool in 2009.173
And the 2009 death of singer Michael Jackson reminded us that
the “King of Pop” lived in a culture that caused him to think
that he could increase his popular appeal by lightening the color
of his skin.174 Because the culture that we live in is actually far
from postracial in nature, supposed efforts to prevent whites from
being victimized by racial minorities end up entailing nothing
more than a new form of old fashioned discrimination.
The Supreme Court has played its part in this form of
postracial discrimination by inverting the traditional concepts of
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perpetrators and victims in a way that allows the Court ultimately
to invert the concepts of discrimination and equality themselves.
Ricci serves as an example of such postracial discrimination,
and other postracial discrimination decisions handed down by
the Roberts Court belie any suggestion that Ricci was merely an
aberration. Moreover, the Roberts Court’s postracial discrimination decisions are reminiscent of historical Supreme Court decisions that were issued when the Court was openly hostile to racial
minority rights, thereby further calling the legitimacy of those
Roberts Court decisions into question.

A. Conceptual Inversion
As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her Ricci dissent,175
when the City of New Haven decided to forego reliance on the
racially disparate results of its firefighter promotion exams, it was
not acting in a vacuum. Rather, the decision was part of the City’s
effort to counteract a long history of racial employment discrimi
nation practiced by the New Haven fire department. Historically,
whites were the perpetrators of discriminatory hiring and promotion decisions, and racial minorities were the victims.176 Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Ricci inverted the concepts of per
petrator and victim in a way that treated minorities as if they
were the perpetrators and whites as if they were the victims.177
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion was even more emphatic in
its depiction of whites as the victims of partisan racial politics in New Haven.178 The Court’s inversion of the distinction
between perpetrators and victims has, in turn, prompted a more
fundamental inversion in the core concepts of discrimination and
equality themselves, so that contemporary racial discrimination
has now come to be viewed as equal, while remedial equality has
come to be viewed as discriminatory.179

1. Perpetrators

and

Victims

In a zero-sum resource allocation context, the roles of
perpetrator and victim can be initially assigned and subsequently
inverted simply by shifting the analytical baseline that is used
to conduct a discrimination analysis. A baseline is the thing that
separates the propositions that are actively addressed in formulating an analytical argument from the propositions that are simply assumed to be true without any effort to justify their validity.
When analytical attention is focused on the issues that lie above
the baseline, tacit assumptions that lie beneath the baseline often
slip through unnoticed, and are passively accepted without any
analytical justification. Indeed, baseline shifting works best as a
persuasive technique when its baseline assumptions are able to
do their work in a way that is largely undetected.180
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Ricci held that it
was unfair to deny the disappointed petitioners the promotions to
which they were entitled as a result of their superior performance
on the written firefighter exams.181 That holding rested on the
tacit baseline assumption that those who perform well on promotion exams are entitled to merit-based promotions. Therefore,
the issue presented in Justice Kennedy’s opinion was whether a
deviation from the merit-based promotions to which the petitioners were entitled was justified in order to advance the independent goal of reducing the racially disparate impact produced by
the promotion exams. Stated in this way, the claims of the disappointed petitioners seem both strong and sympathetic, because it
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is common to use promotion exams for the purpose of assessing Legal Realists have taught us that the job of lawyers and judges is
merit. As a result, the baseline assumption—the assumption that to manipulate legal doctrine for instrumental purposes. However,
those who scored well on their exams were entitled to promo- one cannot help but wonder why Justice Kennedy and a majority
tions—went largely unscrutinized. However, if the analytical of the Justices on the Supreme Court would view this inversion
baseline is shifted down, so that the baseline assumption is high- of the conventional Title VII understanding as normatively desirlighted and actively scrutinized, the claim of the disappointed able. It is likely that their actions in Ricci reflect a more fundapetitioners loses much of its force.
mental inversion of the concepts of discrimination and equality
The assumption that the petitioners were entitled to pro- themselves.
motions because they had performed well on their written exams
is not a valid assumption under Title VII. Title VII does not even 2. Discrimination and Equality
require the use of written exams in awarding promotions. What
The view that minorities have become the perpetrators
Title VII does require is that promotions be awarded in a way that
and whites have become the victims of
is not racially discriminatory, and disparate
racial discrimination in the United States
impact is an expressly prohibited form of
discrimination under Title VII. Accordeven if the petitioners did also inverts the conventional concepts of
discrimination and equality by substituting
ingly, even if the petitioners did perform
perform well on their written for each the behavior and attitudes that we
well on their written exams, they still had
no right to be promoted when their promo- exams, they still had no right previously used to define the other. It used
tions would produce a racially disparate
to be promoted when their to be that the history of racial discrimination in the United States caused us to view
impact. A non-validated promotion exam
promotions would produce a existing distributional inequalities as the
that produces a racially disparate impact is
racially disparate impact. products of past and present discrimination,
simply an unlawful employment practice—
and to view racially redistributive efforts as
especially in a case such as Ricci, where
remedial measures that were necessary to
less-discriminatory, job-related alternatives
move us toward the goal of nondiscrimiexist.
The adoption of an analytical baseline necessarily natory equality. Now, however, we appear to view the existing
entails a normative judgment. There is no “natural” baseline racially-correlated distribution of resources as something that
that can serve as the foundation for legal analysis, because the actually defines equality by honoring the individual differences
instrumental nature of baselines means that they can always be that exist between us, and we view racially-redistributive efforts
contested by specifying some different instrumental objective.182 as discriminatory rather than remedial. If there is no longer
Justice Kennedy’s instrumental objective, reflected in the base- any appreciable level of discrimination against racial minoriline assumption underlying his majority opinion, was to enforce ties, race-conscious efforts to benefit racial minorities cannot be
the Title VII requirement of race-neutral fairness to firefighters justified as remedial. Instead, they are simply a form of “reverse
who performed well on their promotion exams.183 Justice Gins- discrimination,” that is inconsistent with the constitutional and
statutory principles of equality to which we
burg’s instrumental objective, reflected in
claim an enduring commitment. Inverting
the baseline assumption underlying her
dissent, was that Title VII requires an end The view that minorities have the concepts of discrimination and equality
to the historic practice of disparate-impact become the perpetrators and in this way might make sense if the United
States is now a postracial culture, in which
discrimination.184 There is no way to decide
between these competing instrumental whites have become the victims current racial equality has finally triumphed
of racial discrimination in over our long history of prior inequality. If
objectives without asserting a normative
preference for one objective over the other. the United States also inverts the United States has not yet achieved this
postracial status, however, the conceptual
But the normative preference asserted
by Justice Kennedy iIt seems reasonably the conventional concepts of inversion simply becomes a new form of
clear that the enactment of Title VII’s pro discrimination and equality racial discrimination—one that insists on
preservation of existing inequalities in
hibitions on employment discrimination
by substituting for each the the
order to benefit whites.
rested on the belief that racial and other
behavior and attitudes that
It is hard to believe that someone
minorities were the victims of widespread
discriminatory practices being perpetrated we previously used to define could seriously contend that the problem of
discrimination against racial minorities is
against them by white employers and labor
the other.
a problem that is now behind us.187 Whites
unions.185 The United States has had a long
still have a significant advantage over racial
history of pervasive—and often violent—
minorities in the allocation of societal
white discrimination against racial minori188
ties, but racial discrimination against the white majority has resources, and race obviously remains a salient social category
189 However, the
never been a particular problem—at least not until now. Despite that is often used to disadvantage minorities.
the racial history of the United States, Justice Kennedy chose to election of Barack Obama as President of the United States has
invert the Title VII concepts of perpetrators and victims, so that nevertheless fueled characterization of the contemporary period
whites would be viewed as the victims in Ricci, and racial minori as a postracial era in which minorities are able to compete suc190
ties would be viewed as the perpetrators.186 There is nothing cessfully against whites on a level playing field. Under this
analytically impermissible about this doctrinal maneuver—the
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view, the real racial problem in the Untied States is the problem
of minorities discriminating against whites.
A pertinent Comment appeared in The New Yorker,
shortly after the 2009 Cambridge police arrest of Harvard Professor Henry Louis Gates in his own home.191Staff writer Kelefa
Sanneh highlighted a number of ways in which minorities have
been blamed for racist attitudes toward whites: Obama’s former
pastor, Reverend Jeremiah Wright, was called racist and antiwhite for his sermons; Obama himself was accused of insulting
white people when he referred to his grandmother as a “typical white person;” then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor’s “wise Latina”
remark was referred to as “racist;” and Obama’s claim that the
Cambridge Police had “acted stupidly” in arresting Professor
Gates was characterized as “racial self-aggrandizement,” which
revealed a “deep-seated hatred for white people” that made
Obama himself “a racist.”192 Even discounting for the hyperbole
that is often used to score rhetorical points, those accusations
do seem to show that many whites have come to feel genuinely
aggrieved by current racial politics.
Sanneh then went on to make an important point. He
said that the accusations of “reverse racism” that are often used
to combat affirmative action in the post-Civil Rights era have
been so successful that reverse racism against whites has now
come to be viewed as systemic rather than personal. Whites like
Frank Ricci do not simply feel that they are occasionally victimized by the isolated deeds of bad actors. They feel as if the whole
system is skewed in favor of racial minorities, and is therefore
stacked against them.193 The irony here is striking. Title VII was
rooted in the belief that racial equality could be achieved only
by neutralizing the systemic discrimination that existed against
racial minorities, but the postracial Ricci view is that equality
can be attained only by reinstituting the institutional practices
that used to constitute discrimination. Stated more concretely,
under Title VII, a non-validated, multiple-choice exam that had
a racially disparate impact used to be viewed as the very definition of systemic discrimination. Now reinstating the results of
that exam is necessary to prevent systemic discrimination against
whites. Sanneh concluded that aggrieved whites have now commandeered the term “racism”. Racial minorities can still talk
about isolated issues that affect racial minority interests, but the
term “racism” has now acquired a cultural meaning that equates
it with mistreatment of the white majority by racial minorities.194
The view that contemporary culture now entails this
new form of systemic minority discrimination against whites,
rather than the more traditional forms of white discrimination
against minorities, would seem to be legally irrelevant even if
true. The Supreme Court has insisted in its constitutional affirmative action decisions that the Equal Protection principle does
not prohibit general “societal discrimination.” Particularized acts
of identifiable discrimination are illegal, but the subtler forms
of cultural behavior and attitudes that have systemically caused
whites to do better than racial minorities in most social, political and economic categories are not prohibited by the Court’s
conception of Equal Protection.195 That Supreme Court holding
has always been problematic,196 but it nevertheless remained the
established law for as long as racial minorities were the ones
viewed as the victims of such societal discrimination. If the
Supreme Court were to retreat from its refusal to recognize the
legal legitimacy of societal discrimination because it now viewed
whites as the victims, the Supreme Court would be changing the
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rules in a racially motivated way. That would, of course, lend credence to the view that we continue to live in a culture that dis
criminates against racial minorities.
The fact that Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in
Ricci could be viewed as offering even a credible construction of
Title VII shows that the Court’s inversion of the traditional discrimination and equality concepts has a receptive audience. However, it is still difficult to take the postracial hypothesis on which
that inversion rests seriously. White discrimination against racial
minorities remains a serious cultural problem, while minority
discrimination against whites seems at best to be merely marginal. The continuing maldistribution of societal resources along
racial lines strongly rebuts the validity of any postracial-society
claim that one might be inclined to assert. Minorities are disproportionately burdened by high unemployment rates, high levels
of poverty and low access to health care. Minority schools remain
segregated and they offer educational opportunities that are significantly worse than the opportunities offered in white schools.
Minorities are still discriminated against in the job market, in real
estate markets, and in consumer transactions. Moreover, when
minorities do get jobs they are paid less than whites with equivalent levels of education. The biases that lead to these inequalities are both conscious and unconscious, and they show no signs
of abating in the near future.197 Harvard sociologist William
Julius Wilson has stated that we cannot be considered a postracial society as long as so many minorities are disproportionately
concentrated at the low end of the socio-economic scale. When
economic conditions deteriorate, minorities are always the ones
who suffer as the targets of white frustrations.198
It is true that the President of the United States is
now black, but that does not mean that the society that elected
him has become postracial. One could choose to characterize Obama’s election in different ways. One could characterize
it as demonstrating that minorities can now compete on a level
playing field, without the need for affirmative action or serious
antidiscrimination measures. Alternatively, one could characterize Obama’s election as demonstrating only that a mixed-race,
multiple Ivy League graduate, with the intellectual and political
skills to become President of the Harvard Law Review can successfully navigate contemporary racial culture—thereby providing little evidence of how less-exceptional racial minority group
members are likely to fare on a playing field that is far from
level. As Professor Darren Hutchinson has noted, the “postracial”
claim may simply illustrate the phenomenon of “racial exhaustion.” Whites have simply grown tired of having to deal with the
discrimination claims asserted by racial minorities.199 As a result
of this fatigue, whites may now have decided to assert retaliatory
discrimination claims of their own.
For me, the claim that our culture is now postracial is
seriously undermined by the now-famous Henry Louis Gates
arrest in 2009. Black Harvard Professor Henry Louis Gates was
arrested by white Cambridge Police Sergeant James Crowley
after Professor Gates broke into his own home because the front
door was stuck. A neighbor who feared that a criminal might be
breaking into the house called the police. The events that followed are disputed, but Professor Gates ended up accusing Sergeant Crowley of racial profiling, and Sergeant Crowley ended up
arresting Professor Gates. Because Sergeant Crowley knew that
Professor Gates lived in the house at the time that the arrest was
made, President Obama stated in response to a news conference
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question that the police had “acted stupidly”—a comment that he
later “recalibrated.” These events attracted an enormous amount
of media attention, and things ultimately calmed down after Sergeant Crowley, Professor Gates and President Obama all met for
a beer together at the White House.200 I do not know what actually happened. I suspect that all parties probably “overreacted”
in some sense, but that is my point. Racial tensions are still so
high in even a northeastern university community that what
might have been an innocuous non-event became a hot-button
racial issue. Sergeant Crowley may well have thought that he was
being verbally abused simply for doing his job, and Professor
Gates may well have thought that he was being arrested for acting like an uppity nigger. An environment in which racial nerves
are still that raw can hardly be viewed as an environment that is
postracial.
Perhaps the strongest argument against the claim that we
now live in a postracial society—a society where our most pressing discrimination problem is the problem of racial discrimination against the white majority—comes from the Supreme Court
itself. The current Supreme Court commonly rules in favor of
whites and against racial minorities in contemporary race cases.
Moreover, it rules this way even though it has had to strain prior
antidiscrimination doctrine to do so. When the Supreme Court
goes out of its way to favor white interests over the interests of
racial minorities, the culture in which that Court operates can
hardly be said to be postracial in any meaningful sense of the
term. The Supreme Court favored the interests of whites over the
interests of racial minorities in Ricci, and it has done so in a
host of other race cases as well. When viewed in the context of
these collective racial decisions, the Supreme Court emerges as
an institution that facilitates discrimination against racial minorities rather than an institution that promotes equality.

B. Context
The Ricci decision did not occur in isolation. It was a
5–4 decision handed down by the conservative voting bloc of
the Roberts Court, which in its brief history has already issued
a number of decisions that favored the interests of whites over
the interests of racial minorities. Some of those decisions were
issued the same Term as Ricci, and some were issued in prior
Terms. But the racial tenor of all those decisions suggests a general hostility to the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws and
precedents that were initially adopted to protect the interests of
racial minorities from continued oppression by whites. Unfortunately, the racial tenor of those Roberts Court decisions is also
reminiscent of decisions issued by the Supreme Court in earlier
eras, when the Court was openly antagonistic to the rights of
racial minorities. Consistent with the theory of postracial discrimination, what emerges from the Roberts Court decisions is
a Supreme Court that views its function to be that of protecting
the white majority from discrimination claims asserted by racial
minorities.

1. Roberts Court Discrimination
John Roberts was confirmed as Chief Justice of the
United States in 2005.201 Since his confirmation, the Roberts
Supreme Court has issued decisions that favored the interests
of whites over the interests of racial minorities in a number of
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cases. In addition to Ricci, those cases include decisions that
have rejected minority allegations of racial discrimination in the
areas of voting rights, racial profiling, English language education, and school resegregation.
a. Voting Rights.
Ricci was probably the most significant race case that
the Roberts Court decided during its 2008 Term, but another
closely watched case was Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder.202 In Northwest Austin, the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 remained constitutional in light of the
increased minority voting participation that has occurred since
1965. Section 5 seeks to prevent future voting discrimination
against racial minorities by requiring jurisdictions with a history
of prior voting discrimination to obtain federal preclearance from
the Department of Justice or from a three-judge Federal District
Court in the District of Columbia for any changes that they wish
to make in their voting practices or procedures. In 2006, Congress voted overwhelmingly to reauthorize Section 5 for another
twenty five years. This was the fourth time the Act had been
reauthorized by Congress since 1965. However, the plaintiff utility district argued that Section 5 could not constitutionally be
applied to it because there was no evidence that the utility district
had ever engaged in voting discrimination. A three-judge district
court rejected the claim, but the Supreme Court avoided the constitutional question by holding that the utility district could apply
for a Section 5 waiver under the statute’s “bailout” provision.203
It might at first seem as if Northwest Austin was decided
in a way that was favorable to the interest of racial minority voters, because the Court declined to hold Section 5 unconstitutional.204 However, the majority opinion of Chief Justice Roberts
left little doubt that he believed Section 5 to be unconstitutional
in light of the increased minority participation in voting that
occurred since the original adoption of the Voting Rights Act in
1965. Discussing two potentially applicable constitutional standards, he concluded that “[t]he Act’s preclearance requirements
and its coverage formula raise serious constitutional questions
under either test.”205
Northwest Austin and Ricci are alike in at least two
important respects. First, in both cases the Court practiced postracial discrimination by supplanting an unambiguous statutory
effort to protect racial minorities with a dubious judicial effort
to protect whites.206 In Northwest Austin, Congress decided as
recently as 2006 that minority voters still needed the voting
rights protections of Section 5. It did so by a vote of 390-33 in
the House and 98-0 in the Senate, after extensive legislative hearings, and a voluminous legislative record.207 In Ricci, Congress
not only adopted Title VII in 1964 to protect racial minorities
from employment discrimination at the hands of whites, but it
amended Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in order to
overrule prior Supreme Court decisions that proved excessively
protective of white employer interests, and insufficiently protective of racial minority rights.208 Both cases, therefore, illustrate
the Court’s propensity to undermine congressional antidiscrimination initiatives when the Court disagrees with the racial policies that they embody.
Second, both Northwest Austin and Ricci sought to
engage in racial policymaking through the technique of regulatory “chill,” rather than through the process of direct adjudication.
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Because the race relations issues that underlie the Voting Rights
Act and Title VII are pure legislative policy issues, the Supreme
Court was understandably reluctant to invalidate the two statutes
directly. To have done so would have subjected the Court to a
potential political backlash, and to questions about the Court’s
usurpation of legislative policymaking powers in a way that was
inconsistent with separation of powers principles. In both cases,
what the Court did instead was to issue in terrorem dicta that was
designed to advance the Court’s postracial policy agenda without forcing the Court to internalize the attendant political costs.
Therefore, in Northwest Austin, the Court threatened to hold Section 5 unconstitutional in the future, so that Congress might be
chilled into adopting “saving” modifications of the statute that
better protected the interests of the Court’s white constituents.209
Similarly, in Ricci, the Court tacitly threatened to hold Title VII
unconstitutional in the future, so that Congress might be chilled
from once again overruling by statute the Court’s postracial
administration of Title VII.210
It is not clear how successful these dictum threats will
prove to be, but they will almost certainly contribute to a political
climate in which the representative branches will have to consider rejuvenated reverse discrimination claims that are asserted
by whites. The problem is likely to be particularly acute in the
voting rights context. If the Northwest Austin decision causes
the upcoming 2010 census to be followed by a plethora of Voting Rights Act redistricting challenges such as those that arose
after the 1990 census,211 racial minorities are likely to end up
suffering new forms of vote dilution. After the 1990 census, the
Justice Department was able to negotiate redistricting plans that
did not unduly dilute minority voting strength by threatening to
withhold Section 5 preclearance under the Voting Rights Act.212
Now, however, the Supreme Court decision in Northwest Austin
may not only encourage whites to file redistricting challenges to
efforts aimed at protecting minority voting strength, but it may
also reduce the Justice Department’s negotiating leverage to
resist such challenges. If a covered jurisdiction wishes to engage
in redistricting that will increase relative white voting strength,
by diluting minority voting strength, that jurisdiction can simply
thumb its nose at Justice Department threats to deny preclearance. Defiant jurisdictions will now have every incentive to risk
litigation, gambling that the Supreme Court will simply declare
Section 5 to be unconstitutional the next time a Section 5 challenge is presented to the Court.
The Roberts Court also decided a second voting rights
case during its 2008 Term. Bartlett v. Strickland,213 was itself a
redistricting case, in which the conservative bloc held 5–4 that
the Voting Rights Act prohibitions on minority vote dilution did
not apply to so-called “crossover districts.” A crossover district
is a district in which minorities do not comprise a majority of
the voting population, but comprise a large enough percentage to
elect a candidate of their choice by forming political coalitions
with whites. The issue presented was whether splitting a crossover district in a way that deprived its minority voters of a realistic chance to elect the candidate of their choice constituted vote
dilution of minority voting strength that was prohibited by the
Voting Rights Act.214 In announcing the judgment of the Court,
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion held that splitting the district
did not violate the Voting Rights Act, because minorities had to
comprise at least 50% of the voting population in a district in
order to qualify for vote dilution protection under the Act.215
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Justice Souter’s dissent not only disagreed with the 50%
requirement, but argued that reading such a requirement into the
Act perversely encouraged racial bloc voting rather than interracial voting coalitions. Justice Souter believed that the majority
provided an incentive for states to pack minority voters into fewer
majority-minority voting districts. It also punished minorities
who were able to form voting coalitions with whites, by denying
them statutory protections from vote dilution.216 Justice Souter
stressed that minority vote dilution could be accomplished not
merely by minority vote dispersion, but also by the very minority
vote packing that the Court’s holding encouraged.217
Although the Bartlett decision is in many respects technical, the ultimate effect of the decision is to increase white voting strength by decreasing minority voting strength. By denying
statutory vote dilution protections to crossover districts, minorities will have less influence in the electoral process than they
would have had if crossover districts were protected, because
minorities will be able to control the electoral outcome in fewer
voting districts. Once again, Justice Kennedy’s opinion argued
that granting vote dilution protections to racial minorities that
white voters did not have would discriminate against whites.218
As in Ricci, he indicated that reading the statute to compel such
racial considerations might make the statute unconstitutional.219
Also reminiscent of Ricci, he viewed the society as postracial,
because the existence of crossover districts now showed that the
Voting Rights Act had “by definition” been successful in reducing racial discrimination in voting.220 But as in Ricci as well,
Justice Kennedy’s postracial opinion seems to ignore the fact that
it is racial minorities rather than whites who suffer the types of
historical discrimination that the pertinent statutes were intended
to remedy.221
b. Racial Profiling.
The Roberts Court conservative bloc issued another
5–4 decision during its 2008 Term in the racial profiling case of
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.222 In Iqbal, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
held that a Pakistani Muslim immigrant who was detained after
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks did not adequately state
a cause of action when he claimed that high level Justice Department officials, including the Attorney General and the Director of
the FBI, singled him out for “harsh confinement” because of his
religion and ethnicity.223 Iqbal’s complaint alleged that the defendants “each knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously
agreed to subject” Iqbal to harsh treatment, and that they did so
“as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race,
and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.” The complaint further alleged that the Attorney General was
the “principal architect” of the policy, and the FBI Director was
“instrumental in [its] adoption, promulgation, and implementation.”224 Although the lower courts upheld the adequacy of the
complaint,225 Justice Kennedy’s opinion stated that the allegations
in the complaint were too conclusory and insufficiently plausible.
They were too conclusory because they did not contain specific
factual allegations, but rather were nothing more than “a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional discrimination
claim.”226 They were insufficiently plausible because there were
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons why law enforcement officials would have focused on Arab Muslims following a terrorist
attack by Arab Muslim hijackers.227 Moreover, because the high
level Justice Department officials were not subject to vicarious
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liability, any plausible misconduct by lower level officials would
not prevent dismissal of Iqbal’s complaint against the high level
officials.228
The Iqbal Court’s dissatisfaction with “conclusory”
pleadings, and its insistence on a stringent “plausibility” standard, seem inconsistent with the idea of notice pleading that was
incorporated into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.229 The
Court, however, also held “implausible” an Arab Muslim’s allegation that discriminatory racial profiling caused him to be targeted for post-9-11 harsh confinement. To me, it is the Court’s
holding that seems “implausible.” Given the nation’s current
anxieties and fears about Arab and Muslim terrorism, and the
alleged involvement of high level federal officials in formulating United States torture policy,230 racial profiling seems more
likely than not. As in Ricci, however, Justice Kennedy once again
gave the benefit of the doubt to white claims of legitimacy rather
than to racial minority claims of discrimination. As in Ricci, Justice Kennedy seemed intent on precluding any opportunity for
an inquiry into the actual facts—entering summary judgment in
Ricci and dismissing the complaint in Iqbal. And as in Ricci, Justice Kennedy had to strain the meaning of existing law in order
effectuate his inversion of the perpetrators and the victims.
c. English Language Education.
Yet another Roberts Court 2008 Term decision that
disadvantaged racial minorities was Horne v. Flores.231 In an
opinion by Justice Alito, the conservative bloc voted 5–4 to
reverse the District Court and Court of Appeals holdings that Arizona was violating the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of
1974 by failing to provide adequate educational opportunities for
students with limited English language proficiency. The Equal
Educational Opportunities Act is an antidiscrimination statute
that prohibits the denial of “equal educational opportunity on
account of race, color, sex or national origin.” It further prohibits
“the failure by an educational agency to take appropriate action
to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by
its students in its instructional programs.”232 In 1992, the plaintiffs filed a class action challenging the State’s alleged failure to
provide adequate educational opportunities for minority at-risk
and limited English proficient children. Beginning in 2000, the
lower courts began issuing a series of orders that required the
adoption of minimal educational standards and increased funding
to comply with the Act. The State’s repeated failures to comply
ultimately led to contempt citations. The lower courts also denied
the State’s Rule 60(b)(5) motion for relief from the compliance
order, which the State argued had become inequitable in light of
changed circumstances.233
Justice Alito’s opinion reversed, stating that the lower
courts should have been more flexible in ruling on the Rule 60(b)
(5) motion, because such motions perform a particularly important function in “institutional reform litigation” where “sensitive federalism concerns” are involved.234 Here the lower courts
had been insufficiently flexible, because they focused too much
attention on whether the prior funding orders had been complied with, and not enough attention on the question of whether
changed circumstances brought the State into compliance with
the Act in a way that made enforcement of the original order
inequitable.235 Justice Alito therefore stated that a remand was
necessary to determine if changed circumstances were provided by factors including new educational strategies adopted
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by the State, and cong ressional enactment of the No Child Left
Behind statute.236 Justice Breyer’s dissent argued that the lower
courts adequately considered the factors relevant to a changedcircumstances inquiry, and that adequate funding was essential
to compliance with the Act.237 Justice Breyer concluded that the
Court’s decision would hinder congressional efforts to ensure
that Spanish-speaking students will learn the English skills necessary to participate in a society where English is the predominant language.238
Commentators have viewed Horne as establishing a new
Rule 60(B)(5) standard for relief from court orders in institutional litigation that will undermine finality by permitting litigants to reopen remedial injunctions that have been issued to
control their conduct.239 For present purposes, however, Justice
Breyer’s concern that the decision will frustrate congressional efforts to provide equal educational opportunities to Spanish-speaking minorities is particularly pertinent. Among the
allegations made by the plaintiffs was the claim that Arizona’s
school finance scheme “is just sufficient to let less distressed,
predominantly Anglo districts impart State-mandated essential
skills to their mainstream student bodies” without providing sufficient funds for minority students to acquire the same skills.240
Although this claim was first asserted in 1992, by 2009 the plaintiffs had still not received the relief they requested. Despite lower
court decisions and contempt citations ordering such relief, the
Roberts Court simply remanded for yet another round of proceeding. Moreover, it did so in an opinion whose tone suggested
that the Court disfavored granting any relief. Consistent with its
postracial orientation, the Roberts Court again appears to believe
that there is no longer any real discrimination problem to remedy,
and that racial minorities are simply asking for more than they
are entitled to receive. And again, it adopted this position despite
the existence of a federal statute that seems designed to remedy
the precise problem of which the plaintiffs complained.
d. Resegregation.
In its 2006 Term, the conservative bloc of the Roberts Court issued a 5–4 decision in the school Resegregation
Cases.241 The majority opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts
invalidated voluntary race-conscious efforts by the Seattle and
Louisville school boards to prevent the resegregation of public schools that was occurring as a result of residential resegregation.242 In previous years, both school districts eventually
achieved integration after making strenuous efforts to comply
with the Supreme Court decisions in Brown.243 When population
shifts began to produce resegregation, the school boards became
convinced that only race conscious student assignment could
preserve the integrated nature of the schools. Accordingly both
school boards adopted narrow integration plans, affecting a small
number of students, that considered race when a student’s desired
school assignment would force a school’s racial makeup to fall
outside of a predetermined integration range.244 White parents
who did not receive their desired school assignments challenged
the plans. 245 The Court then reversed the lower courts and held
the plans to be unconstitutional because they were not narrowly
tailored to advance the interest of the schools in promoting student diversity.246
Although Brown was issued to desegregate public
schools, Chief Justice Roberts read the Brown decision itself as
invalidating the integration plans that were adopted to prevent
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resegregation.247 He justified this conclusion by asserting that a felt a need to distance itself from those historical and contemposchool board was prohibited from considering race regardless of rary decisions, rather than risk being aligned with them. I fear
its benign motive.248 He concluded his opinion by stating that that the reason may be that the conservative bloc Justices on the
“[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop Roberts Court actually favor such an alignment.
discriminating on the basis of race.”249 Justice Breyer’s dissent
The historical Supreme Court was no friend to racial
argued that the Court’s decision was inconsistent with Brown, minorities. In the 1823 case of Johnson v. McIntosh,253 the
and with a range of other Supreme Court precedents. He stressed Supreme Court upheld the seizure of indigenous Indian lands by
that because other race neutral ways of addressing the problem the United States. In the 1857 case of Dred Scott v. Sanford,254
proved inadequate, the Court’s decision left school districts with the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the Missouri Comprono effective way to prevent resegregation.250
mise Act of 1820, which Congress enacted in an effort to limit
The Court’s decision in the Resegregation Cases seems the spread of slavery in new United States territories. The Court
to epitomize the conceptual inversion of discrimination and not only held that the statute interfered with the property rights
equality that animates the Court’s postracial view of contempo- of white slave owners, but it also held that blacks could not be
rary culture.251 When the decision in the Resegregation Cases is citizens within the meaning of the United States Constitution.255
juxtaposed to the 5–4 conservative bloc decision in 2009, denying The Fourteenth Amendment overruled Dred Scott256 after the
a black defendant post-conviction access to evidence for DNA Civil War, when other Reconstruction constitutional amendments
testing,252 it appears that white parents have a stronger constitu and implementing legislation were also enacted to promote equal
tional right to send their children to segregated schools than post- rights for former black slaves. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
conviction criminal defendants have to test the evidence offered began limiting the remedial scope of the amendments, and even
against them in a way that could establish their innocence. It takes invalidated some of their implementing legislation.257 In the 1896
quite a stretch of the legal imagination to
case of Plessy v. Ferguson,258 the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of Jim
conclude that Brown v. Board of Education requires the resegregation of public There is now a fairly standard Crow official segregation in public faciliDespite some formal minority victoschools. Yet the aphorism with which
litany of infamous decisions ties.
ries, the Court commonly capitulated to
Chief Justice Roberts ends his Resegregain which historical Supreme Southern white supremacist attitudes. It
tion opinion attests to his possession of
such an imagination. The Chief Justice, Courts have openly sacrificed acquiesced to Southern evasion efforts to
blacks the right to vote, to replace
and the other members of the Supreme
the interests of racial minorities deny
slavery with peonage, to preserve segCourt conservative voting bloc on race,
appear to believe that the nation’s racial to advance the interests of white regated transportation, and to preserve
problems can be solved by a mere commit slave holders, segregationists, housing segregation.259 The Court also
capitulated to Southern racism in
ment to prospective race neutrality. The
and other white supremacists. often
Roberts Court’s recent race decisions turn
the criminal justice system by permitting
a blind eye to the continuing effects of
racial seg regation in the jury box and on
prior discrimination, and to the structural
the witness stand. It sometimes allowed
forces that continue to perpetuate subtle forms of institutional apparently innocent black defendants to be imprisoned or even
discrimination. In cases ranging from firefighter promotions to executed, rather than interfere with the procedural sovereignty of
school resegregation, the Court seems to care very little about the Southern state courts.260
interests of racial minorities—and very much about the interests
In the mid-Twentieth Century, the Supreme Court’s
of the white majority. Inequalities suffered by racial minorities racial performance was little better. In the 1944 case of Koresimply do not seem to count when the Court submits to the lure matsu v. United States,261 the Court upheld the constitutionality
of postracial discrimination. Unfortunately, this aligns the Rob of a World War II order excluding Japanese-American citizens
erts Court with prior Supreme Courts that were more transpa from their own homes on the West Coast, which led to the internrently committed to the practice of racial minority oppression.
ment of Japanese-Americans in detention centers. After the official segregation doctrine of Plessy was invalidated by the 1954
Brown school desegregation case,262 the Court still refused
2. Historical Discrimination
to order immediate desegregation. Instead, Brown II required
The postracial discriminatory decisions of the Rob- desegregation “with all deliberate speed,” which permitted
erts Court are reminiscent of the overt discriminatory decisions Brown to be evaded by massive Southern resistance for nearly
issued by prior Supreme Courts. There is now a fairly stan- a decade.263 Then, when the school desegregation effort moved
dard litany of infamous decisions in which historical Supreme out of the South, the Court articulated a distinction between de
Courts have openly sacrificed the interests of racial minorities to facto and de jure discrimination—a distinction that has permitted
advance the interests of white slave holders, segregationists, and most schools in the United States to remain de facto segregated
other white supremacists. Traces of those historical decisions can even today.264 The year after Brown was decided, the Supreme
also be found in more recent contemporary cases, including those Court also declined to invalidate a Virginia miscegenation statute
that have imposed constitutional limits on school desegregation, in Naim v. Naim,265 even though Brown almost certainly rendered
racial redistricting, and racial affirmative action. The Roberts the statute unconstitutional. More recently, Brown has been read
Court’s postracial discrimination cases can be easily aligned with as establishing a colorblind race-neutrality requirement that the
those prior decisions, in terms of both tone and outcome. Accord- Court now uses to invalidate race-conscious affirmative action
ingly, one cannot help but wonder why the Roberts Court has not and redistricting programs.266
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The tone and outcomes of the historical Court’s decisions sometimes made the Court’s hostility to racial minority
interests unmistakable. In frequently quoted language from his
opinion in Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney described the framers’
view of black slaves. Not only could blacks not be citizens, but
they were at the time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been
subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether
emancipated or not, yet remained subject to
their authority, and had no rights or privileges
but such as those who held the power and the
Government might choose to grant them.267
Chief Justice Taney went on to say that blacks “had for
more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior
order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either
in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect.”268 Hopefully,
that is no longer a widely shared view of racial minorities, and it
is certainly not a view that is often expressed in polite company.
Nevertheless, the tone of Roberts Court race cases sometimes
reflects a disregard of racial minority interests that strikes me as
similarly callous.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Ricci displays an understandably sincere concern for the interests of white firefighters
who scored well on their promotion exams. However, it displays
a near total lack of concern for the interests of racial minorities,
who daily suffer the relentless disparate-impact harms that Title
VII was adopted and amended to prevent.269 Moreover, by adopting an unrealistically high standard for the avoidance of disparate-impact injuries, Justice Kennedy’s opinion seems to place
any meaningful remedy for such harms beyond the practical reach
of Title VII, and perhaps beyond the reach of the Constitution as
well.270 The position of the disappointed New Haven firefighters seems to be that abandoning a resource allocation criterion
that favors whites constitutes racial discrimination against the
white majority, and that seems to be the way the Roberts Court
views thinJustice Alito’s refusal to uphold equal educational
funding in the Horne English Language Education case also
seems unnecessarily to disregard the interests of racial minority
students. The seventeen years that elapsed between the time the
plaintiffs filed their class action and the time the Supreme Court
remanded without a remedy for yet additional proceedings, has
a disquieting similarity to the long period of time that elapsed
after Brown, when the Supreme Court first acquiesced in Southern evasion of the Brown desegregation mandate but ultimately
refused to desegregate Northern and Western schools.271 Horne
has a disquieting similarity to the Roberts Court’s more recent
refusal to permit voluntary efforts to maintain hard-won integration in the Resegregation Cases.272
The dictum suggestion of Chief Justice Roberts in
Northwest Austin, that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act might
be unconstitutional despite its recent overwhelming reauthorization by Congress, suggests a similar callousness to the interests of racial minorities.273 By its terms, the Voting Rights Act
applies only to jurisdictions that have a history of minority voter
disenfranchisement. And by its terms the Act permits those jurisdictions to make any changes they desire to their voting practices
and procedures, provided they can first demonstrate that they are
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not perpetuating the sorts of past discrimination that caused them
to become covered jurisdictions.274 Rather than acquiesce in the
need for suspect jurisdictions to make that showing, however,
Chief Justice Roberts preferred to subject racial minorities to the
danger of continued voter discrimination. Moreover, he did so
in a political climate involving recent presidential elections that
were rife with allegations of politically-partisan, minority voter
disenfranchisement.275
The aphorism with which Chief Justice Roberts chose to
end his opinion in the Resegregation Cases—“[t]he way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on
the basis of race”276—conveys what is perhaps the most disturbing tone of all of the Roberts Court’s post racial discrimination
cases. Chief Justice Roberts appears to suggest that the problem
of racial discrimination in the United States—a problem that has
plagued the nation for hundreds of years, since before the nation’s
inception—is really not such a difficult problem after all. All we
have to do to solve the pesky problem of racial discrimination
is ignore the continuing legacy of past discrimination, and prospectively behave in a colorblind, race neutral manner. Imagine
how insulting it must be for racial minorities to be told that their
problem can be solved in such a simple-minded manner.
There remains an enduring sense of white entitlement,
highlighted by Cheryl Harris in Whiteness As Property,277 pursuant to which whites have traditionally thought it natural to exploit
racial minorities in order to advance white interests. Hillary Jordan’s novel Mudbound278 illustrates this nicely. In the novel,
post-slavery Southern white planters—who commonly cheated
and abused their black workers—sat around vilifying the “nig
gers” for moving North and leaving the planters with no one to
harvest their crops, other than workers who would demand market rates for their labor. The novel was set in the post-World War
II era, but I fear that the attitude of entitlement that it captures is
both less fictitious and less dated than one would hope.
I doubt that the conservative bloc members of the Roberts Court share the racial sentiments expressed by Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott.279 Still, there is an aspect of Roberts
Court postracial discrimination that Dred Scott renders hauntingly familiar. Dred Scott entailed the Supreme Court’s invalidation of a cong ressional effort to solve a serious racial problem.
As the subsequent Civil War indicates, the Court’s invalidation of
that congressional effort did not work out well. During Recon
struction, the Supreme Court also engaged in efforts to limit or
invalidate congressional efforts to solve our continuing racial
problems. Again, the Supreme Court often chose to limit or
invalidate those efforts. 280 Unfortunately, Roberts Court efforts
to treat racial minorities as if they are no longer victims of dis
crimination, in order to protect the interests of whites instead,
share the historical Court’s propensity to marginalize or overrule congressional policies that have been adopted to help remedy racial discrimination. The Roberts Court Justices certainly
understand this facet of Supreme Court history, but the conservative bloc Justices have chosen to align themselves with those
historical practices nevertheless. Separation of powers considerations aside, it is simply not clear to me why the Roberts Court
thinks it can do a better job of formulating race relations policy
than the politically accountable, representative branches of government, or why the Roberts Court would want to align itself
with the darker strands of Supreme Court racial history. I fear
that the conservative bloc Justices on the Roberts Supreme Court
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may actually consider themselves to be proud heirs of the racial
attitudes that they seem to have inherited from their predecessors.

Conclusion
The view that the Roberts Court seems to have of racial
minorities is disheartening. The Ricci firefighters decision suggests that the Court’s conservative bloc majority favors the interests of whites over the interests of racial minorities. Moreover,
the intensity of that favoritism is strong enough to prompt the
Court to circumvent statutory protections that Congress enacted
precisely to prevent such racial favoritism. Because other Roberts Court race decisions exhibit a similar favoritism, the Court’s
preference for whites seems intentional and persistent, rather

than incidental or sporadic. The tone and outcome of the Court’s
decisions are reminiscent of earlier Supreme Court decisions that
were openly hostile to racial minority rights. This suggests that
contemporary racial attitudes may be more firmly rooted in the
past than we would like to admit. The Roberts Court’s race decisions seem premised on the view that we now live in a postracial culture, where discrimination against racial minorities has
largely ceased to exist, and our most serious racial problem is the
problem of minorities discriminating against whites. The election
of Barack Obama notwithstanding, the systemic disadvantages
that minorities continue to suffer relative to whites makes the
assertion of that view seem disingenuous. It is as if the Supreme
Court were simply looking for a novel justification to continue its
time-honored practice of sacrificing racial minority rights for the
benefit of whites.
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160 See id. at 2702-03 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2703 n.9 (noting
that the majority’s failure to remand deprived the City of the opportunity to raise
a statutory defense that was available for good faith compliance with a written
interpretation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).
161 See id. at 2681.
162 See id. at 2698-99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659-60).
163 See id. at 2675-76 (borrowing the “strong basis in evidence” standard from
the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence).
164 After the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a congressionally
enacted broadcast affirmative action plan in Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497
U.S. 547 (1990), the Court did not uphold the constitutionality of another
racial affirmative action plan until it’s 2003 decision upholding the University
of Michigan Law School plan in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
However, that same day, the Court invalidated the University of Michigan’s
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undergraduate affirmative plan in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003),
even though the two plans are difficult to distinguish. See, e.g., Girardeau A.
Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, 21 Const. Comment. 221, 227-29, 242-49
(2004) (discussing Supreme Court voting blocs, and the difficulty distinguishing between Grutter and Gratz); Spann, supra note 99, at 159-63 (discussing
Supreme Court outcomes and voting blocs in racial affirmative action cases).
165 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681.
166 See id.; see also id. at 2681 (noting that Justice Kennedy’s “advisory opinion” was explicitly articulated in terms of interest balancing. Justice Kennedy
states: “Our holding today clarifies how Title VII applies to resolve competing
expectations under the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions. If,
after it certifies the test results, the City faces a disparate-impact suit, then in
light of our holding today it should be clear that the City would avoid disparateimpact liability based on the strong basis in evidence that, had it not certified the
results, it would have been subject to disparate-treatment liability.”).
167 See id. at 2701-02 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying note 88 (discussing Justice Ginsburg’s fear of impeding voluntary
compliance).
168 See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (asserting that official
segregation did not stamp blacks with a badge of inferiority unless blacks chose
to interpret segregation in that manner).
169 See, e.g., Robert Goldman & Stephen Papson, Nike Culture: the Sign of
the Swoosh 113-17 (Sage Publications) (1998) (discussing Nike’s use of Tiger
Woods as a post-racial, multicultural icon).
170 See Leonard Pitts, It’s Not the End of Race—Just a Big Step Forward,
Orlando Sentinel, Jan. 18, 2009, at A19 (discussing whether black politicians,
including Michael Steele, are “post-racial”).
171 See sources cited supra note 1 (suggesting that Obama’s election as president
indicates shift to postracial culture).
172 See Cheryl W. Thompson, et al., Gates, Police Officer Share Beers and His
tories with President, Wash. Post, July 31, 2009, at A3 (discussing Gates arrest
by Cambridge police officer).
173 Ann Gerhart, Alleged Prejudice Starts Probe at Club: Pa. Organization
Revoked Swim Contract for Day Camp that Included Minorities, Wash. Post,
July 11, 2009, at A2 (discussing exclusion of minority children from swim
club).
174 See DeNeed L. Brown, Through the Past, Darkly: The Legacy of Colorism
Reflects Wounds of Racism that Are More than Skin-Deep, Wash. Post, July 12,
2009, at E1 (discussing Michael Jackson’s transformed skin color).
175 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2689-91 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
176 See id.
177 See id. at 2673-77, 2681.
178 See id. at 2683-87 (Alito, J., concurring).
179 See Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Inaction, 50 How. L.J. 611, 645-52
(2007) [hereinafter Affirmative Inaction] (noting the author’s inversion arguments in the context of criticizing the Supreme Court’s hostility to affirmative
action, , and the author’s efforts to deconstruct the very distinction between
affirmative action and discrimination); see also Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative
Action and Discrimination, 39 How. L.J. 1, 63-76 (1995).
180 See Girardeau A. Spann, Constitutionalization, 49 St. Louis U. L.J. 709,
722-29 (2005) [hereinafter Constitutionlization] (describing baseline shifting as
a strategic analytical technique).
181 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673-77, 2681 (depicting white firefighters as victims, and minority firefighters as perpetrators of discrimination).
182 See Constitutionalization, supra note 180, at 721-23 (discussing Realist
insight that there is no natural baseline).
183 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673-77, 2681 (discussing the need to avoid disparate-treatment discrimination, and to avoid burden on high scoring firefighters).
184 See id. at 2689-90, 2696-700 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing the need
to avoid disparate-impact discrimination).
185 See id. at 2696-99 (discussing Title VII’s goal of preventing disparate-impact
discrimination).
186 See id. at 2673-77, 2681.
187 See sources cited supra note 2 (citing commentators who are skeptical of the
postracial claim).
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See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 299-301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the striking racial disparities that continue to exist in
distribution of societal resources).
189 See supra text accompanying notes 172-174 (discussing the contemporary
significance of race).
190 See sources cited supra note 1 (citing commentators who suggest that contemporary culture is now postracial).
191 See Kelefa Sanneh, Comment: Discriminating Tastes, The New Yorker, Aug
10 & 17, 2009, at 21.
192 See id.
193 See id.
194 See id.
195 This prohibition on the use of legal remedies to redress general societal
discrimination, as opposed to identifiable acts of particularized discrimination,
was articulated by Justice Lewis Powell in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 307-10 (1978), and reasserted by Justice Powell in Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-78 (1986) (Powell, J., plurality). Led
by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, this view has now been adopted by a majority
of the full Supreme Court. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323-25
(2003) (citing Bakke as rejecting interest in remedying societal discrimination);
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909-10 (1996) (rejecting societal discrimination);
Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 610-14 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496-98 (1989)
(plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616,
647-53 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 288 (O’Connor, J., concurring). See generally Spann, supra note 99, at
168-69 (discussing general societal discrimination).
196 See Spann, Affirmative Inaction, supra note 179, at 636-39 (criticizing the
societal discrimination rule).
197 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 299-304 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (dis
cussing the striking racial disparities that continue to exist in distribution of
societal resources).
198 See Gates, supra note 2, at 15-23 (2009) (discussing Wilson’s rejection of the
postracial claim).
199 See Thompson, supra note 1, at A3 (discussing Darren Hutchinson’s concept
of “racial exhaustion”).
200 See Thompson et al., supra note 172, at A3 (citing discussions of Gates’
arrest).
201 See Stone et al., supra note 106, at lxxi (discussing the confirmation of
Chief Justice Roberts).
202 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
203 See id. at 2508-11, 2513-17.
204 See id. at 2513 (declining to address the constitutional question).
205 See id. at 2511-13 (suggesting that Section 5 would now be unconstitu
tional). Justice Thomas expressed similar sentiments, stating that “[t]he Court
quite properly alerts Congress that § 5 tests the outer boundaries of its Fifteenth
Amendment enforcement authority and may not be constitutional.” See id. at
2519 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
206 See David S. Broder, For Obama, Court Cases That Matter, Wash. Post,
July 2, 2009, at A19 (arguing that Northwest Austin and Ricci reflect the
Supreme Court view “that racial discrimination is no longer as big a problem as
we thought”).
207 See Adam Cohen, The Supreme Court’s Hostility to the Voting Rights Act,
N.Y. Times, May 13, 2009, at A30 (discussing congressional vote, hearings and
legislative record).
208 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2696-99 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
209 See Northwest Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2511-13 (suggesting that Section 5 would
now be unconstitutional); see also id. at 2519, 2526-27 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting that Justice Thomas
expressed similar sentiments and would have declared Section 5 to be unconstitutional in Northwest Austin itself, stating that “[t]he Court quite properly
alerts Congress that § 5 tests the outer boundaries of its Fifteenth Amendment
enforcement authority and may not be constitutional.”); see also E.J. Dionne,
Jr., Courtly Politics: A Compromise Sustains the Voting Rights Act, Wash. Post,
June, 25, 2009, at A19 (commenting on threatened future invalidation of Voting
Rights Act).
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See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2676, 2681 (expressly raising and reserving the question of Title VII constitutionality).
211 See Spann, supra note 99, at 180-89 (discussing the redistricting cases that
the Supreme Court decided after 1990 census); see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S.
952, 956-57 (1996) (plurality opinion of Justice O’Connor, J.) (citing a series of
Supreme Court redistricting cases decided “in the wake of 1990 census”).
212 See, e.g., Lawyer v. Dep’t. of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 569-75 (1997) (discussing a redistricting plan that was modified after preclearance denial and subsequent negotiations with Justice Department); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
905-10 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633-39 (1993).
213 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009).
214 See id. at 1238-40 (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J.).
215 See id. at 1241-1246 (rejecting the vote dilution protections for crossover
districts).
216 See id. at 1250 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing perverse incentives).
217 See id. at 1251 (Souter, J., dissenting).
218 See id. at 1243.
219 See id. at 1245, 1247-49.
220 See id. at 1249 (suggesting that racism in voting was waning); but see id.
(suggesting that much still remains to be done).
221 Cf. id. at 1255 (Souter, J., dissenting).
222 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
223 See id. at 1942-43 (holding that the allegations in the complaint were insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss).
224 See id. at 1943-44.
225 See id. at 1944-45.
226 See id. at 1951 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(1950)).
227 See id. at 1951.
228 See id. at 1948-49, 1952.
229 See Melinda Hanson, Term in Review: Civil Cases, 78 U.S.L.W. 3025, 302527 (July 21, 2009) (discussing the tension between Iqbal and notice pleadings).
230 See, e.g., Editorial, Illegal, and Pointless, N.Y. Times, July 17, 2009, at 22
(discussing possible involvement of high level government officials in torture
of terrorist suspects); Doyle McManus, Tortuous Road to the Truth, L.A. Times,
July 19, 2009, at A31; Michael Muskal, What and Why Behind CIA Counterterror Issue, Chi. Trib., July 26, 2009, at 30.
231 129 S. Ct. 2579 (2009).
232 See id. at 2588-89.
233 See id. at 2590-92.
234 See id. at 2593-95 (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) standards).
235 See id. at 2595-2600 (discussing the need for flexibility, and deemphasizing
the importance of complying with lower court funding orders).
236 See id. at 2600-2606.
237 See id. at 2607-08, 2613-15, 2621-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
238 See id. at 2631 (expressing concern for Spanish-speaking students).
239 See, e.g., Thomas D. Edmondson & Melinda Hanson, High Court Gives
Arizona Another Crack At Doffing Language Program Injunction, 77 U.S.L.W.
1825 (June 30, 2009) (discussing the finality problem).
240 See State English Language Learners’ Program Triggers Debate on Funding,
Remedial Orders, 77 U.S.L.W. (April, 28, 2009).
241 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007).
242 See id. at 709-10 .
243 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954) (rejecting the
separate-but-equal doctrine and declaring official school segregation to be
unconstitutional); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301
(1955) (tempering the effect of Brown by declining to order immediate school
desegregation and instead requiring desegregation “with all deliberate speed”).
244 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 709-18.
245 See id. at 710-11, 715-18.
246 See id. at 711, 722-25.
247 See id. at 745-48 (plurality opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (invoking Brown).
248 See id. at 741-48 (plurality opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (ignoring motive).
249 Id. at 748.
250 See id. at 803-04, 823-30, 858-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that Brown
and other precedents permitted plans).
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See, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, The Conscience of a Court, 63 U. Miami L.
Rev. 431 (2009) (noting the author’s vigorous criticisms of the Resegregation Cases arguing that the Supreme Court is serving as the judicial arm of
the “movement conservative” effort to dismantle the New Deal welfare state);
Girardeau A. Spann, Disintegration, 46 U. Louisville L. Rev. 565 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court is constitutionalizing school segregation).
252 See District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct.
2308, 2319-23 (2009) (denying post-conviction access to DNA testing).
253 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (discussing the European discovery of the land now constituting the United States, the conquest of
indigenous Indian inhabitants, and divesting Indians of title to that land).
254 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
255 See id. at 407 (holding that blacks could not be citizens within the meaning
of the United States Constitution for purposes of establishing diversity jurisdiction and invalidating congressional statute enacted to limit spread of slavery as
interfering with property rights of slave owners).
256 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (granting citizenship to blacks); cf. id. amend.
XIII (abolishing slavery).
257 See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 8-19 (1883) (invalidating public
accommodations provisions of Civil Rights Act of 1875 and imposing “state
action” restriction on congressional antidiscrimination legislation); United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551-59 (1876) (refusing to apply criminal
provisions of Enforcement Act of 1870 to Ku Klux Klan lynching of black
freedmen); see also Stone et al., supra note 106, at 453-56 (describing the
Supreme Court’s restrictions on Reconstruction legislation).
258 163 U.S. 537, 548, 551-52 (1896) (upholding the constitutionality of sepa
rate-but-equal regime of racial discrimination in public facilities by finding that
segregation did not constitute unconstitutional discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause).
259 See Michael Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Sup
 reme
Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality 61-97, 135-70 (2004) (discussing formal minority victories in the Supreme Court that made little practical
difference in preventing actual discrimination).
260 See id. at 117-35 (discussing formal minority victories in the criminal justice
system that had little practical consequence in preventing discrimination).
261 323 U.S. 214, 215-19 (1944) (upholding the World War II exclusion order
that led to Japanese American internment).
262 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954) (rejecting the
separate-but-equal doctrine and declaring official school segregation to be
unconstitutional).
263 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (tempering
the effect of Brown by declining to order immediate school desegregation and
instead requiring desegregation “with all deliberate speed”); see also Stone et
al., supra note 106, at 473-79 (discussing delay in implementation of Brown).
264 See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208-09 (1973) (adopting
expansive interpretation of de jure segregation, but reaffirming the prohibition of race-conscious remedies to eliminate de facto segregation); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1971); cf., Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976) (reading the Equal Protection Clause
to permit racially disparate impact that is not directly caused by intentional
discrimination); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 732-36, 744-47 (1974)
(refusing to allow inter-district judicial remedies for de facto school segregation,
thereby permitting suburban schools to remain predominantly white and innercity schools to remain overwhelmingly minority); see also Stone et al., supra
note 106, at 479-88 (discussing the current de facto school segregation).
265 350 U.S. 891, 891 (1955) (per curiam) (considering the constitutionality of
aVirginia miscegenation statute that was upheld by the Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals, vacating the Virginia decision, and remanding for clarification of the
record); Naim v. Naim, 90 S.E.2d 849, 850 (Va. 1956) (per curiam) (reaffirming
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its earlier decision and refusing to clarify the record); Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S.
985, 985 (1956) (per curiam) (declining to recall or amend the mandate, finding that the constitutional question had not been “properly presented,” which
allowed the Virginia Court’s decision to remain in effect). Because the neutrality
principle announced in Brown seemed to make the Virginia miscegenation
statute unconstitutional, and because the Supreme Court’s failure to resolve
Naim on the merits also seemed to violate a federal statute giving the Supreme
Court mandatory jurisdiction over the case, the Supreme Court’s actions in
Naim have been vigorously criticized. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, The Subtle
Vices of the “Passive Virtues”–A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1964) (“[T]here are very few dismissals
similarly indefensible in law.”); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 34 (1959) (noting that dismissal of the
miscegenation case was “wholly without basis in the law”). The Supreme Court
ultimately invalidated the Virginia miscegenation statute as a manifestation of
white supremacy eleven years later in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6, 11-12
(1967), when only sixteen states still had miscegenation statutes on the books.
266 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 293-95, 307
(1978) (controlling opinion of Powell, J.) (reading Brown to prohibit affirmative
action that benefits racial minorities at the expense of whites); see also Spann,
supra note 99, at 156-89 (discussing affirmative action and redistricting cases).
267 See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-05 (1857).
268 See id. at 407.
269 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673-77, 2681 (2009) (depicting white firefighters as victims, and minority firefighters as perpetrators of
discrimination).
270 See id. at 2664-65, 2672, 2673-77 (finding conflict between the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title VII, and adopting a
“strong basis in evidence standard” to give primacy to the disparate-treatment
provision).
271 See supra text accompanying notes 262-264 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
failure to enforce Brown).
272 See supra text accompanying notes 241-251 (discussing the Resegregation
Cases).
273 See Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504,
2511-13 (2009) (suggesting that Section 5 would now be unconstitutional);
id. at 2519 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part) (“[t]he Court quite properly alerts Congress that § 5 tests the outer
boundaries of its Fifteenth Amendment enforcement authority and may not be
constitutional.”).
274 See id. at 2508-10.
275 See, e.g., Ronald W. Walters, Freedom Is Not Enough: Black Vote
 rs,
Black Candidates, and American Presidential Politics 96-105, 180-81
(2007) (discussing black disenfranchisement in recent presidential elections).
276 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748
(2007) (plurality opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
277 See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness As Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1709, 171015 (1993) (discussing white entitlement).
278 See Hillary Jordan, Mudbound 61-62 (2008) (conveying white
entitlement).
279 See supra text accompanying notes 267-268 (quoting from Dred Scott).
280 See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551-59 (1876) (refusing
to apply the criminal provisions of the Enforcement Act of 1870 to Ku Klux
Klan lynching of black freedmen); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 8-19 (1883)
(invalidating public accommodations provisions of Civil Rights Act of 1875 and
imposing “state action” restriction on congressional antidiscrimination legisla
tion); see also Stone et al., supra note 106, at 453-56 (describing the Supreme
Court’s restrictions on Reconstruction legislation).
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Update on Asylum Law: New Hope for Victims of
Domestic Violence
By
Sandra A. Grossman and María Mañón*
I. Meeting “Ana”
One afternoon not so long ago, we met “Ana,” a young
woman from El Salvador. At the age of 14, Ana met and formed
a “relationship” with a 43-year-old man who would later become
the father of her two daughters. “He was nice in the beginning,”
Ana recounted, but then one day he got jealous and beat her. In
fact, he beat her several times that night. The beatings grew more
vicious, continuing for more than a decade, and often occurring
in the presence of their two young daughters. “You can never
leave me,” he would tell her, “you belong to me.”
Ana sought the help of local police and the courts, but
to no avail. Her family and friends knew of the abuse, but no one
did anything to stop it. Ana knew she must leave or risk losing her
life and the lives of her children. Ana decided to make the long
and treacherous journey to the United States, and with our help,
recently applied for asylum before the U.S. Executive Office of
Immigration Review (EOIR) based on fear of continued persecution and abuse if returned to El Salvador. Thanks to a recent
change in policy by the Obama administration, Ana, and others
like her, have a chance at obtaining asylum and rescuing themselves and their families from further abuse.

II. Domestic Violence-Based Asylum Claims: Once
Hopeless, Now Hopeful?
Asylum is available to an alien physically present in the
U.S. who can establish himself/herself to be a refugee according to section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA).1 To qualify as a refugee, an applicant for asylum must
show that he or she has suffered persecution in the past or has a
well-founded fear of persecution in the future on account of at
least one of five protected grounds: race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.2 A
request for asylum may be based on past persecution, as well as
a well-founded fear of future persecution.3
The term “well-founded fear” was defined by the
Supreme Court as containing an objective and a subjective component referring to, respectively, the known country conditions
and the applicant’s own beliefs.4 A foreign national “possesses
a well-founded fear of persecution if a reasonable person in her
circumstances would fear persecution if she were to be returned
to her native country.”5 Quantitatively stated, an applicant’s fear
is well-founded if there is as little as a 10 percent chance of the
feared event happening.6 Yet, practically speaking, at least once
before an immigration judge, applicants are often forced prove
their cases beyond a shadow of a doubt.7 Asylum applicants must
show that relocation within their own country is either not an
option or would not protect them from persecution.8 Finally, the
persecution must be by the government or by a persecutor which
the government is unwilling or unable to control.9
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Domestic violence victims seeking asylum in the U.S.
often assert their fear of persecution on account of membership in a social group. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
defined this ground as persecution “that is directed toward an
individual who is a member of a group of persons all of whom
share a common, immutable characteristic…that the members
of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to
change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or
consciences.”10 Subsequent BIA decisions further qualified the
definition of social group, requiring that “the group have particular and well-defined boundaries, and that it possess a recognized
level of social visibility.11 The “social visibility”12 and “particularity” requirements further support the idea that to qualify for
asylum, victims must show they are persecuted because of an
immutable characteristic known to their persecutor.
Whether a battered woman may be a member of a cognizable social group has been a subject of much contention, as
reflected in the Department of Homeland Security’s nine year
delay in producing regulations or an authoritative precedent on
the issue.13 In Matter of R-A-, first heard in 1996, the BIA analyzed an asylum claim involving a young woman from Guatemala, Rody Alvarado, who suffered horrific domestic abuse at
the hands of her husband.14 Ms. Alvarado applied for asylum
on account of her membership in a particular social group and
political opinion, specifically, “Guatemalan women who have
been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions,
who believe that women are to live under male domination.”15
In 1999, the BIA denied Ms. Alvarado asylum, finding she was
not a part of a cognizable social group and that her persecution
was not on account of her political opinion.16 The BIA’s decision was subsequently reviewed by several attorney generals, and
recently came before the BIA for entry of a new decision. This
time, lawyers for the Department of Homeland Security have
recommended asylum for this horribly abused woman, virtually
guaranteeing the entry of a grant of asylum.17

III. Defining Ana’s Social Group: The Key to a
Successful Asylum Claim
The decision to recommend asylum in Ms. Alvarado’s
case came after the Department laid out its new stance on domestic violence based claims in a related case involving an abused
woman from Mexico, respondent in Matter of L-R-. In April of
2009, DHS, now under Secretary Janet Napolitano, acknowledged
the difficult issues and challenges presented by the application
of asylum in the domestic violence context18 and recommended
remand in Matter of L-R-.19 More importantly for immigration
law practitioners and advocates, the brief provides a set of important guidelines on what a successful domestic violence-based
claim might look like.20 For the first time, the DHS’s brief opens
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the door to the possibility that foreign domestic violence victims
can qualify for asylum in the United States.21
According to DHS, a particular social group based on
domestic violence “is best defined in light of the evidence about
how the respondent’s abuser and her society perceive her role
within the domestic relationship.”22 The key is identifying what
characteristics the persecutor targeted in choosing his victim.23In
Ana’s case, for example, it may have been her youth,24 her gender, her economic disadvantage, and the fact that she was unprotected and vulnerable. Ana was 14 years old when she met her
abuser, who was both older and wealthier than she was, and even
though family and friends knew of the abuse, nobody did anything to stop it.
According to DHS, an applicant’s status within a domestic relationship is immutable where the applicant is economically,
socially, or physically unable to leave the abusive relationship,
or where “the abuser would not recognize a divorce or separation as ending the abuser’s right to abuse the victim.”25 Ana, for
example, because of her age, her financial dependence, and her
fear of retaliation, was unable to leave the abusive relationship.
Every time she tried to escape, her family would encourage her to
return to her abuser because he was her only means of financial
support and security. Even when she tried to end the relationship
or relocate to a different city, her abuser would find her and force
her to resume the relationship.
“Visibility,” another requirement for establishing asylum based on social group, may be demonstrated by submitting
evidence of country conditions related to the social perception
of domestic violence.26 It is not surprising that Ana’s family and

friends knew of the abuse, but did nothing to stop it, since 9 out
of 10 women in El Salvador have suffered from domestic violence.27 The fact that Salvadoran society is accepting of relationships between older men and younger women, even in cases of
abuse, made Ana an easy target. Finally, according to DHS, the
“particularity” requirement in social group assessments can be
met with the use of the term “domestic relationship,” since the
term itself suggests a certain level of specificity.28
We are tasked with showing that Ana and other victims
of domestic violence were viewed and treated as property by
their abusers, and that this behavior was deemed socially acceptable. Importantly, DHS warns against “circularity,” or defining
the social group by the persecution suffered or feared.39 In other
words, practitioners should avoid defining the particular social
group as “targeted for persecution because they belong to a group
of individuals who are targeted for persecution.”30

IV. Conclusion: Yes we Can!
Victims of abuse, like all other asylum applicants, must
meet their heavy burden of persuasion by providing testimony
and evidence documenting their statutory eligibility for asylum.
For Ana and others similarly situated there is no denying that the
road ahead remains difficult and long, and that the United States
has not traditionally accepted domestic violence based asylum
claims, but careful and creative lawyering combined with a keen
understanding of the law relating to social group-based asylum
claims, may yet change the landscape of what is possible.
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Annotated Bibliography: Who Can Help? A History
Lesson on Urban Relations
By
Daniel A. Broughton
Detroit has inspired dozens of books and hundreds of
articles exploring what happened after World War II and why the
Motor City has fallen victim to drastic spatial inequalities and
continuing racial segregation. From Joe T. Darden to Thomas
Sugrue, numerous authors have taken their shot at explaining the
declining of Detroit and what factors have had similar repercussions in other parts of the United States. New literature is published every year, and each new research design comes out with
the latest findings and statistics, trying to top its slightly older
counterparts. As urban policy expert Angela Glover Blackwell
has noted, “Fortunately, if America really wants to solve the problem of racial and ethnic inequality, it has a history of programs,
strategies, and policies to build upon”(116). I argue that before
we dive into the latest hardcovers on our bookstores’ shelves, we
must first look to the findings of past urban researchers to discover which policy schema have been tested, which have been
successful, and what is still left uncovered.
The study of Detroit’s urban and race relations may
be my particular field of interest, but the cornucopia of urban
research designs that flourished throughout the second half of
the twentieth century are applicable to sociologists, lawyers, and
advocates in major cities throughout the United States. Again,
before diving deeper into current theoretical analyses of and
policy proposals for American cities, it is important to review
what older research designs suggest for the varying perceptions
of today’s urban crises. Through reevaluating the related literature of the past 20 years, case studies of different cities’ struggles
over time may provide insight on effective solutions in light of
the current economic recession:
Blackwell, Angela Glover, Stewart Kwoh, and Manuel Pastor.
Searching for the Uncommon Common Ground: New
Dimensions on Race in America. New York: The American Assembly, 2002.
Sifting through virtually all corners of urban America,
Angela Glover Blackwell analyzes the constantly changing demographic of African Americans. With various maps and histograms
complementing the text, Blackwell tackles racial tension/race
relations as a challenge to the development of the United States
at all levels. Her data suggest that “racial justice” is becoming increasingly ambiguous and that multiculturalism must be
viewed as a competitor with traditional black-white typologies.
Blackwell’s examination helps to assess the national versus local
responsibilities regarding urban race relations.
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DeParle, Jason. American Dream: Three Women, Ten Kids, and
a Nation’s Drive to End Welfare. New York: Penguin
Group, 2004.
Jason DeParle’s American Dream uses a narrative style,
yet is lined with accurate depictions of the welfare state as they
intersect with specific events in his story. The book reads as an
oral history, capturing the conversation and tension of those dealing with welfare while maintaining households in present-day
Milwaukee. This micro-level chronicle allows readers to learn
of personal disparities that may lead to poverty and how welfare policies contain clauses that often discriminate against the
impoverished who are the most dependent on them
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Fortune. The Negro and the City. New York: Time, 1968.
This book presents a contextual perspective of American
business in the fight against racism in cities. Set in the late 1960s,
The Negro and the City was published by Fortune magazine and
was devoted to corporate America’s search for a solution to the
urban crisis. The project surveys African Americans as its central
methodology, asking them to comment on inner-city conditions
and their ability to find stable employment. In its conclusion, the
book suggests that a constructive future lies not in new laws but
in better attitudes supporting “colorblind” practices.
Gans, Herbert, et al. “Viewing the ‘Underclass’ and Ghetto from
the Top Down.” Journal of Urban History. 25.4, 1999:
583-593.
This review essay draws parallels and similarities among
five contemporary pieces on the urban poor of America. As the
title suggests, the articles in this journal approach the American
city from the top down, looking the intellectual and social contexts within minority factions that have been stigmatized by outside perspectives. Gans’ article, in particular, attacks the current
modes of urban planning, arguing that the working-class subculture cannot be neglected in today’s social policy considerations.
Gilbert, Dennis. The American Class Structure: In an Age of
Growing Inequality. 6th ed. Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 2003.
Dennis Gilbert’s textbook is a good reference for the
application of social theory to datasets and case studies. In particular, Gilbert introduces Karl Marx’s “class consciousness” and
Maximiliam Carl Weber’s “status considerations” and integrates
these principles into various American models and typologies of
social hierarchy. Most importantly, Gilbert explains the implicit
costs of class consciousness, such as prestige and association,
and how these outside pressures can be used to further define
status boundaries.
Jennings, James, ed. Blacks, Latinos, and Asians in Urban America. Westport, Connecticut: Preager, 1994.
Blacks, Latinos, and Asians in Urban America examines
the formation of ghettos in American cities, questioning how
enclaves of ethnic minorities relate to one another politically.
In considering social and fiscal monopolies in urban centers,
Jennings describes how different power struggles can encourage ethnocentrism in minority communities, provoking rivalries
among racial groups. The book appeals to an achievable “social
justice,” yet it recognizes the functional steps of ethnic identity
and acceptance.
Massey, Douglas S. and Nancy A. Denton. American Apartheid:
Segregation and the making of the Underclass. Harvard
University Press, 1994.
American Apartheid takes a public policy approach
to examining the dynamics of private ghettoization of urban
United States and the public regulation that legally advocated
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the segregation of cities. The Fair Housing Act presents a number of problems with law enforcement, including poor funding and narrow objectives. The book also takes a sociological
stance, researching the isolating effects of the ghetto and how, as
an urban microcosm, it is contained by both inside and outside
pressures.
Mohl, Raymond A. “The Second Ghetto Thesis and the Power
of History.” Journal of Urban History, 29.3, 2003:
243-256.
The Second Ghetto Thesis looks at the roles of government and public policy in housing projects and other forms of
urban renewal. As new resources and public housing communities are constructed, they take on the demographics of previous
residential options. Efforts to renovate the American city are hollowed out by the incapability to mobilize the urban racial composition. Mohl concludes that the model of a “second ghetto”
movement should have a strong influence on today’s civil rights
legislation.
Omi, Michael and Howard Winant. Racial Formation in the
United States. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 1994.
In Racial Formation in the United States, Michael Omi
and Howard Winant explore the aspects of nation and hegemony
that encourage the collection of a common lifestyle and, consequently, a definition of deviance. Hegemony promotes group
mentalities, such as morality-based conservatism, that must
maintain a system of ideas and practices; it advocates a “common sense.” The authors present five paradigms to answer how
racism in America has changed and survived, stressing the fluid
influences of class and gender interactions during different time
periods.
Reed, Adolph. ed. Without Justice for All: The New Liberalism
and Our Retreat from Racial Equality. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1999.
With a unique and crucial study, Adolph Reed challenges the abilities and integrities of America’s progressive
politics. Specifically critiquing the Democratic Party, this book
explains the successes of Reaganism and social hegemony in the
midst of a crumbling liberal movement. As progressivism opens
its doors to a wide spectrum of issues, its strength is dispersed,
and it loses power against a strong Republican coalition. AfricanAmerican advancement is especially vulnerable as it juggles the
included obstacles of political and gender relations.
Stokes, Curtis and Theresa Meléndez. eds. Racial Liberalism and
the Politics of Urban America. East Lansing, Michigan:
Michigan State University, 2003.
In this collaboration, Stokes and Meléndez offer a set
of scholarly essays to explore contemporary systems of privilege and oppression in America’s urban centers through socioeconomic and political typologies. The essays concentrate on the
entrapment of multicultural identity in the city, posing that factors of a “universal” social citizenship often conflict with “group
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differentiated” citizenship, resulting, historically, in an American caste system. The essays also look at specific case studies,
Detroit among them, to express the polarizing effects of metropolitan politics.
Street, Paul. “Urban Race Relations: ‘Everything Changed?’”
Hidden Continuities of Urban Racial Inequality Before
and After 9/11.” Dissident Voice. September 18, 2003.
Sociologist Paul Street views the domestic racializing
effects of 9/11 and how the downturns of the nation’s economy
and the semi-permanent war on terror have shifted America’s
policy focus to a hegemonic agenda. The article provides statistics of incarceration rates and annual incomes by race in light of
the 2001 terrorist attacks. Stree aims to expose the magnitude of
contemporary urban race relations, exemplified by the economic
recession felt after 9/11 that left many African Americans locked
out of the workforce.
Sugrue, Thomas J. The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and
Inequality in Postwar Detroit. New Jersey: Princeton,
1996.
Thomas Sugrue questions the conventional theories of
twentieth-century urban racism by looking at the racial violence
that flourished at the end of World War II, instead of attacking the
welfare reform and social programs of the 1960s. Like Detroit,
other major cities of the “rust belt” have also experienced postwar conflict, and Sugrue concentrates on spatial and social structures to explain the economic and racial disparities that limit the
freedom and mobility of urban minorities.

Taylor, Henry Louis and Walter Hill. eds. Historical Roots of the
Urban Crisis: African Americans in the Industrial City,
1900-1950. New York: Garland, 2000.
Historical Roots of the Urban Crisis very specifically
exposes the history of the industrial city to explain modern urban
dilemmas. As American cities enter a more information-based
economy, African Americans need to play “catch up” in order
to compete with the new market. The authors assembled a team
of junior and senior colleagues to research different facets of
African Amerincans’ dependence on the industrial city and how
internal conflicts add to more widespread racism in preventing
class mobility.
Wright, Nathan. Black Power and Urban Unrest: Creative Possibilities. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1967.
In Black Power and Urban Unrest, Nathan Wright analyses the Civil Rights movement shortly after its “completion.” He
gives specific anecdotes and presents group dynamics of only a
few years earlier, describing the Black Power struggle that chose
to form in the cities. Black Power, Wright argues, was perceived
as a new effort to “regain” a liberal democracy in the United
States. The conclusions in this 1967 book take a more liberal
stance than many of today’s platform: Black Power needs to support African American self-development and social citizenship.
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LEGISLATIVE UPDATES
By Rene Carballo

S. 21 “Prevention First Act of 2009”
Introduced by Senator Harry Reid (D, NV)
The Prevention First Act seeks to improve women’s
access to health care, specifically by increasing access to reproductive health care services.1 Congress introduced this legislation to expand women’s access to these services by providing
funds to states and other entities to invest in research, education, and preventative programs regarding teen pregnancy and
sexually transmitted diseases.2 The Act would require hospitals
receiving federal funding to provide, upon request, emergency
contraception to victims of sexual assault.3 In regard to health
plans and their coverage, this Act would prohibit the exclusion or
restriction of benefits related to prescription contraceptive drugs,
devices, and outpatient services.4
Senator Harry Reid from Nevada introduced this Act on
January 6, 2009 with 27 co-sponsors. After its introduction in
the Senate, the Act was referred to the Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions. The companion bill in the House
of Representatives, the Unintended Pregnancy Reduction Act of
2009, was referred to the committees on Energy and Commerce,
Ways and Means, and Education and Labor.

S. 424 “Uniting American Families Act of 2009”
Introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy (D, VT)
The Uniting American Families Act (UAFA) was introduced to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act5 to eliminate discrimination by the following: 1) permitting permanent
partners of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents
to obtain lawful permanent resident status in the same manner as spouses of citizens and lawful permanent residents and
2) penalizing immigration fraud in connection with permanent
partnerships.6
The Act defines the scope of a “permanent partner” as
an individual 18 or older in a committed intimate relationship
with another individual 18 or older in which both parties intend
a lifelong commitment. The individual must be financially interdependent with the other party and not married to, or in a permanent partnership with, any other person. The individual must
be unable to contract with the other individual a marriage cognizable under this Act and finally, the partners cannot be in first,
second, or third degree blood relation to one another.7
Family reunification has been essential to U.S. immigration policy for decades, but lesbian and gay families have
been entirely excluded from discussion.8 By introducing this
legislation, Congress intended to extend the U.S. Immigration
and Nationality Act to same-sex partners of U.S. citizens and
permanent residents. Under the current law, same–sex partners
are not considered “spouses.” Consequently, the current law
tears apart bi-national couples and their families. According to
the most recent U.S. Census, there are nearly 36,000 gay and
lesbian bi-national couples.9 As with opposite-sex couples, there
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are requirements such as providing proof of the relationship.
Furthermore, this Act would impose harsh penalties for fraud,
including up to five years in prison and as much as $250,000 in
fines.
Senator Patrick Leahy from Vermont introduced this Act
on February 12, 2009 with 20 co-sponsors. After its introduction,
it was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. Representative
Jerrold Nadler from New York introduced its companion legislation, H.R. 1024, in the House with 115 co-sponsors. After its
introduction, it was referred on February 12, 2009 to the Committee on the Judiciary and on March 16, 2009 to the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security,
and International Law.

S. 697 “Community Living Assistance
Services and Supports (CLASS) Act of 2009”
Introduced by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
(D, MA)
This Act was introduced to amend the Public Health
Service Act10 to help individuals with functional impairments
and their families pay for the services and supports that they
need to maximize their functionality and independence. The Act
increases families’ options for community participation, education, and employment. This legislation creates a new financing
strategy for community living assistance services to allow these
individuals to live in the community. It also supports the establishment of an infrastructure that will help address America’s
community living assistance services and support need and alleviate burdens on family caregivers.11
Senator Ted Kennedy from Massachusetts introduced
the CLASS Act on March 25, 2009 with five co-sponsors. It was
referred to the Committee on Finance. Its companion legislation,
H.R. 1721, was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. It was referred to the House Committees on Ways and
Means, Rules, and the Budget.
S. 909 “Matthew Shepard Hate Crimes Prevention Act
of 2009”
Introduced by Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D, MA)
This Act was introduced to provide federal assistance to
states, local jurisdictions, and Native American tribes to aid in the
prosecution of hate crimes.12 The legislative intent is to expand
the scope of the 1969 U.S. federal hate-crimes law13 to include
bodily crimes motivated by a victim’s actual or perceived gender,
sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability. Furthermore, it
codifies and expands the funding and investigative capabilities of
federal officials for aiding their local counterparts, particularly at
the behest of the Attorney General.14
The legislation was named after Matthew Wayne
Shepard, a student at the University of Wyoming who died after
being tortured because of his sexual orientation. Due to the circumstances surrounding Spepard’s murder, the legislation also
amends the Hate Crimes Statistics Act. Data collection and
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reporting requirements would now include crimes manifesting
prejudice based on gender and gender identity, as well as hate
crimes committed by and against juveniles.
Senator Edward M. Kennedy from Massachusetts introduced this Act in April 28, 2009 with 45 co-sponsors. After dying
in committee when brought for a vote by Senator Kennedy in
the 110th Congress, the Act was approved as an amendment to
the Senate Defense Reauthorization bill. Due to staunch opposition, it was ultimately dropped from the Reauthorization, but
President Obama indicated his goals to see the bill passed in its
original language was signed into law on October 28, 2009. Its
companion legislation, H.R. 1913, passed the House on April 29,
2009.15

S. 931 “Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009”
Introduced by Representative Henry Johnson
(D, GA)
The Arbitration Fairness Act would amend Title 9 of the
United States Code to prevent the enforcement of pre-dispute
arbitration agreements that require arbitration of employment,
consumer, franchise, or civil rights disputes.16 The purpose of the
amendment is to alter mandatory arbitration because it lacks any
meaningful judicial review of the arbitrators’ decisions, undermining the development of public law for civil rights and consumer rights.17
Senator Russell Feingold from Wisconsin introduced
this Act on April 29, 2009. It was referred to the Committee on
the Judiciary. Representative Henry Johnson from Georgia introduced its companion legislation, H.R. 1020, on February 12,
2009 with 85 co-sponsors. It was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and on March 16, 2009 to the Subcommittee
on Commercial and Administrative Law.

H.R. 3017 “Employment Non-Discrimination
Act of 2009”
Introduced by Representative Barney Frank
(D, MA)
This Act was introduced to prohibit employment discrimination based on actual or perceived sexual orientation or
gender identity.18 Specifically, the intent of the legislature is to

address the history and widespread pattern of discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity by private sector employers and local, state, and federal government employers.19 It also seeks to provide comprehensive federal prohibition
of employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
or gender identity and include meaningful and effective remedies
for any such discrimination.
Because there is no federal law that consistently protects
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals from employment discrimination, Congress invokes the 14th Amendment of
the Constitution,20 and Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution,21
granting it power to propose this legislation. However, this Act
shall not apply to a corporation, association, educational institution, or society that is exempt from the discrimination provisions
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Under Title VII, all
employers excluding the four aforementioned exceptions are not
only prohibited from being motivated by discriminatory intent,
but must also not use a facially neutral employment practice that
has an unjustified adverse impact on members of a protected
class.22 By enacting the Employment Non-Discrimination Act,
Congress would extend the protected class under this disparate
impact theory to include lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
people.
Representative Barney Frank from Massachusetts introduced this Act on June 24, 2009 with 152 co-sponsors. After
being introduced it was referred to the Committee of Education
and Labor, which held the first of its hearings on the bill on September 23, 2009.

Healthcare Reform
The Affordable Health Care for Americans Act of 2009
was introduced Representative John Dingell (D, MI) on October
29, 2009. The Obama Administration pushed for the introduction of the Affordable Health Care for Americans Act of 2009 in
response to the growing demand for healthcare reform.23 Earlier
in the year, the House introduced H.R. 676, the United States
National Health Care Act or the Expanded and Improved Medicare for All Act,24 to provide for comprehensive health insurance
coverage for all United States residents, improved healthcare
delivery, and for other purposes. This in turn led to the Affordable Health Care for Americans Act, seeking to expand health
care coverage to the approximately 40 million Americans who
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are currently uninsured by lowering the cost of health care and
making the system more efficient.
To successfully revamp the current health care system,
the Act includes a new government-run insurance plan to compete with companies in the private sector. It would require that
all Americans have health insurance, and prohibit denying coverage of those Americans with pre-existing conditions. In order
to fund the project, there will be a surtax on households with
an income above $500,000. The legislative intent behind the
Act is to help low- and middle-income individuals and families

purchase insurance. Despite mandating universal coverage and
disallowing discriminatory practices for health status or gender,
the premiums would still vary based on factors such as age, geography, and family size.
Representative John Dingell from Michigan introduced
this Act on October 29, 2009 with six co-sponsors. The bill
passed on November 7, 2009. Due to the pressing nature of the
issue, amendments and potentially new legislation is bound to
arise in the Senate during Congress’ next session.
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About The Modern American
Diversity is one of America’s greatest assets. It continues to reshape and refine our laws and culture daily. The Modern American is the Washington College of Law’s non-partisan, student-run
publication dedicated to cutting-edge issues in diversity and the law. It promotes a provocative,
fresh dialogue evaluating legal and social issues influencing minority groups in our country today.
The Modern American discusses America’s legal and social systems’ treatment of racial, ethnic,
sexual, and other underrepresented peoples from a wide range of political and social viewpoints.
Featuring a broad spectrum of stimulating articles by legal scholars and practitioners from all over
the country, The Modern American publishes submissions regardless of their political sway, social
leaning, or limitation to legal issues. To submit or subscribe to the publication for free, send a
“Letter to the Editor,” or request more information, please email tma@wcl.american.edu.
For more information, please visit our web site at:

http://wcl.american.edu/modernamerican/

Submission Guidelines
The Modern American accepts articles on a rolling basis. We will not publish articles over 50
pages in length. Please email all articles submissions to tma@wcl.american.edu and a cover letter with your name, phone number, address, biographical sketch of all authors, as well as a short
abstract of the article. Articles should be in MS Word, in Times New Roman, and double-spaced.
Citations should conform to A Uniform System of Citation (18th Ed.) (the Bluebook). For questions
of literary style, authors should consult The Chicago Manual of Style (15th Ed).
Articles or portions of articles already published may be eligible with permission. Please indicate all publications in which your proposed article appears or is forthcoming. Please contact The
Modern American with any questions regarding the eligibility of your article.

The Modern American Disclaimer
No portion of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of The
Modern American. The views expressed in this publication are those of the writers and are not necessarily those of the editors or American University. American University Washington College of
Law is an equal opportunity, affirmative action university.
Corrections: Volume 5 – Issue 1, Much Ado About Nothing or A Wake Up Call to Do Something
By Lydia Edwards, Esq.
Corrections to this piece will be available online January 2010.
Copyright The Modern American, 2010.
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Announcing
Progressive People of Color Caucus
n Progressive People of Color Caucus is a new initiative founded by students of color
interested in creating a supportive space for color-and-politics consciousness at WCL.
n We invite any WCL community member who self-identifies as a person of color and who
is passionate about the politics of race and ethnicity to join PPOCC.
n We intend to sponsor several informal and formal conversations about our guiding
principles and future activities through semester’s end.
n As a self-governed group that depends on individual contributions rather than a chain of
command we’ll need your involvement and input to sustain our vision.

To join our listserve, please contact

ppocc.wcl@gmail.com

